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The five essays included in this thesis are five empirical studies in microeconometrics, concerning
different but related themes. First, from the economic point of view, they cover three topics on
the labour market and on consumer demand. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the segmentation of the
urban labour market into the formal and informal sectors in Mexico, Chapter 4 and 5 focus on
female labour supply in urban Mexico and the Netherlands, respectively, and Chapter 6 is on the
households allocation of their consumption resources in rural China. Second, from the point of
view of micro-econometric modelling, they also touch upon several modelling approaches. While
models used in Chapter 2 to 5 are all considered to be limited dependent and latent variable
models, and simulated maximum likelihood is used as a common estimation methods, models
in Chapter 2 and 3 are dynamic and for panel data, and those in Chapter 4 and 5 are static
and for cross-section data. Moreover, the models in Chapter 2 to 4 are parametric in nature,
the model in Chapter 5 is nonparametric. In Chapter 6, a semiparametric model is estimated
using a kernel estimation technique. However, a common theme shared by all these papers is
the micro-economic behavior of individuals or households. The individuals or the families are all
assumed either explicitly or implicitly to behave optimally, given certain restrictions. Because
the other chapters all have their own introductions, this chapter serves as an overview of the
whole thesis and focuses on the relationships between the other chapters, and it will be brief.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we investigate the labour market mobility in urban Mexico. Urban labour
markets in developing countries are generally characterized by the presence of a large informal
sector. While formal sector employment is subject to regulation, social premiums and taxation,
with wages paid on a regular basis, and explicit contracts between employers and employees, the
informal sector is not subject to institutional regulations and mainly consists of small firms and
self-employment.
2                                                                                                                           Ch 1.   Introduction
Due to its significant effects not only on the labour market but also on the overall economic
structure, particularly on the issues of equality, efficiency and economic policy, the segmentation
of the labour market into a formal and an informal sector has been analyzed extensively during
the last two decades. Two competing points of view on the role of the informal sector exist.
The traditional staging hypothesis in the theoretical model of Fields (1975) is that formal
sector employment is rationed. Those who cannot obtain a formal sector job either search from
unemployment, or, if they cannot afford to be unemployed, work in the informal sector. Thus
informal sector workers have secondary jobs, and would be better off with a primary job in
the formal sector.  In this view, the informal sector functions as an intermediary buffer sector
between not working and the formal sector.  One of the direct implications of this model is the
wage dualism. In equilibrium, the wage in the informal sector is less than in the formal sector
for every individual. The fact that the informal sector is a buffer could also have some influence
on the mobility pattern between different labour market states.
The other view sees the two sectors as symmetric and competitive. The formal and informal
sector have different production functions, and heterogeneity among workers implies that some
are more productive in one sector while others have larger productivity in the other sector. Under
the assumption that unrestricted workers choose the sector where they are most productive and
can earn the highest wage, this model can be tested using cross-section data on individual workers'
sector choice and wages, see Heckman and Sedlacek (1985). Magnac (1991) applies an extension
of this model -which also accounts for the state of not working- to married women in urban
areas in Columbia. He finds that this model cannot be rejected, and concludes that the labour
market  is  in a 'weakly competitive equilibrium.'
Other empirical evidence on sector choice and wage differentials between formal and informal
sector is mixed. For example, Strassmann (1987) found that 71 percent of home workers in
Lima would require a considerable financial incentive to move to the formal sector (see also
Thomas, 1992). Pradhan  and Van Soest (1995), using  data for urban Bolivia, compare reduced
form models for sector choice in which sectors are ordered with models in which sectors are not
ordered, and find that the ordered model performs better for men but not for women. Using the
same data in a more structural model, Pradhan and van Soest (1997) find that wage differentials
between formal and informal sector tend to be negative rather than positive, and that non-
monetary job characteristics  (such  as job stability, social security, health care access,  etc.)   are
needed to explain why most people prefer formal sector jobs. Studies looking at wage differentials
for various countries -with mixed results- are reported by Pradhan  and van Soest  (1995).  for
example. These existing studies are based on cross-section data.
In Chapter 2, we explore the role of the informal sector from a dynamic perspective focusing on
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the labour market mobility, using quarterly panel data for five large cities in  lexico. We study the
mobility patterns among three different labour market states which are formal sector employment.
informal sector work, and not working. We analyze how these patterns vary across groups
with different characteristics and family resources, and between periods of econoniic growth or
recession.  We also discuss the extent to which our findings support either the Fields (1975) model
or the weakly competitive equilibrium view. We use a reduced form dynamic inultinomial logit
model for panel data with random effects, explaining the labour market state of each individual
in each time period. The model is a variation of the first-order Markov models proposed in
Heckman ( 198la), where 'true' structural state dependence and heterogeneity are distinguished
by including dummies for the one period lagged labour market state. as well as unobserved
individual random effects. The initial condition problem associated with this kind of model is
treated following the procedure proposed by Hecknian C 198lb).
The model estimates are evaluated using simulated probabilities of transitions for individuals
in different market conditions and for differeiit iiidividuals iii the same period. We find, for all
but lower educated men, that the probabilities of remaining in the formal sector are larger than
the probabilities of remaining in the informal sector, and that the transition probabilities from
the informal sector to the formal sector are larger than those from the formal to the informal
sector. Together with the descriptive statistics on wage rates, these findings suggest that for the
higher educated, formal sector employment has the characteristics of primary jobs, which are
superior to jobs in the informal sector. Informal sector jobs are held by those with low other
family income, who cannot afford not to work at all. This is in line with the staging hypothesis
in the Fields (1975) model. For men and women with low education levels, however, we find a
very different pattern, and there is no evidence that formal sector jobs are superior to informal
sector  jobs.   Thus  for  the low educated, the weakly competitive  view of Magnac  ( 1991) seeins
more  relevant.
A limitation of the model in this chapter is that the wage effect is not explicitly incorporated.
However, the strong education effects could reflect the wage effects. Meanwhile. wage dualism,
which is closely related to the labour market segmentation hypothesis, is not studied.
In Chapter 3, using (part of) the same data as in Chapter 2, we focus on wage differentials
between the formal and informal sectors and on mobility between various labour market states:
working iii the formal sector, working in the informal sector. and, for women. not working. Wage
dualism itself often associates with labour market segmentation, and is the direct iniplication
of the staging hypothesis. Moreover. by incorporating the wage effects explicitly into the sector
choice equation. we add more structure to the model. We develop a dynamic randoni effects
panel data model, consisting of a multinomial logit equation for the choice of labour market
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state. and two wage equations for the wages in the two sectors. The wages are included as
explanatory variables in the choice of labour market state part of the model. All model equations
are estimated simultaneously using simulated maximum likelihood.
The estimates show that the wages in both sectors increase with education, but the effects
of education are much stronger in the formal than in the informal sector.  As a consequence.
wage differentials increase with education level. The estimates also show that the probability
of formal sector employment strongly increases with the wage differential between formal and
informal sector. Using simulations based upon the estimated model, we compare the transition
probabilities for some benchmark individuals in different market conditions. These probabilities
illustrate the effects of unobserved heterogeneity, wage differentials, and true state dependence
on the labour market state. The main finding is that for the choice between formal and informal
sector of niale workers. both wage differentials and unobserved heterogeneity drive the sector
choice, while true state dependence is much less important.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we focus on labour female labour supply. The model used for the
analysis is a discretized structural niodel of female labour supply. The model is based upon
the framework of Van Soest (1995) and its extensions by Callan and van Soest (1995) and
Euwals  and van Soest   (1999),   but  we  take  a  different wage equation estimation strategy,   i. e.,
the wage equation is estimated jointly with the labour supply model. The model can be used
for the analysis of all sorts of (non-linear) tax and benefits changes. Moreover, the model can
deal with several other problems in estimation of structural labour supply models, such as non-
convex tax rules, benefits, unobserved wages of non-workers, and model coherency. The utility
maximization problem is solved by discretizing the budget set and choosing the optimal leisure
and income combination from a finite set of alternatives. The model is estimated by smooth
simulated maximum likelihood. Measurement errors in wage rates are also allowed for.
In Chapter 4, we analyze simultaneously labour supply and labour force participation of
married women in Mexico City. We aim at explaining low labour force participation of 1Ilarried
women using the above-mentioned structural model of female labour supply. Female labour
supply is analyzed taking the husband's behaviour as given. This is simpler than the family
labour supply model with joint utility maximization. The simplification can be justified by the
empirical finding in the latter type of models that cross elasticities of the husband's labour supply
with respect to the wife's wage tend to be small.
As usual in this type of analysis, we estimate wage and other income elasticities. Moreover,
we focus on the role of family structure. which is a potentially important determinant of labour
supply. Tlie study differs from previous work by examining one structural model, in which the
effects of the wage rate, other income, and family structure on labour force participation and
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hours worked are analyzed simultaneously.
We find that the overall effects of family structure on labour supply are limited although
significant,   with some opposite effects through fixed revenues  of not working and preferences.
Nevertheless, in the range where most observed wages are found, the presence of another female
increases labour supply of mothers with young children. These results are robust across the
different specifications. The married women's labour supply elasticities we find are in line with
those  in the literature (although these are often  defined and computed in different  ways):    in
our benchmark model, the uncompensated wage elasticity of average hours worked for the total
sample is 0.87, while the other income elasticity is -0.17.
Chapter 5 is not only an empirical study, but is also methodologically oriented. Nonparametric
techniques are usually seen as a statistical device for data description and exploration, and not as
a tool for estimating models with a richer economic structure, which are often required for policy
analysis.  In this chapter we show, using the example of labour supply model, how nonparametric
features can be built into a fully structural econometric model which is useful for policy analysis.
Compared to the framework in Chapter 4, the structural labour supply model is modified to
contain a nonparametric specification of the key element in this framework-the direct utility
function. The direct utility function is approximated with a series expansion. For a given length
of the expansion, the model is estimated by smooth simulated maximum likelihood. Basically,
we combine information in the data with two types of prior information: the nonparametric
assumption of utility maximization, and the limitation of the number of terms in the series
approximations required due to the finite size of the sample.
The model is estimated with Dutch data on labour supply of married females, for various
lengths of the series expansion. Estimates of labour supply elasticities and effects of a proposed
tax reform suggest that the results do not change much once the order of the series expansion
is extended beyond two, even though the second order model is statistically rejected against
higher order models. Monte Carlo simulations are used to show that the estimation strategy has
remarkably good finite sample properties for the size of our sample.  On the other hand they lead
to some concern about the potential bias induced by measurement error in the hours variable.
The topic of Chapter 6 is consumer demand. In this chapter, we analyze Engel curves for
several commodities in rural China using semiparametric methods. The aim is twofold. The first
is to examine the shape of the Engel curves, which is relevant for the analysis of consumer demand
and welfare. Studies on Engel curves in China are few, and Engel curves are mostly estimated
with data aggregated at the provincial level. Following most of the papers in this field, they
used  specifications in which the budget shares are linear  in log income (linear Engel curves),  in
line with. for example, the Almost Ideal Demand System developed by Deaton and Muellbauer
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(1980). Recent evidence, however, shows  that a linear Engel curve might  not be appropriate
for many commodities. Atoreover, analyses based upon aggregated data may be misleading if
relationships are nonlinear (see Blundell et at.. 1993). Aggregate data cannot be used to estimate
the impact of demographic changes or to calculate the equivalence scales.
The second objective of this chapter is to investigate the differences between consumption
patterns of households with boys versus households with girls in various age groups.  we want
to determine whether the commonly found boy preference in China is embodied in household
consumption behavior. In China, families have preferred boys over girls for centuries. But just
as in other countries, evidence for this is largely based on census data on gender differentials
in mortality and school enrolnient rates rather than on consumption data. For this purpose,
we compare the linear Engel curve specification with a semiparametric partially linear model, in
which total expenditure enters in a flexible way, while the influence of demographics etc. remains
linear. Since total expenditure might well be determined simultaneously with the expenditure
shares, we also allow for the endogeneity of total expenditure. It appears that for many goods,
total expenditure is significantly endogenous, and failure in correcting for endogeneity leads to
substantial biases in some of the elasticity estimates.
Our semiparametric estimates of Engel curves suggest that Linear Engel curves are not suit-
able for most of the commodity categories we considered. Particularly in the case of food, the
linear model is clearly rejected by our data.  We find significant indications for economies of scale
in consumption of seven out of nine goods. The variation in consumption behavior among differ-
ent geographic regions is also clearly shown by the results. We find that whether the children in
the family are boys or girls hardly affects the food consumption patterns. However, conditional
on enrolment, educational expenditures for boys in certain age groups are larger than for girls
in the same age group. Moreover, Probits for school enrolment suggest that boys have a larger
probability to go to school than girls of the same age. These findings confirm the documented
findings for other developing countries that the sexual bias often becomes apparent through other
channels such as lower school enrolment rates among females but not through consumption of
common goods.
From the findings iii this thesis, we can draw the following conclusions. First, although
reduced forni models are normally easier to estimate and require fewer assumptions, they are
not always coherent with economic theory and may entangle the effects of various factors. On
the other hand. given that the models are correctly specified. models with a richer economic
structure are based on sound economic foundations. They give a clearer insight in the story
and are often necessary iii policy analyses.  For example. both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal
with the problem of labour market mobility. but the model in Chapter 2 is of reduced form and
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that in Chapter 3 is structural. The estimates of the reduced model from Chapter 2 show that
labour market mobility patterns are strongly attributed by educational levels. however, from the
structural model in Chapter 3, one can see that these educational effects are largely due to the
wage differentials. Moreover, issues relevent to policy making such as nonlinear taxation and
fixed cost of working usually are very difficult to address without structural modelling. Chapters
4 and 5 also illustrate how these issues can be incorporated into a structural model and how the
model can be used in policy analysis. Second, the usefulness of parametric structural models is
often jeopardized by their strong assumptions on functional forms,  etc.. For example, Chapter
6 shows that the linear form of Engel curves is clearly rejected for some commodities. At the
same time, although nonparametric and semiparametric techniques provide a way of relaxing the
assumption on functional forms, they are usually seen as a statistical device for data description
and exploration, and not as a tool for estimating models with a richer economic structure.  In
Chapter 5 we show how nonparametric features can be built into a fully structural econometric
model. We hope these essays could contribute to bridge gaps between theoretical econometricians
and empirical economists.
Chapter 2
Mobility   in the Urban Labour Market:
a panel data analysis for Mexico*
2.1 Introduction
Urban labour markets in developing countries are generally characterized by the presence of a
large informal sector. While formal sector employment is subject to regulation, social premiums
and taxation, with wages paid on a regular basis, and explicit contracts between employers and
employees, the informal sector is not subject to institutional regulations and mainly consists of
small firms and self-employment.
The segmentation of the labour market into a formal and an informal sector has been analyzed
extensively during the last two decades. Two competing points of view on the role of the informal
sector exist. The traditional staging hypothesis in the theoretical work of Fields (1975) is that
formal sector employment is rationed. Those who cannot obtain a formal sector job either search
from unemployment, or, if they cannot afford to be unemployed, work in the informal sector.
Thus informal sector workers have secondary jobs, and would be better off with a primary job
in the formal sector. In this view, the informal sector functions as an intermediary buger sector
between not working and the formal sector.
The other view sees the two sectors as symmetric and competitive. The formal and informal
sector have different production functions, and heterogeneity among workers implies that some
are more productive in one sector while others have larger productivity in the other sector. Under
the assumption that unrestricted workers choose the sector where they are most productive and
can earn the highest wage, this model can be tested using cross-section data on individual workers'
* Chapter  2 is identical  to  Gong. van Soest and Villagomez  (2000)
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sector choice and wages, see Heckman and Sedlacek (1985). Magnac (1991) applies an extension
of this model - which also accounts for the state of not working - to married women in urban
areas in Columbia. He finds that this model cannot be rejected, and concludes that the labour
market  is  in a 'weakly competitive equilibrium.'
Other empirical evidence on sector choice and wage differentials between formal and informal
sector is mixed. For example, Strassmann (1987) found that 71 percent of home workers in
Lima would require a considerable financial incentive to move to the formal sector (see also
Thomas, 1992). Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), using data for urban Bolivia, compare reduced
form models for sector choice in which sectors are ordered with models in which sectors are not
ordered, and find that the ordered model performs better for men but not for women. Using the
same data in a more structural model, Pradhan and van Soest (1997) find that wage differentials
between formal and informal sector tend to be negative rather than positive, and that non-
monetary job characteristics (such as job stability, social security, health care access, etc.) are
needed to explain why most people prefer formal sector jobs. Studies looking at wage differentials
for various countries -with mixed results- are reported by Pradhan  and van Soest   (1995),   for
example. These existing studies are based on cross-section data.
Our study explores the role of the informal sector from a dynamic perspective, using quar-
terly panel data for five large cities in Mexico. This seems particularly useful since the staging
hypothesis model of Fields (1975) uses a dynamic setting, and has implications for the mobility
between sectors. We study the mobility patterns among three different labour market states
which are formal sector employment, informal sector work, and not working; and analyze how
these patterns vary across groups with different characteristics and family resources, and between
periods of economic growth or recession.  We also discuss the extent to which our findings support
either the Fields  ( 1975) model  or the weakly competitive equilibrium view.
Obviously, both views are stylized, and the actual labour market will share features of both.
Still,  many of our findings are  in line with the staging hypothesis of Fields (1975). Entry rates
into the formal sector are lower than into the informal sector for the low educated nonworkers,
showing that entry into the formal sector is more difficult for them. The probability of formal
sector employment strongly increases with education level. For men, it is easier to enter the
formal sector from the non-working state than from the informal sector. Such a result cannot be
found for women, since most women who do not work are not looking for work either, implying
that the transition rates from non-working to formal and informal sector work are low. The
probability of working in the informal sector decreases with the level of income of other family
members, while other family income increases the probability of not working. This confirms the
view that only those who can afford it do not work.
2.2. Background information on the labour market and Data                        11
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides some background
information regarding the Mexican urban labour market and describes the data. which are drawn
from the Mexico Urban Employment Survey. Two separate panel data sets are available to us,
each of which consists of five quarterly waves. The first runs from the first quarter of 1992 until
the first quarter of 1993, a period of steady economic growth. The second runs from the last
quarter of 1994 till the last quarter of 1995 - a period of recession following the so-called Peso
crisis. We present descriptive statistics on the size of the three sectors in each wave, and on
transition rates. We also present some illustrating figures on wage levels in formal and informal
i sectors, although wages will not be incorporated explicitly in our econometric model.
The econometric model is discussed in Section 2.3. We use a reduced form dynamic multi-
tiomial logit model for- panel data with random effects, explaining the labour market state of
each individual in each time period. The model is a variation of the first-order Markov models
proposed in Heckman ( 198la), where 'true' structural state dependence and heterogeneity  are
distinguished by including dummies for the one period lagged labour market state, as well as
unobserved individual random effects. We compare the results of a model in which the lagged
dependent variables are interacted with exogenous variables with those of a parsimonious model
without interactions. The initial condition problem associated with this kind of model is treated
following the procedure proposed by Heckman (198lb).
The estimation results are discussed in Section 2.4. Moreover, to interpret the meaning of
the parameter estimates, we use the model to simulate transition probabilities for groups with
various background characteristics. Conclusions are drawn in section 2.5.
2.2 Background information on the labour market and
Data
Mexico's Labour Market
After going through a serious and painful economic adjustment in the wake of the "debt crisis"
in the 1980's, Mexico enjoyed a period of economic growth. From 1989 to 1994, average GDP
growth was about 3.9 percent per year.1 Growth ended abruptly in 1995, when GDP fell by 6.2
percent in the aftermath of the so-called "Peso Crisis" The economy recovered rapidly in 1996
with GDP increasing by 5.9 percent.
A typical feature of the Mexican labour market is its low unemployment rates. despite a
i The  figures are based on World Development Indicators,  1997.
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continuously growing labour force. Since the 1980's, the official urban unemployment rate kept
falling, to 2.6 percent in 1991, and it remained below 4 percent until 1994 (see Fleck and Sor-
rentino,   1994). It increased  in  1995  due  to the crisis,  but  even  at the worst point  in  1995,   it
was still below 7 percent. In 1997 and 1998, it fell back below 4 percent and 3 percent, respec-
tively (see OECD, Main Economic Indicators, May 1999). At the same time, Mexico's labour
force grew rapidly, with an annual rate of about 2.9 percent in the 1990's. An explanation for
the low unemployment rate could be that official open unemployment does not include all those
who would be counted as unemployed by Western concepts, such as underemployed workers. As
shown by Fleck and Sorrentino (1994), however, the unemployment  rate is still relatively  low
according to Western standards after this is adjusted for.
Another explanation for this is the presence of an informal labour market, where a large
number of individuals have some marginal job. Two arguments for this second explanation can
be given. On the one hand, Mexico's formal sector is characterized by extensive labour market
regulations. Mexican Federal Labour Law (FLL) governs virtually every aspect of labour rela-
tions, such as minimum wages, limits on working hours, overtime pay, profit sharing, etc. It
was especially designed to protect the individual employees' employment security (see Hollon,
1996, and Zelek  and  de  la  Vega,   1992), and includes rules for termination of employment,  in-
cluding obligations of severance payments. In addition, the government places health and safety
requirements on firms. Hiring would be prohibitively costly for many small firms, particularly
those who are not officially registered, if they were to fulfil all the requirements. On the other
hand, Mexico has no unemployment compensation, so that individuals without (formal) work
are often forced into "marginal activities",  such as street vending, etc. Those who are actually
unemployed and do not undertake such activities are then those who can afford to search (See
Fleck and Sorrentino,  1994).   This  is in line with the staging hypothesis which views the informal
sector as consisting of secondary jobs.
Mexico has the lowest labour costs per worker of all OECD countries. Its average labour costs
are less than  25% of those in Germany  and  less  than  30% of those  in the US  (OECD,  1998).   The
main reasons are low gross wages and the absence of income taxes. Social security contributions
are lower than OECD average but higher than in countries such as Japan, the UK or Spain.
Data
The data used in the analysis were drawn from Mexico's Urban Employment Survey (Enctiesta
Nacional  de  Empleo Urbano), conducted by Instituto  Nacionat  de Estadistica, Geograjia € Infor-
matica (INEGI,  i. e. Mexican Statistical Institute).  This is a rotating panel drawn in 32 Mexican
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cities, and it is the only quarterly household panel survey in Mexico. For our analysis, we use the
data for five Mexican cities: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tijuana, and Ciudad-Juarez.
These five cities cover 60 percent of urban employment in Mexico. In the border towns Tijuana
and Ciudad-Juarez the in-bond industries concentrate. Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey
represent about a quarter of the entire population of Mexico, and half of the population of cities
with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, Guadalajara is the city with the largest share of
informal workers (See Villagomez, 1998).
Our first panel covers a period of economic growth: from the first quarter of 1992 until the
first quarter of 1993. The second panel, from the last quarter of 1994 until the last quarter of
1995, covers the recession after the Peso crisis. The survey provides detailed information on
the economic activities of all the household members older than twelve years of age, such as
employment status, employment conditions, working hours, labour income, characteristics of the
workplace,  etc.,  but no information  on nonlabour income.   Data  from the survey  have  been  used
to calculate the official open unemployment rates of Mexico. They have also been used by, for
example, Fleck & Sorrentino (1994) for the analysis of unemployment in urban Mexico, and by
Villagomez (1996,1998) and Calder6n-Madrid (1999) for studies of labour market segmentation
and labour market mobility.
The 1992 panel consists of about 2500 households in each wave, and the 1995 panel has about
2700 households per wave. From the two panels, four separate unbalanced panels of men and
women were created. Only those individuals who are present in at least two consecutive quarters
were selected.  We only selected men and women who are either the head of the household or
the spouse of the head of the household, who are younger than 65 years of age, and who are
not full time students. In this way we retained 1691 males and 1907 females for the 1992 panel,
and 1673 males and 1923 females for the 1995 panel. However, 269 males and 627 females in the
1992 panel, and 298 males and 636 females in the 1995 panel were excluded because information
on other family members' income was missing. Moreover, 18 males and 82 females in the 1992
panel, and 11 males and 79 females in the 1995 panel were left out because they are unpaid
family workers (see below).   This  gave the final samples  we  work  with.   For  the 1992 panel,  we
have 1404 men and 1198 women. For the 1995 panel, we have 1364 men and 1208 women. In
the 1992 panel, about 64% of the observations is present in all the five waves, and about 12% in
only two waves; while in the 1995 panel, about 75% of the observations are present in all the five
waves, and 7.7% in only two waves. The explanation of the variables used in the analysis and
sample statistics are presented in Table 2.A.1 and Table 2.A.2 of the appendix.
Until now, we have not precisely defined the distinction between formal and informal sector
jobs. According to the 1972 ILO Employment mission to Kenya, informality is defined as a "way
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of doing things characterized by:  (1) ease of entry, (2) reliance on indigenous resources, (3) family
ownership of resources, (4) small scale of operation, (5) labour intensive and adapted technology,
(6) skill acquired outside of the formal school system, and (7) unregulated and competitive
markets"   (c.f. ILO, 1972). This definition, however,   has  to  be  made more precise  to  be  used
empirically. Some authors have emphasized the small scale of informal activities, and use a
definition based upon size. Others have used survey information on the nature of the employment
relation (Magnac, 1991, Pradhan   and van Soest,   1995,   1997). A third definition which seems
less common in the international literature, is based upon whether social security premiums are
paid (see Calder6n-Madrid,  1999, and Martin,  1999).    We  compare the classifications according
to these three definitions. In the economic models, we will use a definition based upon size as
the benchmark, but also present some results using a definition based upon occupational status.
For the benchmark ('size') definition, an individual is defined as working in the informal
sector if he or she is an employer or employee in a setup with fewer than six workers, and is
neither a professional  nor an unpaid family worker. Professionals (lawyers, doctors,  etc. , about
5% of men and 0.5% of women) are categorized as formal sector workers, together with all those
in enterprises of more than five workers. Unpaid family workers could neither be categorized as
workers nor as non-workers, and are therefore deleted from the sample.
The alternative ('job type') definition is mainly based on a survey question which distinguishes
various sorts of jobs. Those who  "work for their own account," piece-workers, and those who
report to be the head of a firm with zero employees, are categorized as informal. Those who work
for a fixed wage, cooperative workers, employers (with at least one employee) and independent
professionals, are categorized as formal. Unpaid family workers are again deleted from the sample.
The two definitions do not lead to the same classification. For the first panel, for example,
57.4% of working men are in the formal sector according to both definitions, 12.2% are formal
according to the job type definition, but informal according to the size definition, 5.0% are formal
according to the size definition and informal according to the job type definition, and 25.4% are
informal according to both definitions. In particular, many workers are salaried employees in
firms with less than six employees, and are classified as informal according to the size definition
only.  For the first panel of men, for example, salaried workers are about 63.3% of all workers,
and about 13.8% of the salaried workers are classified as informal workers according to the 'size'
definition, but all of them would be classified as formal workers according to 'job type' definition.
Moreover, piece workers who would be classified as informal workers according to the 'job type'
definition are about 8.2% of all the workers, but about 60.3% of them are classified as formal
workers according to the 'size' definition. For the other panel and for women, a similar degree of
overlap between the two definitions is found.
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To  understand the classifications more precisely, we cross-tabulated in Table  2.1 the results
according to both definitions given above witli the coverage of social security services. Compul-
sory social security includes 'ISSSTE'  and IMSS' which  are the social security institutions  in
Mexico. By law, an employee in an officially registered firm should be covered by either of the
two. They cover a range of services for those who pay into either of the two systems (medical,
sport facilities, funeral services, child-care services for working women, etc.). ISSSTE covers
public sector employees. and IMSS covers the private sector. Until recently, these two systenis
also involved pensions, but this has recently been reformed. Other social security services thali
'ISSSTE' or 'IMSS' include, for example. private and voluntary insurances. Most of the 54.7%
workers covered by tlie social security services are classified as formal workers by both of the two
definitions. atid tliis is similar for the two definitions. However, about 26.4% and 40.2% of the
workers who are not covered by the social security services are classified as formal workers accord-
ing to firm size and job-type definition. respectively. Thus social security coverage corresponds
better to the firm size classification than to the job type classification. This also Inakes us lean
towards the firm-size definition. The reason that we do not use the coverage of social security
services as the criterion is that it seenis too restrictive and does not correspond to definitions
used iii the international literature. The formal sector implies more than having access to social
security services, for example, severance payments,  etc.. Some workers may only enjoy some  part
of their riglits regulated by the labour institutions.
Table 2.1. Social security and classification into
formal and informal jobs (%)
Social security Firm-size Job-type
fornial informal total formal informal total
11Olle 11.98 33.35 45.33 18.24 27.09 45.33
COIllpillsory 45.03 3.36 48.39 45.62 2.77  48.39
other 5.43 0.85 6.28 5.79 0.49 6.28
total 62.44 37.56 100 69.65 30.35 100
Because of the problems with measuring open unemployment and the small numbers of people
classifying themselves as unemployed, we do not distinguish unemployment as a separate labour
market state. We thus merge the unemployed with other non-workers. Table 2.2 shows how the
percentages of formal sector workers. the inforinal sector workers, and nonworkers evolve over
time. It is based upon the size definition. For men iii our sample, the fornial sector and informal
sector workers represent about 60% and 355'i of the labour force. respectively. During 1995. the
formal sector share falls from 61% to 55%. illustrating the recession. On the other hand. the
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informal sector increases  from  33%  to  36%. The number  of men without  work is small, but larger
in 1995 than in 1992. The employment rate of women in the sample has increased from 1992
to 1995, but remains quite low. During 1992, about 18% of women worked in the formal sector.
This increased to about 21% in 1995. The percentage in the informal sector is smaller. Still, the
proportion of informal sector workers as a percentage of all workers of a given sex, is larger for
women than for men.
The analogue of Table 2.2 using the job type definition of the informal sector is presented
in Table 2.A.4 in the appendix. It has smaller numbers of informal sector workers, in line with
the comparison for the first quarter discussed above. The pattern over time and the relative
differences between men and women, however, are similar to those in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. Sample percentages in three labour market states
Quarter 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 93.1 94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4
Males
Formal 57.9 56.4 58.8 58.6 57.7 60.9 59.9 56.4 55.0 55.2
Informal 35.8 35.4 34.6 34.1 34.2 33.1 32.4 34.8 35.3 36.4
Nonempl. 6.4 8.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 5.9 7.7 8.8 9.8 8.4
Females
Formal 17.6 17.6 17.8 18.4 17.8 21.9 20.6 20.8 21.1 19.6
Informal 13.6 12.5 12.1 12.5 12.6 13.8 13.9 12.7 12.1 12.8
Nonempl. 68.8 70.0 70.1 69.0 69.6 64.4 65.5 66.6 66.7 67.6
As a first illustration of the difference between formal and informal sector, Figures 2.1 and 2.2
compare real wages  in the two sectors (using  the size definition).2  We do this separately for those
of the middle and higher and those  of the lower education levels (see Table  2.A.1).  For  men and
women who received middle and higher education, the averages of the formal sector log wages are
always clearly larger than those in the informal sector. The sample standard deviations of the
log wages are similar. The higher average wage in the formal sector seems to support the staging
hypothesis.  For the individuals with lower education level, however, a very different picture
emerges. The differences in the means are small, and the standard deviation in the formal sector
is smaller than in the informal sector.3
In Table 2.3, the sample probabilities of individuals' transitions among the three labour
market states are presented. These are based upon the firm size classification. For both males
2The nominal wages are computed from reported monthly income divided by actual working hours, and the
real  wages are obtained  from the noniinal wages using  IMF  CPI  as the deflator (Source: Data Stream).
3Quantitatively similar results are obtained if monthly earnings are used iIistead of hourly rates.
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and females, the nonworkers have a larger probability to find an informal job than to find a formal
job, and for males, this difference increases during the recession. Moreover. the proportion of
male nonworkers who remain inactive iii the next quarter is higher in the economic boom than
in the recession. As shown in the table, the probabilities of remaining in the formal sector are
larger than those of remaining iii the informal sector, suggesting that the exit rates for the formal
sector are lower than for the informal sector. This does not necessarily mean, however, that jobs
in the formal sector are more stable than jobs in the informal sector. It could be the case that
job separations for formal and inforinal sector jobs are equally likely. The difference in sector
exit rates could then be due to the fact that the probability that someone who leaves a job in the
formal sector finds another formal sector job, is larger than the probability that someone who
leaves an informal sector job, goes to aiiother informal sector job. The mere difference in size
between the sectors might be a plausible explanation for this, particularly for men. Since the
data do not provide information on whether people change jobs or not. we are unable to compare
job mobility within the two sectors.
The sample probabilities of transitions according to the job type definition are presented in
Table 2.A.5. The transition rates into the formal sector are larger than according to the "firm-
size"   definition,   but the general patterns  of the transitions probabilities  are   not very different.
The size of mobility among the three states is quite large according to both definitions.  For
example. around 12% of formal sector and more than 20% of informal sector male workers in
1992 leave their sector in the next quarter according to the firm size definition. According to the
job type definition, these two figures are about 14% and 29%, respectively.
M.
Table 2.3. Sample probabilities of transitions
t=2 t-3 t=4 t=5
t-1 Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem. Forin. Infor. Nomn. Fonn. Infor. Noem.
Men 92
Forin. 0.874 0.088 0.038 0.884 0.098 0.018 0.880 0.093 0.027 0.871 0.099 0.030
Infor. 0.142 0.796 0.061 0.175 0.765 0.059 0.158 0.772 0.070 0.134 0.797 0.068
Noeni. 0.100 0.271 0.629 0.200 0.250 0.550 0.227 0.213 0.560 0.183 0.183 0.634
Men 95
Forni. 0.873 0.()95 0.033 0.841 0.106 0.053 0.864 0.083 0.053 0.877 0.084 0.038
Infor. 0.167 0.758 0.076 0.133 0.787 0.080 0.128 0.802 0.070 0.139 0.801 0.060
Noelli. 0.203 0.261 0.536 0.155 0.393 0.452 0.186 0.320 0.495 0.189 0.369 0.441 9
Women 92                                                                                                                  w
Form. 0.769 0.036 0.195 0.810 0.033 0.158 0.823 (). 059 0.118 0.826 0.047
0.128        K
Infor. 0.062 0.608 0.331 0.083 0.598 0.318 0.062 0.628 0.310 0.040 0.640 0.320        &
Noem. 0.033 0.052 0.915 0.033 0.056 0.911 0.041 0.052 0.908 0.035 0.050 0.915        v,9Women 95                                                                                                                  5'
Form. 0.817 0.052 0.131 0.863 0.048 0.088 0.853 0.022 0.124 0.813 0.064 0.123                   *
Iiifor. 0.056 0.681 0.264 0.058 0.639 0.303 0.064 0.636 0.300 0.063 0.659 0.278 :
Noem. 0.019 0.052 0.929 0.032 0.047 0.922 0.040 0.051 0.909 0.027 0.053 0.920 1
Explanation: number of transitions from labour market state in 1-1 (row) to labour market state in t, r
(column),asa percentage of number of people  iii  labour  market  in  t-1  (row).   For  example.                           8·
14.2% of all men who work in the informal sector at tinie of tlie first wave of the 92 panel work            2
in the formal sector three months later.
K
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2.3  Model and Estimation Method
To explain the labour market state of each individual in each quarter, we use a dynamic multino-
mial logit panel data model with random effects. This model is similar to the first-order Markov
model proposed in Heckman (198la). The model distinguishes between 'true' structural state
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by including lagged state dumnlies as explanatory
variables and individual effects to control for the unobserved characteristics. The individual ef-
fects are assumed to be independent of the observed characteristics (aiid therefore called random
effects) and to follow a multivariate normal distribution. The model is reduced form in that it
does not take into account the wage effect directly. Instead, the impact of wages is accounted
for indirectly by including education and age variables. The initial condition problem associated
with  applying this model  to a short panel, is treated  as in Hecknian ( 198lb).
More precisely. assume individual i  (= 1, , n) can be in any of J possible labour market
states  at  time t. Throughout the paper.  we  will  use  J=3:   working  in the formal sector  (j  -  1)
working   in the informal sector   (j   =   2),   and not working   (j   =   3). The "utility" of state  j
(j =1, . . . ,J)i n time period t>l i s specified as
V(i, j, t) - «'Cti j + Z:t7j + a,j -1- €,jt, (2.1)
where X,t is a vector of explanatory variables which includes age, educational dummies, family
composition, time dummies,  etc..   Zit  is a vector of dummy variables indicating the lagged labour
market state, and of interactions of these dummies with X,t .  Here we use two dummies for
informal sector and not working, the formal sector is taken as the reference state. The vectors Bj
and 75 are parameters to be estimated. aij is a random effect reflecting time constant unobserved
heterogeneity. To identify the model,  Bl,  71, and  ail are normalized to  0.  The €ijt  are i.i.d. error
terms.   They are assumed  to be independent  of the  Xit  and  aii,  and  are  assumed to follow  a
Type I extreme value distribution. Hence, the probability for individual i to be in state j at
time t > 1, given characteristics Xt. random effects a  's and the lagged state dummies, can beU
written as
P u 1 Xi t, Zi t ' a i l ..... a, J ) - (2.2)
exp(X tBj + Z,t"li + a,j)
E,=i ed:p(X,td, + Z'A, 4- a„) '
Let ai E (a,2, · · · ' a,J)'.  The ai are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution.'4
In other words, the a,J are specified as linear combinations of J- 1 independent N(0,1) variables:
ai  = Aqi.    with  gi - NJ-1 (0, IJ-11 (2.3)
#We also experitiiented with discrete distribiitions with a fiIiite nimiber of mass points, but this did not lead
to larger likelihood valizes and gave convergence probleIllt for more thall two or three mass points.
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where A i s a J-l x J-1 lower triangular parameter matrix to be estimated. The covariance
matrix of ai is then given by Eo - AA'
Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variables in Zit, an initial conditions problem
arises. This can be dealt with in the same way as in Heckman (198lb): for time t = 1, a static
multinomial logit model  is  used, with different slope parameters  and not including  Z,t·    This
model can be seen as a linear approximation to the reduced form that would be obtained if the
lagged dependent variables were replaced by their specifications according to the dynamic model
for periods earlier than t = 1. Although this approximation is not exact due to the nonlinear
nature of the model, Heckman (198lb) reports Monte Carlo results showing that this procedure
performs quite well for a dynamic panel data binary choice model, and the approximation leads
to a small asymptotic bias only. The specification of V(i, j, 1) is as follows:
V(i,j, 1) = X;l 7rj + 80 4- €ijl, (2.4)
where   7rj   is a vector of parameters   and   8       is   the  random   effect: As before, the errors   €,ji   are1/
assumed to be independent of all Xit and a,j(and 8,j), and of all €ijt in other time periods t, and
are assumed to be i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value distribution. The probability for individual
i t o b e i n state j(j - 1, .  . ,J)a t time t=1, given Xii and the random effects #i- 8,2, 70:J,
can thus be written as
ezp(Xi'17rl + 8,j)
·Pl (j  I X,1, Oi) - (2.5)Ef=i exp(XA,rs + 0,«)
Again, 7Tl and 8,1 are normalized to 0. The reduced form interpretation of (2.4) implies that
the random effects  8· · are induced by unobserved heterogeneity  in   (2.1),   so  that  they  will  be'J
functions  of ai. We therefore assume that  8:  -  (0,2,··, 8,j)' is given  by                                                                              
0, == Ca: == Bgi (2.6)
where B i s a J-l x J-1 lower triangular parameter matrix to be estimated. The covariance
matrix of Gi (Ee) is thus given by BB'.
The model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood.  If the random effects,li (or ai and #i)
were  observed, the likelihood contribution of individual  i with observed states j l, · · · ,j T would
be given by
Li('li) - Pl(jl | Xil, 81)P(j2   X,2, Z,2, ai) ·· · PUT I XiT, ZiT, Oti) (2.7)
This is straightforward to compute, since it is a sequence of multinomial logit probabilities.
Since the individual effects are not observed, however, the likelihood contribution will be given
by the expected value  of  (2.7)
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r°°      f°°Li =  1    · · · /    L,(77i)9(gi)(111,2 ' - ' dlhj, (2.8)J -Il        I -00
J-1
wherep(rli) is the joint density function ofgi Computation of the likelihood contribution in (2.8)
involves J-1 dimensional integration.   In our case,  J=3,  and various numerical techniques exist
to approximate the integral. We will use a (Smooth) Simulated Maximum Likelihood approach,
which also works for larger values of J. It is based upon the fact that (2.8) is the expected value
of (2.7), the expected value is approximated  by a simulated  mean.   For each individual, R values
of 7li are drawn  from  Nj_i (0, Ii-1 ),  and the average of the R likelihood values conditional  on the
drawn values of rli are computed. The integral in (2.8) is thus replaced by
1 R
Lf = # S Li(77i ) (2.9)
q=1
The resulting estimator is consistent if R tends to infinity with the number of observations (n).
If ni/2/R » 0 and with independent draws across observations, the method is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood, see Lee  (1992) or Gourieroux and Monfort  (1993), for example.
In our empirical setting, we used R = 30. To check the sensitivity of the results for the choice
of R, we also estimated the model for R = 20, and found little change in the results when we
increased R from 20 to 30.
2.4 Results
Estimates
We estimated two models. The first is a parsimonious model in which the interactions between the
lagged dependent variable and demographic variables, such as, age, education, and city dummies,
are excluded. The other is the general model without this restriction and with all interactions.
The models were estimated separately for the two panels, for both men and women. Likelihood
ratio tests show that, at the 1% significance level, the null hypothesis of no interaction terms
is rejected only for males of the 1992 panel.5 Hence, our further analysis will focus on the
restricted model. We present some results of the unrestricted model for men of the 1992 panel
in the appendix (Tables 2.A.6) for comparison.
5The X2 statistics for men of 1992 panel, women of 1992 panel. men of 1995 panel, and women of 1995 panel,
are  91.0,  42.6,  44.8, and 34.1. respectively.   The 1% critical value for  a X2 distribution  with 28 degrees of freedom
is 48.3.
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Presented in Table 2.4 are the estimates of the dynamic equations in (2.1), for the restricted
and unrestricted models, respectively. The estimates of the static reduced form equation (2.4)
are reported in Table 2.A.3 of the appendix. A positive sign of the parameter Bj or 71 (j - 2,3)
means that the corresponding variable has a positive impact on the probability to be in state
j  compared  to the probability  to  be  in the formal sector (the reference state). Most parameter
estimates are similar for the two time periods. According to the restricted model, age plays a
significant role in that the young and the elderly are more likely not to be employed. Compared to
the ones who received lower education  (both  men and women), higher educated persons  were less
likely to be in the informal sector or not to be employed. For women, having younger children
reduces the probability to work, both in the formal and the informal sector. The number of
children does not affect the men's behavior. The impact of these demographic variables is also in
line with the common findings in the literature. The regional dummies are mostly insignificant
for the 1992 panel, but for the 1995 panel, when the general market conditions were worse in
most of the country, the picture changed. In the city of Guadalajara, where the informal sector
was the largest, men were more likely to be in the informal sector or not employed than in
Mexico City. Women in the border cities of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana are less likely to be in
the informal sector or not to be employed than those in Mexico City. An explanation may be
that in the former two cities, many Maquitadoras6 (in-bond industries) whose main labour force
are unskilled women are located (See Kopinak, 1995). These workers are classified as formal
sector workers. The products of these industries are mainly exported to the U. S.. The 30%
devaluated peso after the 'Peso Crisis' made Mexican labour cheaper and stimulated the activity
and demand for labour in the in-bond industries.
For the 1992 panel, the coefficients of the variable 'Othinc' (income of other family members)
corresponding to the state 'Informal' are significantly negative, which means that higher income
of other family members decreased the probability of working in the informal sector. However,
for the 1995 panel, although the signs are still negative, this is not significant anymore, although
there is no overall loss in precision in the estimation for 1995 in comparison to  1992.   This is
the case for both men and women. In addition, for the 1995 panel, higher income from other
family members increased the men's probability of being not employed. In the boom of 1992,
individuals with more sources of income could afford to search and could find desired (formal)
jobs, but during the recession, when the number of (formal) jobs shrank, they could not find
formal jobs as easily as before, and their probability of being not employed increased.
The positive signs of coefficients of the lagged dependent variables indicate that an individual
6'See  Martin  (1999),  for some institutional background information
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who works in the informal sector is more likely not to be employed in the next quarter than a
similar individual who held a formal sector job, and that a nonworker has a larger probability
to enter the informal sector than a formal sector worker. The variances and the covariances of
the random effects are in the last part of Table 2.4. The results show that the random effects
always play a significant role and contribute more to the state choice than the idiosyncratic errors
(which, by normalization, all have variance *2/6). Moreover, the two individual heterogeneity
terms are positively correlated.
Our findings with the unrestricted model are not very different. Taking into account the
interaction effects, the overall profile does not change much, but the parameters (particularly the
interaction terms) are estimated with less precision. In Table 2.A.6. we present the estimates
of the unrestricted model for nien of the 1992 panel.  Only the interactions of lagged dependent
variables with city dummies are included, because other interaction terms (including, perhaps
surprisingly, interactions with education level dummies) do not play a significant role. In 1992,
compared to those in Mexico City, men in Tijuana, Ciudad-Juarez. or Guadalajara are less likely
to have a formal sector job, but the informal sector workers in these cities are significantly more
likely to find a formal sector job in the next quarter than in Mexico City, and the inactive
individuals in the two border towns are also more likely to find a formal sector job in the next
quarter. The dynamic effects in this model are not so easy to interpret. We willlook at simulated
transition probabilities in the next section.
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Table 2.4. Estimates of the restricted model -dynamic equation
1992 Panel 1995 Panel
 Ien Woinen Men Women
Parani. hifor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem.
31
Const. -0.513 -1.677 -4.816* -2.164** -1.845 0.095 -1.476 2.381**
Age -0.033 -0.142* 0.140** -0.129** -0.007 -0.201* -0.027 -0.174*
Age2 0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.003* 0.001 0.003*
Child 0.163 -0.173 0.157 0.545* -0.094 -0.129 0.159 0.390*
A dults -0.089 -0.008 0.093 0.087 0.172* 0.144* 0.140 0.022
Afedu -0.960* -0.304 -1.199* -0.967* -1.427* -1.071* -1.634* -1.152*
Hedu -3.058* -1.459* -1.904* -2.279* -2.387* -1.584* -2.092* -2.375*
Othinc -0.040** 0.038 -0.073** 0.022 -0.011 0.050** -0.053 0.059
JuaTij 0.016 0.176 -0.453** 0.134 -0.185 -0.368** -0.586** -0.534*
Guada 0.065 0.219 0.011 -0.089 0.763* 0.849* 0.119 0.126
Mont. -0.193 -0.015 0.001 0.042 -0.466* -0.360 0.420 0.195
Nmar -0.149 1.395* 0.050 -1.958* 0.132 1.319* -0.307 -1.949*
TY -0.141 -0.401** -0.140 -0.201 0.397* 0.452* -0.379 -0.273
T# -0.213 -0.225 -0.104 -0.270 0.409* 0.528* -0.498** -0.324
T5 -0.085 -0.072 -().094 -0.154 0.414* 0.289 -0.136 -0.062
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Infor._1 1.238* 1.294* 3.901* 2.489* 1.437* 0.776* 2.322* 2.027*
Noem.-1 1.161* 2.584* 2.856* 2.927* 1.738 2.081* 1.937* 3.492*
I.
4 9.686* 1.412* 9.121* 6.400*
0 2.920* 3.489* 3.121* 3.762*
023 3.954* 0.610 4.517* 3.293*
Notes:
* Significant at 5% level: ** significant at 10 % level.
Reference state: foriiial sector work
 : variance of aij, j = 2,3: (T·23: covariance of a,2 atid (723
"Lowed'ti" ."Aks.   City' .  "Afarried".  " T2" . aiid   "Form._1". are the omitted control group dummies
Simulations
The simulations are conducted for the first two quarters. with individual characteristics fixed and
the unobserved heterogeneity terms (random effects) drawn from their estimated distribiltions.
The "unconditional" probabilities (for given characteristics, but not for given lagged labour
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market state) are the averages over the draws of the random effects, the conditional probabilities
- given characteristics as well as the lagged labour market state - are computed as the ratio of
two unconditional probabilities. 7 Specifically, for each of the two panels, and for men and wometi,
the average probabilities (over the randoni effects) of all the labour market states in the first and
the second quarter are calculated for two persons, who only differ in education level. Moreover,
the same characteristics are imposed for the individuals in both panels. For example, Table 2.5
refers to two individuals. who are both married with one young child. received higher education.
are 40 years old in the first quarter of each panel. etc. Standard errors of the proba.bilities are
estimated by repeating the simulations for a large number of draws (1000 draws in our case) from
the estimated asymptotic distributioil Of the parameter estimates. The results are summarized
in Tables 2.5-2.8.
Several things are worth to be pointed out. First, higher educated individuals (both nien
and women) not only have a larger chance to be employed. but are also much more likely to be
formal sector workers than lower educated persons. For example, the probabilities for the highly
educated male to be a formal sector worker are 0.77 or more, versus 0.57 or less for the lower
educated male. This can be seen as evidence that highly educated men are more likely to find
formal sector jobs.
Second. for men of both education levels. the probability to enter the formal sector is larger for
the non-employed than for infornial sector workers. This is in line with the notion that it is easier
to search for a formal sector job from non-employment than from informal sector employment,
which is one of the assumptions underlying the staging hypothesis. On the other hand. it could
also mean that some informal sector workers are not looking for a formal sector job.
Third, a salient difference between the transition patterns for men in the two panels, is that
the transition rates from formal and informal sector into non-employment are larger for the
second than for the first panel. This is the case for men with low as well as high education. This
result could reHect higher lay-off rates during the recession, combined with the fact that some of
those who are laid off do not immediately find different employment in either sector.
Fourth, the transition rates from non-employment into the formal sector are larger than those
into the informal sector for the higher educated men. but given the large estimated standard
errors, they are not significantly different for either panel. However, for lower educated men
the transition rates froni 11011-employment into the forinal sector are smaller than those into the
informal sector, and in the second panel. this difference is even significant despite the imprecise
estimates. Given the relative sizes of the two sectors in both markets for the higher educated
7This implies that the conditional probability is the weighted average of the conditional probabilities for given
valite of (¥,. where the weights are posterior weights given the lagged labo,ir Illarket state.
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(0.779:0.196 in the first panel) and lower educated men (0.573:0.402 in the first panel), the
estimates suggest that it is easier to find jobs iii the informal sector than iii the formal sector for
both higher educated and lower educated non-workers. This is concordant with the assumption
that the entry of the formal sector is more restricted. Moreover, the transition rate from non-
employment into the informal sector is higher in the second panel, though this result is not
significant. While the estimated transition rate from non-employment into the formal sector
hardly changes for men with high education levels between the two panels, it falls substantially
for the low educated. The reason could be that during the recession, excess labour supply allows
firms to hire mainly skilled workers. Again, however, this result is insignificant, due to the small
numbers of non-employed men.
For highly educated females, the estimates sliow the same pattern as for highly educated
males, althozigh the standard errors are much larger, due to the small number of observations in
this category. Few women with high education level work in the informal sector. The probability
to stop working is quite high for informal sector workers. There are no larger differences between
the two time periods.  For low educated women, the probabilities of formal and informal sector
work are almost the sallie.  Given this and the fact that the probabilities of remaining in the
formal sector (for exainple. 0.766 in the first panel) are larger than those of remaining in the
informal sector   ( for example,   0.541   in the first panel), we conclude that formal sector   work   is
more stable than informal sector work.  For the higher educated females. the transition rates
into the formal sector from non-employment are the same as the corresponding rates into the
informal sector; but for the lower educated females, they are significantly smaller than those into
the informal sector. Surprisingly. the probabilities to stay in the same sector are larger during
the recession than during the upswing of the business cycle. In particular, transition rates into
non-employment are lower during the recession. This might reflect the fact that fewer people
could afford to be without work.
In the appendix (Table 2.A.7 and 2.A.8), we also present some results for the model with
interactions (men, first panel). These simulation results are very imprecise due to both a larger
number of parameters involved and the small number of observations in some categories because
of the inclusion of interaction terms. Still, the picture is more or less unchanged compared to
the model without interactions. and the conclusions remain valid.
8Parallel to the analysis for men. ozie might draw the conclusion that it is easier to find jobs in tlie fornial sector
for higher ediicated feniales given the relative size of the two sectors.  But females 11011workers Collsist lilostly of
Iionpartici pants. hence the self-selection effect is proniinent here.
2.4 Results 27
Table 2.5. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(12 I jl)
A           t=l t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.779 0.782 0.926 0.062 0.012
(0.035) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005)
Informal 0.196 0.201 0.202 0.765 0.033
(0.031) (0.024) (0.046) (0.050) (0.015)
Not-employed 0.025 0.018 0.378 0.272 0.351
(0.020) (0.011) (0.090) (0.109) (0.139)
94.4
Fornial 0.797 0.772 0.926 0.059 0.026
(0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
Informal 0.184 0.195 0.188 0.771 0.042
(0.030) (0.020) (0.042) (0.047) (0.012)
Not-employed 0.018 0.033 0.392 0.336 0.272
(0.013) (0.010) (0.085) (0.068) (0.065)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.6. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2  I jl)
11            t=1 t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.573 0.537 0.841 0.135 0.024
(0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.009)
Informal 0.402 0.429 0.119 0.849 0.032
(0.037) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.016)
Not-employed 0.025 0.035 0.276 0.380 0.344
(0.033) (0.024) (0.078) (0.124) (0.158)
94.4
Formal 0.537 0.491 0.807 0.123 0.070
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.017)
Informal 0.433 0.434 0.117 0.822 0.061
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.013)
Not-employed 0.030 0.075 0.228 0.408 0.364
(0.017) (0.016) (0.085) (0.068) (0.086)
Standard errors in parentheses.
2.4 Results 29
Table 2.7. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(32  |  jl)
jt t=1 t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.517 0.453 0.808 0.026 0.167
(0.082) (0.062) (0.064) (0.018) (0.056)
Informal 0.075 0.078 0.110 0.581 0.310
(0.057) (0.033) (0.062) (0.120) (0.098)
Not-employed 0.409 0.468 0.067 0.053 0.879
(0.075) (0.060) (0.035) (0.029) (0.047)
94.4
Formal 0.487 0.448 0.851 0.028 0.121
(0.071) (0.068) (0.066) (0.013) (0.059)
Informal 0.064 0.076 0.102 0.616 0.282
(0.035) (0.028) (0.046) (0.090) (0.091)
Not-employed 0.449 0.476 0.059 0.051 0.889
(0.069) (0.070) (0.035) (0.020) (0.043)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.8. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females, lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(32  I  jl )
jt            t=1 t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.133 0.117 0.766 0.060 0.174
(0.035) (0.020) (0.086) (0.027) (0.070)
Informal 0.156 0.137 0.027 0.541 0.433
(0.041) (0.029) (0.024) (0.065) (0.064)
Not-employed 0.711 0.745 0.016 0.063 0.921
(0.048) (0.031) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
94.4
Formal 0.145 0.139 0.843 0.055 0.102
(0.027) (0.026) (0.074) (0.025) (0.052)
Informal 0.150 0.139 0.036 0.600 0.364
(0.036) (0.026) (0.022) (0.056) (0.058)
Not-employed 0.704 0.722 0.016 0.059 0.926
(0.045) (0.041) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
Standard errors in parentheses.
2.5 Conclusions
We have investigated dual labour markey in urban Mexico by studying the transition patterns
among the three labour market states formal sector employment, informal sector employment,
and non-employizient. Mobility among these three states is extremely large compared to other
OECD countries. A random effects dynamic multinomial logit model was estimated using sim-
ulated maximum likelihood methods for two Mexican panel data sets covering non-overlapping
time periods. Our findings are in line with the literature. The probability of formal sector em-
ployment strongly increases with education level. The probability of working in the informal
sector decreases with the level of income of other family members, while the probability of not
working increases with this.
The simulated probabilities of transitions for individuals ill different market conditions and
for different individuals in the same period were compared. We found that for lower educated
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nonworkers, the transition rates into the formal sector are lower than the transition rates into
the informal sector.  This may be an indication that the barrier of the formal sector is higher
than the barrier of the informal sector. We also found, for all but lower educated men, that the
probabilities of remaining in the formal sector are larger than the probabilities of remaining in
the informal sector, and that the transition probabilities from the informal sector to the formal
sector are larger than those from the formal to the informal sector. For lower educated women,
this suggests that formal sector jobs are more stable than the informal sector, since the sizes of
the two sectors are similar for this group. For the other groups, the difference might be due to the
mere fact that the formal sector is larger than the informal sector, so that people who separate
from their job have a higher probability of finding a job iii tlie same sector if they are in the
formal sector. Since we do not have information on job mobility, we cannot analyze the stability
of jobs in the two sectors directly. Together with the descriptive statistics on wage rates, these
findings suggest that for the higher educated, formal sector employment has the characteristics
of primary jobs, which are superior to jobs in the informal sector. Informal sector jobs are held
by those with low other family income, who cannot afford not to work at all. This is in line
with the staging hypothesis in the Fields (1975) model. For men and women with low education
levels, however, we find a very different pattern, and there is no evidence that formal sector jobs
are superior to informal sector jobs. Thus for the low educated, the weakly competitive view of
Magnac (1991) seems more relevant.
Some limitation of our approach and directions for future research seem worth mentioning.
The first is that our models are reduced form in the sense that wage rates are not explicitly
incorporated. An extension of the current model to a more structural model in which potential
wages in both sectors are modeled simultaneously with labour market state, could be used to
investigate the role of the wage differential between formal and informal sector. The differences
with education level which we find with the current model, could very well reRect the impact of
the wage differential in a more structural model. A second limitation is the issue of migration.
Temporary migration to the U.S. is very common. See Martin (1999) for an extensive descriptive
analysis. Whether the quality of informal and formal sector employment affects this type of
migration, is obviously of great policy relevance for the U.S. as well as Mexico. Unfortunately
however, we cannot use our panel data to take migration into account, since information on
temporary migrants is not available.
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2.A Appendix
Table 2.A.1. Variable explanations
Variables Explanation
Child Number of children younger than 6 years old
Adtilts Number of family members older  than 11 years old
Age Age of the individual
Lowedu No education or primary school education(0-6 years)
Medu After primary but up to senior school education (7-12 years)
Hedu Univ. or vocational education after Senior school (12+ years)
Othinc Real incomes from other family members (in pesos of July, 1995)
JuaTij Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana
Guada Guadalajara
Mont. Monterrey
Mex. City Mexico City
Married Married persons
Nmar Single or divorced
Tl Time dummy:  1 if the first quarter
T2 Time dummy:  1 if the second quarter
T3 Time dummy:  1 if the third quarter
TL Time dummy:  1 if the fourth quarter
T5 Time dummy:  1 if the fifth quarter
Form. formal sector workers
InfoT. Informal sector workers
Noem. being not employed
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Table 2.A.2. Sample Statistics
1st quarter of 92 4th quarter of 94
Variables Men Women Men Women
Chitd 0.720(0.87) 0.660(0.85) 1.716(0.84) 1.711(0.84)
Adults 3.347(1.74) 3.287(1.76) 4.166(1.53) 4.104(1.60)
Age 39.740(11.42) 38.670(12.13) 38.843(10.90) 37.503(11.72)
Lowedtt 0.455(0.50) 0.554(0.50) 0.444(0.50) 0.530(0.50)
Medu 0.363(0.48) 0.375(0.48) 0.380(0.49) 0.391(0.49)
Hedu 0.182(0.39) 0.071(0.26) 0.176(0.38) 0.079(0.27)
Othinc 980.2(1657) 2373.1(2501) 1044.6(1719) 2524.2(3110)
Jita Tij 0.298(0.35) 0.331(0.37) 0.277(0.35) 0.321(0.37)
Guada 0.178(0.38) 0.147(0.35) 0.136(0.34) 0.084(0.28)
Mont. 0.205(0.40) 0.211(0.41) 0.240(0.43) 0.261(0.44)
Mez. City 0.318(0.47) 0.311(0.46) 0.347(0.48) 0.334(0.47)
Married 0.940(0.24) 0.830(0.38) 0.943(0.23) 0.817(0.39)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.A.3. Estimates of the static logit equation
the 1992 Panel the 1995 Panel
Men Women Men Women
Param. Info. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem.
TT j  ..
Const. 3.031** 1.960 -2.895 8.541* 0.980 -0.923* -2.549 5.771
Age -0.223* -0.360* -0.105 -0.367* -0.096 -0.267* -0.001* -0.216*
Age2 0.003* 0.006* -0.001 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.004*
Chitd 0.098 -0.373 0.307 0.679* -0.152 -0.138 0.935* 0.735*
Adults 0.014 -0.070 0.354* 0.271 0.112 0.139 -0.084 -0.119
Medu -1.115* -0.384 -1.621* -1.382* -1.768* -0.426 -2.745* -1.805*
Hedu -3.491* -2.745* -3.586* -3.471* -2.927* -1.445* -4.044* -4.096*
Othinc -0.060 0.026 -0.217* -0.075 -0.062** 0.052 -0.058 0.012
JuaTij 0.084 0.244 -0.591 0.675** -0.401 -0.137 -1.082** -0.767*
Guada 0.485 0.273 0.985 0.526 1.053* 1.516* -0.599 -0.596
Mont. -0.690** -0.872 0.217 0.191 -0.352 -0.149 1.144* 0.660
Nmar -0.822 0.375 -0.737 -4.086* -0.060 1.485* -0.770 -3.802*
T2 0.176 0.108 0.053 -0.573 0.034 0.478 -0.170 -0.449
TS -0.200 -0.581 0.664 0.676 0.999 0.434 -0.848* 0.705
T* 0.425 -0.852 0.657 0.667 0.832* 2.252* 1.206 0.506
ize:
 15.040* 8.365* 14.021* 21.965*
 6.831* 6.523* 5.212* 9.907*
I/23 6.400* 2.451 6.047* 10.655*
(1) * Significant at 5% level, ** significant at 10 % level.
(2) Reference group: formal sector workers.
(3) vf: variance of Oij,j-  2,3, 1'23 covariance of 0,2  and  8,3
(4)  "Lowedu",  " T2", and  "Mez.   City",  were left out as control group dummies.
2.A Appendix 35
Table 2.A.4 and 2.A.5 are the equivalent to Table 2.2 and 2.3 in the text, but using Magnac's
definition of the formal-informal dichotomy.
Table 2.A.4. Sample percentages of the labour market status
Quarter 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 93.1 94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4
Males
Formal 65.3 64.1 65.6 64.7 62.9 69.2 67.6 66.3 63.9  64.9
Informal 28.3 27.8 27.8 28.0 28.9 24.8 24.7 24.9 26.3 26.8
Nonempl. 6.4 8.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 5.9 77 8.8 9.8 8.4
Females
Formal 21.7 21.0 21.3 21.8 21.7 25.8 26.2 25.9 25.3 24.5
Informal 9.5 9.1 8.6 9.2 8.7 9.8 8.3 7.5 7.9 7.9
Nonempl. 68.8 70.0 70.1 69.0 69.6 64.4 65.5 66.6 66.7 67.6
gi
Table 2.A.5. Sample probabilities of transitions
t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5
t-1 Form. Infor. Noeiii. Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noein. Form. Infor. Noeni.
Men 92
F()rii i. 0.855 0.103 0.042 0.865 0.111 0.024 0.861 0.108 0.032 0.859 0.113 0.029
Infor. 0.235 0.707 0.058 0.281 0.662 0.057 0.254 0.678 0.068 0.198 0.723 0.079
Noein. 0.186 0.186 0.629 0.225 0.225 0.550 0.253 0.187 0.560 0.211 0.155 0.634
Men 95
Form. 0.847 0.118 0.035 0.845 0.100 0.055 0.842 0.104 0.054 0.868 0.090 0.042
Infor. 0.295 0.622 0.083 0.263 0.655 0.082 0.250 0.675 0.075 0.264 0.678 0.057
Noem. 0.203 0.261 0.536 0.250 0.298 0.452 0.237 0.268 0.495 0.243 0.315 0.441           0:.
Women 92                                                                                                                  w
Forni. 0.750 0.048 0.202 0.814 0.045 0.141 0.772 0.071 0.156 0.806 0.053
0.141        K
Infor. 0.099 0.527 0.374 0.073 0.510 0.417 0.176 0.527 0.297 0.132 0.505
0.363        3:
-
Noem. 0.035 0.050 0.915 0.042 0.047 0.911 0.049 0.044 0.908 0.045 0.039
0.915        2*
Women 95                                                                                                                  5
Forin. 0.822 0.059 0.119 0.837 0.038 0.125 0.827 0.035 0.137 0.814 0.053 0.133 -
Tr
Infor. 0.165 0.485 0.350 0.097 0.570 0.333 0.123 0.494 0.383 0.123 0.543 0.333 C
Noein. 0.040 0.031 0.929 0.049 0.029 0.922 0.041 0.050 0.909 0.044 0.036







Table 2.A.6. Estimates of the unrestricted model
(Men, 1992 panel)
Dynamic equation Static equation
Parani. Info. Noein. Infor. Noem.
31
Const. -1.304 -2.037 2.659 2.229
Age -0.012 -0.160* -0.215* -0.385*
Age2 0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.006*
Chitd 0.194 -0.158 0.144 -0.229
Adults -0.154* -0.002 -0.037 -0.030
Medu -0.980* -0.251 -1.126 -0.374
Hedu -2.993* -1.613* -3.428* -3.262*
Othinc -0.032 0.028 -0.052 -0.002
JuaTij 0.837* 0.845* 0.033 0.282
Guada 0.754* 0.927** 0.696 0.506
Mont. -0.162 0.499 -0.811** -0.803
Nmar -0.118 1.478* -0.758 0.276
T3 -0.140 -0.387 0.228 0.049
T4 -0.250 -0.263 -0.459 -0.927
T5 -0.139 -0.111 0.491 -0.634
7j:
Infor.1 -1.945* 2.133*
Infor. *JuaTij -1.833* -1.472*
Infor. *Guada -1.247* -1.499*
Infor.*Mont. -0.070 -0.884
No€m·i 1.436* 2.589
Noem. *JuaTij    -1.430**    -1.069
Noem. *Guada -0.508 -0.169
Noem. *Mont. -0.818 -0.386
Ea : 022 10.985* 17.683*
032 4.597* 10.679*
023 5.378* 10.793*
( 1)  *  Significant  at  5%  level; ** significant  at  10 % level.
(2) Reference group: formal sector workers.
(3) af = Var(aij), j = 2,3: 023 - Cov(ai2, ais)·
(4)  "Lowedu",  " TQ",  "Mez.   City",  and  "Form.", were
left out as control group dummies.
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Table 2.A.7. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(J2 | ji)
jt            t-1 1-2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.797 0.783 0.944 0.047 0.009
(0.060) (0.047) (0.042) (0.032) (0.028)
Informal 0.198 0.200 0.145 0.814 0.041
(0.057) (0.051) (0.111) (0.172) (0.114)
Not-employed 0.005 0.017 0.336 0.322 0.342
(0.039) (0.041) (0.182) (0.182) (0.227)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.A.8 Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, Lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob( ·12   1  ji)
jt t=1 t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.567 0.534 0.873 0.109 0.018
(0.044) (0.038) (0.053) (0.037) (0.038)
Informal 0.409 0.432 0.082 0.881 0.037
(0.045) (0.043) (0.040) (0.095) (0.078)
Not-employed 0.024 0.034 0.232 0.426 0.343
(0.043) (0.050) (0.146) (0.172) (0.209)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of the real log wages between the for-
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Figure 2.2. Comparison of the real log wages between the for-
mal sector and the informal sector (Females)
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Chapter 3
Wage Differentials and Mobility in
Mexico's Urban Labour Market*
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we investigated labour market mobility between the same three labour niarket
states using two panel data sets for urban Mexico. We found that labour market mobility is
strongly related to the individuals' education levels. There, we used reduced form models for
the choice of labour market state. and thus did not explicitly incorporate the effect of wages or
wage different:ials on the sector choice. Consequently, the strong education effects we found could
reflect the wage effects.
In the current chapter, we extend the model in Chapter 2 with wage rates. We simultaneously
analyse wages and wage differentials, and mobility between the fornial sector, the informal sector,
and non-employment.  We use five quarterly panel waves drawn in 1992-1993 from Mexico's Urban
Employment Survey. This is the same household survey covering urban areas in Mexico used in
Chapter 2.
The first aim of our study is to analyze wage formation and wage differentials, controlling
for selectivity bias due to correlated unobserved heterogeneity affecting wages and sector choice.
Second, by incorporating the wages iii both sectors or the wage differential explicitly into the
sector choice equation, we can analyze the importance of wages for sector choice and mobility.
Using model simulations, we study the mobility patterns between formal sector and informal
sector for men, and between formal sector work. informal sector work, and lion-eniployment for
Chapter  3 is based upon Gong  atid van Soest  (200()a).
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women.1 We analyze how these patterns vary across groups with different characteristics and
family resources. and distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence.
These results have implications for wage dualism and labour market segmentation, and the
validity of the staging hypothesis.  The main novelty of this chapter is that we address these
issues in a dynamic framework using panel data.
Both the staging hypothesis of Fields (1975) and the hypothesis of Magnac (1991) that formal
and informal sector are competitive, are stylized views of the labour market, and the actual labour
market will share features of both. Thus it should not come as a surprise that our findings are
mixed and do not unambiguously support one of the two hypotheses. We find that the wage is
the main determining factor for the individual's sector choice. Wage differentials between the
formal and informal sector are typically small for the lower educated. but increase strongly with
education level. These two findings explain why the probability of formal sector employment
strongly increases with education level. This indicates that for well educated workers, primary
jobs are to be found in the formal sector, a result which is very much in line with the staging
hypothesis. For the unskilled, however, the competitive view is more relevant. For men. the
probability of working in the informal sector decreases with the level of income of other family
members. while for women, other family income increases the probability of not working. This
confirms the view that only those who can afford to do so do not work, and is in line with the
staging hypothesis.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. As a supplement to Section 2.2, Section
3.2 briefly describes some additional features of the data that are relevant to this chapter.
The econometric model is discussed in Section 3.3. The model consists of a dynamic binomial
(men) or multinomial (women) logit model for panel data with random effects explaining the
labour market state of each individual in each time period, together with two dynamic wage
equations for potential wage rates in each sector. The model is essentially similar to the first-
order Markov models proposed in Heckman ( 198la), where 'true' structural state dependence and
unobserved heterogeneity are distinguished by including dummies for the one period lagged labour
market states, as well as random individual effects. The initial condition problem associated with
this kind of model is treated following the procedure proposed by Heckman (198lb).
The results are discussed iii Section 3.4. We discuss the wage differentials, and, to interpret
the implications of the estimates, we use the model to simulate transition probabilities for groups
of men and women with various background characteristics. Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.5.
1 IIi  Chapter   2.   we  also  look  at   non-employnient   for  men.    The   11111nber  of  non-einployed  men.   however.   is  too
small to obtai Ii useful estimates of the structiiral Illodel We COIisider iIi the curreiit paper.
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3.2 Data
We used two five-wave panels drawn in 1992-1993 and 1994-1995 in Chapter 2. We estimated
our niodels using these waves also, but found similar results as for the 1992-1993 waves. In this
chapter, we therefore present and disc ziss the panel of 1992-1993 only. The sample of females used
in this chapter is the same as that of 92-3 panel in Chapter 2 which consists of 1198 observations.
However, the number of non-eniployed men in each wave is so small that it would not be possible
to estimate the full structural 1nodel with non-workiiig as a separate labour market state. We
therefore exclude froni the sample used in estimation 94 men who were employed for less than two
consecutive waves. This sample of men thus has 1310 individuals. (Tlie 94 are used iii some of
the descriptive statistics in this section, however.)  The data are described extensively iii Section
2.2. In this section. we only present soine additional features of tlie data.
We observe wages for about 88.2% and 90.5% of the workers. for men and women respectively. 2
For nien and women who received middle and higher education, the averages of the formal sector
log wages are always clearly larger than those iii the informal sector. The sample standard
deviations of the log wages iii the two sectors are siniilar. The higher average wage in the formal
sector can be seen as prima facie evidence in favour of the stagizig hypothesis, since it suggests
that the formal sector typically consists of primary, better (paying) jobs. Of course we have not
yet controlled for other characteristics or selection effects. and we will come back to this issue
when we discuss the implications of our model estimates.
For the individuals with lower education level, however. a very different picture emerges. The
I     „differences in the means are small, and, for men, the average  raw wage differential between
formal and informal sector is negative in all time periods. The standard deviation in the formal
sector is smaller than in the informal sector, particularly for women. This suggests that the
informal sector is more heterogeneous than the formal sector, a result also found by Pradhan and
van  Soest ( 1995). The informal sector comprises marginal activities with  very low earnings  such
as street venditig.  but also highly productive self-employment.3 (See Figures  2.1  and  2.2  in  the
previous chapter.)
III Table 3.1. we present sonie saniple statistics on real wage mobility. i.e. on the changes of
individuals' reported log real wages between two consecutive quarters. We do this separately for
those who stay in the same sector and those who change sector. For individuals who stay in the
2Wages are constructed by dividing monthly earnings by working hours. However. about 10'k of workers did
Iiot report the,ir Illolithly earniiigs.
3We did  the saine exercise for the jol »type definition.   The pictures largely remained  miclianged.  but  for  wonien
who received higher and Iliiddle edi.ication ill a few quarters, tlie nieati wage iii the formal sector is less than that
iii tlie i]iforiiial sect()r.
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same sector, the mean and median changes are close to zero with the only exception of median
for men who stay in the fornial sector which is significantly lower than zero. For those who move
to the other sector, however, the results are different. In particular. for men or women who move
from the formal to the informal sector, the mean and median wage increases are positive, and
for   men the increase is significant.    This  is  also  the  case  for  men  who  move  from the formal   to
the informal sector. For women who move from the formal to the informal sector, however, the
average wage change is negative.
Table 3.1. Real wage mobility between sectors
t=1 Formal sector Informal sector
t=2 formal informal formal informal
Afen
Afean 0.009 0.097 0.039 0.008
Std.err.of Alean 0.014 0.045 0.049 0.022
25APercentile -0.277 -0.255 -0.404 -0.409
AIedian -0.019 0.108 0.038 -0.025
Std.err.of Afedian 0.005 0.038 0.039 0.016
75,1'Percentile 0.301 0.420 0.379 0.374
Obs. 1958 197 195 958
Women
Afean -0.054 -0.178 0.127 0.013
Std.err.ofAIean 0.041 0.165 0.149 0.050
25thpercentite -0.342 -0.516 -0.105 -0.432
Median -0.019 -0.166 0.049 -0.019
Std.err.of Median 0.013 0.176 0.082 0.020
75'1'Percentile 0.270 0.331 0.430 0.492
Obs. 574    31       32      319
The sample standard deviations of the real wage changes are huge. While this could be due to
outliers, the interquartile ranges are very large as well. Apparently, many people report very
different wages in two consecutive waves, even if they stay in the same sector.4 For example,
for about 25% of all men who stay in the formal sector in two consecutive quarters, the wage
rate in the second wave is more than 24% lower than the wage in the first wave. Although it
seems conceivable that wage mobility is larger in a country like Mexico than in richer industrial
countries in North-America or Europe, we think these large numbers must at least partly be
4This result remains unchanged if Iijoritlily earnings are considered instead of hourly wage rates.
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due to substantial measureinent errors in reported wages. It raises the question whether the
noisy wage measures should be used as actual wages in the empirical model, or whether the
measurement error should somehow be taken into account. We will come back to this in the next
section.
3.3 The model
To explain the wage differentials between the two sectors and the labour niarket state of each
individual in each quarter. we estimate a joint model for labour market state choices and wages.
We use a dynamic multinomial logit panel data model with random effects for the choices, and
two linear dynamic random effect wage equations for the wages in the two sectors. Wages
or wage differentials are included in the choice equations. Formal sector wage rates are only
observed in a given time period for those who work in the formal sector in that period, and
informal sector wage rates are only observed for those who work in the informal sector. This
implies that the choice model cannot be estimated without the wage equations.  The model
we  use  is a generalization  of the first-order Markov model proposed in Heckman ( 198la).     It
distinguishes between structural state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by including
lagged state dummies as explanatory variables and (random) individual effects to control for the
unobserved characteristics. The individual effects are assumed to be independent of the observed
characteristics (and therefore called random effects) and are assumed to follow a multivariate
normal distribution. The initial condition problem associated with applying this model to a
short panel is treated  as in Heckman ( 198lb).
The model includes two parts, the choice model and two wage equations. The wage equations
are specified as follows.
11111,tj = Att'vj + Di-irj + Aj + <tj,   j = 1,2 (3.1)
Here j=1 denotes the formal sector, and j=2 i s the informal sector. For notational
convenience, we suppress the subscript for individuals.  114 is a vector of individual characteristics
(including a constant term, educational dummies, regional duminies, time dummies  and  age).
Dt- i is a (vector of) dummy variable(s) indicating the lagged labour market state.  For the
model for men. it consists of one dummy for the formal sector (taking the informal sector as the
reference state). For women, it consists  of two dummies  for the formal  aiid the informal sector.
with the state of not-working as the reference state. The random individual effects in the two
wage  equations are denoted  by  Aj.   We  assume  that  they  are i.i.d. normal  with  mean  zero  and
independent of the exogenous variables.  The <tj are idiosyncratic error terms. assumed to be
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i.i.d. normal and independent of other error terms, individual effects, and exogenous variables.
vj and Tj are parameters to be estimated. We do not impose any cross-equation constraints on
the parameters of the wage equations in the formal and informal sector, so that the wage rates
are sector specific.
The error terms <tj reflect measurement error as well as genuine unsystematic wage variation
over time in a given sector for a given individual. These two cannot be separately identified, but
the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 suggest that measurement error plays a dominating role.
In the sector choice part of the model, wages or wage differentials will play a role. We want
to include a wage measure without measurement error, however. To achieve this, we will use
"predicted"log wages ln«j given by
1nwt· = AIt'l'j -1- Di-irj + Aj - 1nuttj - 03,   j = 1,2. (3.2)
We put "predicted" in quotes here, since the "predictions" still contain the random effects
in  the wage equations  (A ), which  are not observed  by the econometrician.    We  are now ready
to define the choice part of the model. An individual can be in any of J possible labour market
states at time t. We will use J=2 for men and J=3 for women: working in the formal
sector  (j  = 1), working  in the informal sector  (j  =  2),  and not working  (j  =  3). For notational
convenience, we define 1nwf3 - 0. The "utility" of state j(j=1, . . . ,J)i n time period t>l i s
specified as
1/(j,t) = XfBj -1- 4-17j -1- aj -1- plntuf, -1- €jt (3.3)
The reason for the quotes on "utility" is that demand side restrictions may play a role,
although they are not explicitly modeled.  Thus V may reflect more than supply factors or
preferences.    A low value  of  V(1, t), for example,  may  mean  that no formal  job is available  at
time t, even though the respondent could have a strong preference for such a job.
Xt is a vector of explanatory variables, including age, regional dummies, family composition,
time  dummies, etc. Educational dummies  are not included  in  Xt,  but they enter through  Alt
in the wage equations. Excluding educational dummies from (3.3) is necessary to identify the
model. The vectors Bj and 71 are parameters to be estimated. The aj are random individual
effects reflecting time constant unobserved heterogeneity. We assume that the aj are i.i.d. normal
with mean zero,  and are independent  of Xt  and  A.4.  By means of normalization, Bi, 71,  and al
are set to 0.
How attractive the various labour market states are also depends on potential wages. We
include the "predicted" wage rates as explanatory variables, with coefficient p. We assume that
the effect of wages on utility is the same in the formal and informal sector, implying that the
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utility difference between the formal and informal sector only depends on the log wage differential.
The €j, are i.i.d. error terms. We assume that they are independent of the Xt and aj and other
error terms in the model, and we assume that they follow a Type I extreme value distribution.
The random effects a and A are assumed to follow multivariate normal distributions.  We
allow for non-zero correlation between random effects iii different states. To be precise, the
random effects are specified as linear combinations of J - 1 independent N(0,1) variables:
a= All-, with, 710 -Ni-1(0·IJ-1) (3.4)
where A i s a J-l x J-1 lower triangular matrix. The covariance matrix of a i s then given by
AA' Similarly.
A = Bnx,   with 71X - 32(0' ·/2) (3.5)
where B  is a 2 x 2 lower triangular matrix. The vectors 71"  and  2/   are assunied to be independelit ,
so we do not allow for correlation between random effects in the wage equations and randoni
effects in the state choice equations. This seems a rather restrictive assumption. but it does not
rule out correlated unobserved heterogeneity in wage and choice equations. The reason is that
the wage variables  ln«j  in  the choice equations also contain aJ ·
Correlations between the idiosyncratic errors < and e are also ruled out.
The assumptions imply that, given characteristics Xt  and AIt . random effects a=  (a2,· · · GJY
and A: = (12, A:1)'. and the lagged state dummies. the likelihood contribution for individual i iii
state j at time t > 1, Lt (j 1 Xt, .114, Dt-1, a', A'), can be written as
exp(Xidj + Di_173 + aj + plnul;,)C                                                         }fi(lnwtj - 1117„fj), (3.6)Ef=  eip(X;il + D;_17: + a., t plliti )
if the wage in sector j is observed. If wages in none of the sectors are observed (for non-employed
females or cases with missing wages) this likelihood contribution is given by
{exp(X;.dj + 1);-173 + c,1 + plntl' )
ELi exp(X;B. + Di-178 + as + plnwa)' (3.7)
Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variables in Dt -1, an initial conditions problem
arises. This can be dealt with in the same way as iii Heckman (1981b): for time t - 1, a static
multinomial logit model replaces equation  (3.3). with different parameters  and  not  including
Dt- 1. This model  can  be  seen  as a linear approximation  to  the  reduced  form  that  would  be
obtained if the lagged dependent variables were replaced by their expectations according to the
dynamic model for periods earlier than t = 1. Although this approximation is not exact due to
the  nonlinear  nature  of  the  model,  Heckman ( 198lb) reports Monte Carlo results showing  that
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this procedure performs quite well for a dynamic univariate panel data binary choice model, and
the approximation leads to a small asymptotic bias only. The initial conditions problem in the
wage equations at t=l i s treated in the same way.
The specification of V(j, 1) is as follows.
V(j, 1) = Xido -- a  + popwji + €ji. (3.8)
where g is a vector of parameters and aj is the random effect; As before, the errors €ji are
assumed to be independent of all Xt and a , and of all e jt in other time periods t, and are
assumed to be i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value distribution. The wage equations at time 1 are
given by
1nwij - .114vf + 4-i·rf + Ajo + <ij = Pwij + Clj,   j = 2,3 (3.9)
Given exogenous variables and the random effects, the likelihood contribution of individual i
in state j (j =1. . . . ,J)a t time t-1, Li(j I Xi, Ati, ao', Ao') can thus be written as
exp(Xfdj' + a  + popwjl)
f?(lnwij -pwij) (3.10)E Li exp(Xid:   +  a   +  populai)    '
or
expiX£13 + 011 + P'pU)il)
(3.11)
Ef=,1 exp(X£132 + a  + popwai )
Again, Bio and a are normalized to 0. The reduced form interpretation of (3.8) implies that the
random effects a are induced by unobserved heterogeneity in (3.3), so that they will be functions
of a. We therefore assume that ao = (a ,..., aoj)' is given by
ao = C°a = H"71 (3.12)
where  H°  is  a J-l x J-1 lower triangular matrix. The covariance matrix  of ao  (Eco)is  thus
given by H"Ha Similarly, for the wage equations,
AO = CAX - HA77X (3.13)
If the random effects 71= and 77X were observed and fixed, the likelihood contribution of
individual  i with observed states jl,·  .  . ,j T would be given by
L(71'*, 77X) = Ll(ji  I Xi, A.Ii, a", A")Ilil-2Lt(jt j Xt, Att, Dt-1, a', A') (3.14)
Since the individual effects are not observed, the likelihood contribution will be given by the
expected value of  (3.14):
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foo      roo
L i  o° I   j- L(710,77A)01-1('ic)02('lx)(1770(177X (3.15)
.-I
2J-2
where 0K is the density of NK(0, IK).
Computation of the likelihood c.ontribution in (3.15) involves 2J - 2 dimensional integration
(excluding the integrals within each period).   In our case,  J  =  3, and various numerical techniques
exist to approximate the integral.  We will use a (Smooth) Simulated Maximum Likelihood
approach, which also works for larger values  of  J.   It is based  upon  the  fact  that   (3.15)   is  the
expected value  of  (3.14). The expected value is approximated  by a simulated  mean.    For  each
individual, R values of 97  and e are drawn (i.e., vectors of independent standard normals)  and
the average of the R likelihood values conditional on these drawn values are computed.  The
integral  in  (3.15)  is thus replaced  by
1 R
LU - -6   L,(77  , 77Aq) (3.16)n
q=1
The resulting estimator is consistent  if R tends to infinity  with the number of observations  (n)
If ni/2/R -9 0 and with independent draws across observations, the method is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood, see Hajivassiliou   and   Ruud   (1994), for example.     In   our
empirical setting, we used R = 30. To check the sensitivity of the results for the choice of R, we
also estimated the model for R = 20, and found little change in the results when we increased R
from 20 to 30.
3.4 Results
Wage differentials
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of dynamic wage equations   (3.1)   for  men and women.     The
estimates of the static reduced form equation (3.9) are reported in Table 3.A.2 of the appendix.
Several findings are common for both men and women. First, age plays a significant role in the
equation for the formal sector wage, but not in that for the informal sector wage. The formal
sector wage first increases with age and then decreases. Second, we find strong positive returns
to education in both sectors, but these are higher in the formal sector than in the informal
sector. For example, in the formal sector, a man with high education level can earn about 145%
more  than  a  man  with the lowest education level ( ceteris  paribus).    In  the informal sector,  the
difference is only 37%. An explanation for this finding might be that in the formal sector, either
due to the formality or due to the large firm size, it is difficult for the employers to observe
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workers' productivity directly. Thus, workers' productivity is judged more on the signal shown
by experience and education level. In the informal sector on the other hand, employers may
have a more direct contact with the employee, and age and education may have less signalling
ingredients.5
In the two border cities Tijuana and Ciudad-Juarez, the wages in both sectors are higher than
in Mexico City. This reflects the fact that many in bond industries6 are located in these border
cities. These firms are usually owned by or are joint-ventures with multinationals, and typically
pay better than other (domestic) firms. In Guadalajara, which is the city with the largest share
of informal workers, males' wages in the formal sector are significantly lower than in Mexico City,
but females' wages are not significantly different.
There is only weak evidence that the lagged labour market state would affect current earnings.
Only for men in the formal sector, there is some evidence (at two-sided significance level 10%) that
those who were in the formal sector in the previous quarter earn different wages from newcomers,
ceteris paribus.  For men as well as women, we find no evidence of random effects in the wage
equations: the estimated variances of the random effect terms are all negligible. On the other
hand, the idiosyncratic errors are quite large, in line with the large standard deviations of wage
changes that we saw in Table 3.1. The variance of the idiosyncratic part of wages of men is larger
in the formal than in the informal sector.  This is not in line with the finding of Pradhan and
van Soest (1995) that the informal sector is more heterogeneous and has larger wage dispersion.
On the other hand, the variance of females' formal sector wages is about 14% less than that of
informal sector wages.
5Stigler (1962) has hypothesised that small firms will suffer less "control loss" and will consequently be better
nianaged than large firms. Hence. small firms probably more easily recognise aiid reward ability. Empirical
evidence also shows that large firms tend to pay more than small firms (See. for example, Siebert and Addison
(1991),  Mellow  (1992).  etc..).   Also see Polachek and Siebert (1996)  for a survey.  in particular.  page  261.
6so  called  Maquiladoms,  see  Martin  (1999)  for  soriie  institutional  background  informatiori
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Table 3.2. Estimates of the dynamic wage equation
hien Wornen
Param. * form. Info. form. Info.
5:
COnst. 0.871(3.70) 1.483(5.19) 0.185(0.42) 1.368(2.34)
Age 0.037(3.38) 0.008(0.60) 0.052(2.40) 0.013(0.45)
Age2 -0.0005(-3.40) -0.0001(-0.50) -0.0005(-1.76) -0.0002(-0.56)
Medu 0.238(6.99) 0.105(4.37) 0.495(6.19) 0.099(1.80)
Hedu 0.898(24.5) 0.317(4.37) 0.844(8.03) 0.175(1.69)
JuaTij 0.361(9.27) 0.515(9.22) 0.218(2.67) 0.345(3.00)
Guada -0.129(-3.03) -0.057(-1.04) 0.027(0.23) -0.083(-0.84)
Mont. 0.202(5.58) 0.297(5.17) 0.118(1.68) 0.180(1.78)
T3 -0.042(-0.76) -0.086(-1.24) -0.025(-0.24) 0.086(0.61)
T# 0.088(1.57) -0.062(-0.88) 0.092(0.82) 0.086(0.68)
T5 -0.014(-0.26) 0.005(0.07) 0.085(0.77) 0.230(1.61)
D:
fori i.-1 0.124(1.84) 0.018(0.27) 0.048(0.51) -0.025(-0.10)









t-valiies iii pare Iitheses
c.f : variances of Aj (<J ), j - 2,3: 023: covariance of X2 and A.3
"Lowedu",' Tl",  and   'MeI.   City",  are the omitted control group dunimies
From the estimates. we construct the wage differentials for some individuals with given bench-
mark cliaracteristics. The results are summarized iii Table  3.3 and in Figures 3.1  and 3.2. Figures
3.1 and 3.2 are based upon individuals who work in Mexico City and who worked in the formal
sector in the previous quarter. For both men and women, wage differentials increase strongly
with education level. Both the table and the figures show that the wages of unskilled workers are
not significantly different in the two sectors, but the wages in the formal sector are significantly
higher than in the informal sector for higher educated individuals. For example, Table 3.3 shows
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that the wage differentials are about 89% for men and about 96% for women of age 40 who
are ex-formal sector workers in Mexico City and received high education. The wage differentials
also vary with age. Figure 3.1 shows that (for an ex-formal sector worker iii Mexico City) the
differential increases with age until about age 40 and falls after that.  On the other hand. as
shown in Figure 3.2. the wage differential for women increases with age over the whole age range.
The results may suggest that skilled workers are usually better off in the formal sector. Formal
sector jobs of skilled workers could be seen as primary jobs. informal sector jobs can be seen as
secondary jobs. This would be in line with the st.aging hypothesis. The main reason why we still
find skilled workers in the informal sector, would then be restrictive entry to the formal sector.
Table 3.3. Wage differentials for some benchmark persons
Charateristics Males Females
Mex. City: ex-formal worker, Low-edu. 0.058 0.005
(0.101) (0.259)
Mex. City. ex-formal worker; Alid-edu. 0.191 0.402
(0.097) (0.259)
 ex. City: ex-formal worker: High-edu. 0.638 0.675
(0.112) (0.273)
Mex. City: ex-informal worker: Low edu. -0.049 0.067
(0.103) (0.226)
J.  &  T.:  ex-formal worker:  Low edu. -0.097 -0.067
(0.104) (0.186)
Mex. City: ex-notemployed, Low edu.          -           -0.122
(0.282)
Standard errors iii pareIitheses. Age- 40.
Mobility
The estimates of the dynamic choice equation (3.3) are given iii Table 3.4. (The results of the
static reduced form equation (3.8) are reported in Table 3.A.1 of the appendix.) A positive sign
of the parameter Bj or 'b (j = 1.2) means that the corresponding variable has a positive impact
on the probability to be iii state j compared to the probability to be in the reference state, which
is the informal sector  for  men, and non-employment  for women). Hence tlie interpretation  of
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parameters is somewhat different for men and women. The first main finding is that wage effects
are significantly positive for both men and women.  For men this means that a higher wage
differential between formal and informal sector leads to a larger probability to work in the formal
sector, given the other characteristics and the labour market state in the previous quarter. For
women. it also means that a higher wage in the formal or in the informal sector increases the
probability to participate.
Secondly, we find that the variances of the randoni effects are substantial and significant. The
random effects in the state equatiotis thus play a much larger role than the random effects in the
wage equations. They contribute even more to explaining the state choice than the idiosyncratic
errors (which, by norinalization. all have variance  216) Aforeover, for women. tlie two individual
heterogeneity terms are positively correlated.
Third. given the wage rates, the sector choice of men is not significantly affected by age or by
the labour market state in the previous quarter. The latter is somewhat surprising. It implies
that there is no genuine state dependence, the fact that men tend to stay in the same sector is
explained by observed and unobserved heterogeneity and is not a structural effect.
The results for women are rather different in this respect. For women, the lagged state
does play a role. In particular, the estimates indicate that being in either of the three states
increases the probability of being iii that same state in the next quarter, given observed and
unobserved characteristics. There are no cross-effects: women who are not employed have the
same probability to find a formal (informal) sector job as women in the informal (formal) sector
with the same observed and unobserved characteristics. This is not iii line with the notion that
people prefer unemployment to informal sector work because it is easier to find a formal sector
(primary) job from unemployment than from informal sector employment. which is one of the
features of the Fields (1975) model. A plausible explanation for this, however, is that many
non-working women are not unemployed but do not participate iii the labour market.
The sector choice of nien varies across cities and with the composition of the liousehold. For
exaniple. living in the two border cities significantly increases the probability of working in the
formal sector. This is because workers in the Maquiladoras are classified as formal workers.
Higher income of other family member also increases the formal sector probability.
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Table 3.4. Estimates of the dynamic choice equation
Men Wonnen
Param. form. forni. Info.
Const. 4.195(1.29) -7.538(-2.96) -12.721(-4.02)
Age -0.140(-0.87) -0.022(-0.16) 0.212(1.57)
Age2 0.001(0.47) -0.001(-0.76) -0.003(-1.78)
JuaTij 1.121(1.78) -0.950(-1.98) -1.908(-3.11)
Guada 0.044(0.07) 0.095(0.15) 0.554(1.05)
Mont. 1.151(1.89) -0.491(-1.00) -0.557(-1.06)
ChiM -0.211(-1.32) -0.502(-2.90) -0.372(-2.28)
Adults 0.172(1.87) -0.084(-0.89) 0.042(0.60)
Othinc 0.053(1.94) -0.046(-0.90) -0.110(-2.89)
Nmar 0.080(0.18) 2.910(7.26) 2.483(7.15)
lwage 6.885(5.47) 3.998(4.47)
T3 -0.248(-0.39) 0.295(0.64) -0.311(-0.52)
T4 -0.874(-1.27) -0.067(-0.13) -0.152(-0.27)
TS 0.186(0.30) -0.160(-0.29) -0.810(-1.26)
73
form.-1 -0.245(-0.35) 1.630(3.32) -0.419(-0.43)
Info.-1 - -0.110(-0.13) 1.505(3.45)
Ea :
0·22 21.121(5.49) 10.255(3.90)




1. t-values in parentheses
2. Reference state: not-employment
3. Qf: variance of aj, j = 2,3, 023 covariance of a2 and a3
4. "Lowedu", "T2", "MeI. City", and"noem._i"
("infor.-1"),  are the omitted control group dummies
For women, having younger children reduces t.he probability to work, both in the formal and in
the informal sector. The impact of these demographic variables is in line with common findings
in the literature. In the border cities of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, the share of working women
in the formal sector is larger than in Mexico City, as could be expected due to the presence of
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in-bond (formal sector) industries. But non-employment is larger compared to both forinal sector
employment and informal sector iii these cities compared to Alexico City. The in-bond industries
pay relatively high wages. but the positive employment effect induced by this holds for inen only.
Women either do not like the nature of the jobs (given the wages), or find it harder to get access
to them than to formal sector jobs in other cities. For women, income of other faniily niembers
(Othinc')  has  a significant negative effect  on the probability to  work iii the informal sector.  This
is in line with the assumption (alio made in the Fields, 1975, model) that iiidividuals with more
sources of income can afford to search for a formal sector job from unemployment rather than
take up informal sector employmerit
To get a clearer picture of the implications of the estimates for the mobility patterns, we look
at simulated transition probabilities. The simulations are conducted for the first two quarters,
with individual characteristics fixed and the zinobserved heterogeneity terms (random effects)
either drawn from their estimated distributions (Tables 3.5 and 3.7) or fixed to the value zero
(Tables 3.6 and 3.8). Iii Tables 3.5 and 3.7, the marginal probabilities (for given characteristics.
but not for given lagged labour market state) are the averages over 100 draws of the random
effects. the conditional probabilities - given characteristics as well as the lagged labour market
state - are computed as the ratio of joint and niarginal probabilities, both averaged over the
random effects.7 The probabilities are calculated for men and women with high and low education
level, with other observed characteristics set to their benchmark values: married with one young
child, 40 years  old  (in the first quarter).  etc.. The (predicted) wages  are thus fully determined by
these observed characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors of the probabilities
are estimated by repeating the simulations for a large number of draws (100 draws in our case)
from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates. Iii Tables 3.6 and 3.8,
individuals with the same observed characteristics are considered, but liOW the values of the
random effects are all set to zero. Differences between Tables 3.5 and 3.6 and between Tables
3.7 and 3.8 thus say something about the importance of the random effects.
Table 3.5 shows that 79% of the group of higher educated inen with benchmark characteristics
work in the formal sector in the first quarter, due to the large wage differential. In the next
quarter, this percentage is still soinewhat higher, due to the low probability to move to the
informal sector.  On the other hand. of the lower educated benchmark men only 62% work in
the formal sector in the first quarter, and this percentage is even lower in the second sector.
The conditional probabilities reveal that. on average  (over the random effects), about  94% of the
high educated benchmark men who are in the formal sector stay in the formal sector iii the next
7This implies that the conditional probability is the weighted average of the conditional probabilities for giVeIl
valize of the random effects, where the weights are posterior weights given the lagged labour market state.
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quarter.  On the other hand, 77% of the high educated men in the informal sector remain in that
sector.  Of the low educated men in the formal and informal sector, 85% and 90% stay in the
same sector, respectively.
In Table 3.6. where the random effects are fixed to zero, we can see that the main reason why
we find that people tend to stay iii the same sector, is the unobserved heterogeneity captured in
the random effects. For someone with given (average) unobserved characteristics, the probability
of being in the formal sector in the second quarter does not depend much on his labour market
state iii the first quarter. This is in line with the finding that the lagged labour market state
is insignificant. both in tlie state equations and iii the wage equations.  The high educated
benchmark man with average unobserved characteristics always has a very high probability of
being in the formal sector. For the low educated man, the wage differential is smaller. leading to
a larger informal sector probability. This probability is about 11%-points higher if the man was
already   in the informal sector   iii the previous quarter  than   if  lie  was  not,   but   this  difference  is
not statistically significant.
For women, the 11011-workers are also included. Table 3.7 shows that about 51% of the
benchinark group of high educated women are employed during the first quarter, and most of
them are in the formal sector. About 79% of the latter stay iii the formal sector during the next
quarter. On the other hand. only 31% of the high educated benchmark women in the informal
sector stay in the informal sector. Instead. many of thetil stop working. The transition rates from
non-employment to employment are low, particularly into the informal sector.  Only 25% of the
low educated benchmark women are employed, and about 60% of them are in the formal sector.
There are many transitions into non-employment from both sectors, and much fewer transitions
between sectors.
In Table 3.8, we only cotisider the benchmark women with average value (zero) of the random
effects. There are substantial differences with Table 3.7, showing that unobserved heterogeneity
plays an important role for women also. But unlike for men. we still find substantial and signif-
icant dependence on the lagged state, showing that there is also an important structural effect.
For example. the probability tliat the high educated benchmark woman is in the formal sector
is much larger if she has been in the formal sector t.lie previous quarter than if she has been in
the informal sector (49% versus  14%). This correspozids  to  the  finding  that  the  estimates  of the
coe#icients on the lagged state dummies are significant for females.
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Table 3.5. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males)
Prob(jt) Prob(J2  | ji)
jtt=1 t=2 Formal Informal
Higher education
Formal 0.785 0.793 0.943 0.057
(0.068) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Informal 0.215 0.207 0.233 0.767
(0.068) (0.028) (0.092) (0.092)
Low education
Formal 0.617 0.565 0.851 0.149
(0.064) (0.028) (0.045) (0.045)
Informal 0.383 0.435 0.104 0.896
(0.064) (0.028) (0.046) (0.046)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.6. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, random effects fixed)
Probtjt) Prob(32 | ji)
1, t=1 t=2 Formal Informal
Higher education
Formal 0.969 0.988 0.988 0.012
(0.076) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Informal 0.031 0.012 0.979 0.021
(0.076) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015)
Low education
Formal 0.764 0.635 0.664 0.336
(0.158) (0.092) (0.086) (0.086)
Informal 0.236 0.365 0.548 0.452
(0.158) (0.092) (0.097) (0.097)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.7. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2  I  jl)
jt            t=1 t=2 Formal Informal Not-employed
High education
Formal 0.508 0.438 0.790 0.019 0.191
(0.071) (0.051) (0.034) (0.015) (0.039)
Informal 0.048 0.039 0.111 0.307 0.583
(0.032) (0.017) (0.066) (0.011) (0.060)
Not-employed 0.444 0.523 0.070 0.033 0.897
(0.070) (0.049) (0.064) (0.097) (0.102)
Low education
Fornial 0.150 0.121 0.685 0.038 0.277
(0.035) (0.023) (0.072) (0.015) (0.068)
Informal 0.097 0.075 0.033 0.427 0.541
(0.036) (0.021) (0.016) (0.072) (0.071)
Not-employed 0.754 0.804 0.022 0.039 0.940
(0.051) (0.031) (0.008) (0.014) (0.019)
Standard errors in parent lieses.
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Table 3.8. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females, random effects fixed)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2 1 ji )
jt t=1 t = 2    Formal   Informal   Not-employed
Higli education
ForiIial 0.493 0.316 0.491 0.023 0.486
(0.167) (0.117) (0.063) (0.029) (0.070)
Informal 0.042 0.046 0.143 0.174 0.683
(0.045) (0.024) (0.136) (0.015) (0.133)
Not-employed 0.465 0.638 0.144 0.059 0.797
(0.162) (0.113) (0.082) (0.083) (0.098)
Low educatioii
Formal 0.019 0.008 0.044 0.021 0.935
(0.018) (0.006) (0.036) (0.013) (0.040)
Itiformal 0.058 0.037 0.008 0.106 0.887
(0.041) (0.018) (0.007) (0.053) (0.053)
Not-employed 0.923 0.955 0.007 0.033 0.961
(0.050) (0.020) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017)
Standard errors iii parentheses.
3.5 Conclusions
We have investigated labour market segmentation in urban Mexico by studying the wage differ-
entials between the formal and informal sectors and the transition patterns between the labour
market states formal sector employment, informal sector employment and (for women only) non-
employment. AIobility among these three states is extremely large compared to other OECD
countries. To explain the wage differentials between the two sectors and the labour market state
of each individual iii each quarter. a dynainic inziltinomial logit equation with random effects for
the choice and two linear dynamic random effect wage equations for the wages in the two sectors
was formulated. We estiinated this model using simulated maximum likelihood for a Mexican
panel dataset covering the period from the first quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 1993.
Our findings on wage differentials are in line with the literature. The wages in both sectors
iiicrease with education,  with  the education effects stronger  in the formal sector. Wages increase
with age in the formal sector. but less so iii the informal sector. Hence, wage differentials between
formal and informal sector increase with education level and with age. We find no evidence of
unobserved heterogeneity or an effect of the previous labour niarket state on the curreiit wage.
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The estimates show that the probability of formal sector eniployment strongly increases with
the wage differential.  For men, the probability of working in the informal sector decreases with
the level of income of other family members. For women, other family income mainly increases
the probability of not working.
The simulated probabilities of transitioiis for iiidividuals in different market conditions and
for different individuals in the same period were compared. The results show that the main
reason why men tend to stay iii the same state is unobserved heterogeneity. For women on the
other hand, we also find a substantial structural impact of the lagged labour market state. The
high wage differentials for workers with high education level imply that they work more often in
the forinal sector. High wages also induce more (female) non-workers with high education level
to work.
One of the limitations of this study is the issue of migration. Temporary migration to the U.S.
is very common. See Martin ( 1999)  for an extensive descriptive analysis. Whether the quality  of
informal and formal sector employment affects this type of migration is obviously of great policy
relevance for the U.S. as well as Mexico. Unfortunately however, we cannot use our panel data
to take migration into account, since information on temporary migrants  is not available.
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1. Estimates of the static choice equation
Men Women
Paralll. form. form. Info.
AJ 1
Const. -1.614(-0.16) -11.950(-2.44) -16.842(-2.59)
Age 0.301(0.61) 0.142(0.53) 0.412(1.37)
Age2 -0.005(-0.84) -0.003(-1.01) -0.005(-1.42)
JuaTij -1.900(-1.02) -1.339(-1.53) -4.538(-2.84)
Guada -4.216(-1.74) -0.901(-0.66) -1.410(-1.22)
Mo,it. -0.918(-0.43) 0.016(0.02) -1.214(-1.00)
Child -0.139(-0.73) -0.494(-1.82) -0.298(-1.56)
Adults -0.007(-0.05) -0.214(-1.33) 0.091(0.76)
Othinc 0.055(1.18) 0.065(0.74) -0.121(-1.74)
Nmar 1.002(1.·17) 5.003(6.44) 3.260(6.09)
Zwage 12.247(2.00) 4.450(3.58)
Te -1.903(-0.86) 1.557(1.61) 0.640(0.49)
T3 -3.074(-0.93) -0.194(-0.17) -2.111(-1.44)
T4 1.614(0.57) -0.784(-0.60) -0.222(-0.08)
E..O
03 24.817(4.48) 14.063(3.54)
032                                    7.611(3.55)
023 6.552(3.73)
Notes:
1.   t -values iIi parentheses
2. Reference state: not-employment
3.  f: variance of (d. j = 2.3, 023 covariance of ag and (,9
4. "Loutedu", "TB", "Met. City", and "noem.-1
c"infor.-1"),are  the omitted control group  dimimies
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Table 3.A.2. Estimates of the static wage equation
Alen Women
Param. form. Info. form. Info.
6:
Const. 1.051(1.79) 1.174(2.17) 0.145(0.16) 1.574(1.23)
Age 0.023(0.80) 0.026(0.98) 0.070(1.54) -0.004(-0.06)
Age2 -0.0002(-0.68) -0.0003(-0.98) -0.0008(-1.35) -0.0000(-0.02)
Afed,1 0.243(3.22) 0.165(2.31) 0.504(4.12) 0.055(0.71)
Hedu 0.738(8.02) 0.408(3.21) 1.001(5.06) 0.014(0.08)
JuaTij 0.532(5.39) 0.392(3.65) 0.161(0.97) 0.776(2.79)
Guada 0.072(0.65) -0.187(-1.69) 0.083(0.31) 0.368(1.68)
Atont. 0.255(2.83) 0.096(0.80) -0.047(-0.29) 0.324(1.35)
T2 0.028(0.27) -0.101(-0.87) -0.223(-1.28) -0.040(-0.15)
T3 -0.040(-0.33) -0.325(-2.26) -0.015(-0.06) 0.577(2.25)










 : variances of A  (41). j = 2,3, 023: covariance of X8 and X9
'Lowedu".  " Tl ".  and  "AI€x.   City" . are the oinitted control group duinmies
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Figure 3.1. Wage differentials between the formal sector and
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Figure 3.2. Wage differentials between the formal sector and


















Family Structure and Female Labour
Supply in Mexico City*
4.1 Introduction
We analyze labour supply and labour force participation of married women in Mexico City.
Labour force participation of women iii Mexico is low. For example, in 1987, 45% of females (age
15 to 64) in EC countries and 55% of females iii the seven major industrialized countries were
employed (CBS, 1993). while according to our 1992 survey,  only 38% of women Cage  15  to 64)  were
employed in Mexico City. For the urban areas of Mexico as a whole. the women's participation
rate  was  36%   in 1993 (Fleck and Sorrentino, 1994).     We  aim  at  explaining this phenomenon
using a structural model of female labour supply. Such models have been estimated for many
countries, but this is, to our knowledge, the first such study for Mexico. This seems particularly
interesting since Mexico shares characteristics of industrialized and developing countries.  It
has gone through a period of serious economic transition and as of 1992, its per capita income
(measured at purchasing power parity) is about that of lower income OECD countries such as
Greece and Turkey.
As usual in this type of analysis, we estimate wage and other income elasticities. Moreover,
we focus on the role of family structure, which is a potentially important determinant of labour
supply. The average family in Mexico City had 4.1 persons in 1992. About 20% of the families
had more than five persons. and about 26% of the households were extended families, i.e. contain
members other than head. partner, and their children. In many families, the presence of other
females offers a potential substitute for child care services. In developing countries, large size
* Chapter  4  is  idetitical  to  Gong and van Soest (20001,).
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and complicated composition of families are prevalent and influence people's behaviour. This
has received little attention in the empirical structural labour supply literature. An exception is
Newman and Gertler (1994), who examine rural Peru. They find that family structure closely
relates to household production and labour supply; the family values the leisure of various mem-
bers differently, and the marginal return to own on farm work is affected by the amount of work
performed by other family members.
Wong and Levine (1992) study the effect of household structure on labour force participation
of recent mothers in urban Mexico. They formulate reduced-form equations of female labour force
participation and fertility.    They  find  that the presence  of  a " mother substitute" significantly
increases the labour force participation of females who have newly given birth to a child. Such
findings   are   not   confined   to developing countries. Tienda and Glass (1985), using a similar
model, find that in the US, the presence of other adults increased the probability of labour force
participation of mothers who were heads of households. Neither Wong and Levine (1992) nor
Tienda and Glass (1985) use a structural labour supply model.
Our data define a household  as  " the  set of individuals living  in  the same house sharing  a
common income (provided by one or more of the household members) used to cover food, rent
and housing expenditures for all the members. This includes individuals living on their own"
(see also Villagomez,   1996). This means that households  not only include nuclear families  but
also extended families of more complicated structure. The number of household members in our
sample varies from 2 to 19. In some households, servants and their families are also included.
We confine ourselves to the female spouse (including cohabiting partners) of the head of the
household, and refer  to  her  as  the  wife  or the mother  (if she has children).
Our paper differs from previous work by examining one structural model, in which the impact
of wages, other income, and family structure on labour force participation and hours worked
is analyzed simultaneously. We follow the framework of Van Soest (1995) and its extensions
by  Callan  and van Soest   (1995) and Euwals   and van Soest   (1999),   but  take a different  wage
equation estimation strategy,   i. e.,  the  wage  equation is estimated jointly  with the labour supply
model. We analyze female labour supply and take the husband's behaviour as given, following,
for example, Hausman  (1985).    This is simpler  than the family labour supply model with joint
utility maximization  used  by,  for example, Hausman  and Ruud (1984). The simplification  can
be justified by the empirical finding in the latter type of models that cross elasticities of the
husband's labour supply with respect to the wife's wage tend to be small (see van Soest, 1995,
for  example).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the model. Section 4.3 describes
the data, which stem from the Urban Employment Survey conducted in the second quarter of
4.2.  Model and Estimation Method 67
1992 by Alexico's National Statistics Institute (INEGI). In Section 4.4 the estimation results
are presented. In Section 4.5 we discuss the results of some simulations and sensitivity and
misspecification analysis. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2   Model and Estimation Method
We follow the discrete choice approach  of van Soest (1995). He assumes that the agent maximizes
utility over a finite choice set. This approach has several advantages compared to the traditional
(continuous) models.1 First, it does not require convexity of budget set or preferences. Second,
the approach makes it computationally feasible to incorporate nonstandard budget restrictions
(fixed costs, hours  constraints, nonlinear taxation, unemployment benefits, etc.). which enlarges
the scope for policy analysis. Third, flexible functional forms of the direct utility function can be
used. without the need for analytic expressions of the labour supply or the expenditure function.
Fourth. the stochastic specification can be allowed to be quite rich, for exaniple allowing for
unobserved wage rates of nonworkers. for random preferences. and for correlation between error
terms in wage equatiotis and random preferences.
We assume that the woman decides on her leisure. l. and after-tax income, y composed of
her own labour income, her husband's earnings, and her children's earnings.2 Leisure is set equal
to  TE  - h, where  h is working  hours  per  week  and  TE  is  the  time endowment. which  we  set
equal to 80 hours per week.3 We assume that each woman maximizes utility given by the direct
translog specification:
U(v) = v'Av + b'v (4.1)
where  v=  (logy, logl)'.   A i s a  symmetric  2 x 2 matrix with entries A,3, ('i,j - 1,2), and b =
(bi, 4)'. Preference variation across individuals through observed and unobserved characteristics
is incorporated through one of the parameters:
K
b2  =  r  2kzk + Er, (4.2)
k=1
where  I   =   (Ili···•IK)'  is  a  vector of exogenous characteristics,   such  as  age and family
composition. The error term €r is interpreted as random preferences due to the unobserved
characteristics. It is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. independent of I.
1The traditioiial niodels  are,  for  example,  described  in  Hazisman  (1985)  and  Aloffitt ( 1986).
2Due to lack of information in the data. we are not able to consider the nonlabour inconie of the fankily. such
as asset income.
'  Setting  TE  =  80  hoiirs  per  week  is  ad  hoc. biit results  of Van Soest  ( 1995) and Euwals  and  vari  Soe.st  C 1999)
suggest that results are not sensitive to this.
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U is assumed to be increasing in y, implying that each woman will choose a point on the
frontier of her budget set. Following the standard approach in this type of labour supply models,
the woman's before tax wage rate w is assumed not to depend on hours worked. Thus, once 1 is
chosen, after tax income v is determined by w:  V - V(t, w)
In the traditional standard continuous model, the individual solves the problem:
Max U(y, t) s.t.  y 5 7(t, w) and 1 5 TE. (4.3)
This can be solved using Lagrange techniques, but the shape of the budget set determines the
complexity  of the solution. Following Van Soest  (1995),  we  use a discrete budget set, replacing
the budget frontier given above by some of its points. The optimization problem then becomes:
Max U(v, l) s.t. (y, 1) C CS(W) (4.4)
where the choice set is given by
CS(w) = {(1/, TE - h); y= v(TE - h, w); h e {0, I L, . . . , (m- 1)IL}} (4.5)
Here IL is a fixed interval length for the working hours. These are rounded to a multiple of IL
and censored at (m - 1)IL. The choice set with m points is denoted by {(Vo, to), ..., (ym-1, t™-1)}·
There are two ways to interpret the discrete budget set, with different implications for the
optimal number of points and interval length IL. First, the discrete budget set can be seen as an
approximation to the traditional continuous budget set. The rounding errors then indicate the
quality of the approximation, and the larger the hours interval length (IL) is chosen, the larger
these errors will be. Rounding errors no longer play a separate role if IL is chosen equal to one,
since in our data, observed weekly hours worked are always an integer number. Thus for IL = 1,
the rounding error in the model would coincide with the rounding error in the data.
The other view is to see the labour supply decision as genuinely discrete. The peaked nature
of hours distributions in many countries suggests that people often choose between a very limited
number of hours earnings combinations.  From this point of view, the continuous model is an
approximation to a discrete optimization problem. We do not aim at explaining why firms offer
certain (wage,hours) packages, and do not incorporate the demand side constraints which may
lead to the peaked hours distribution. We focus on labour supply and neglect the (wage,hours)
bivariate distribution that might be generated by an equilibrium model with explicit modelling
of the demand side. In that sense, the interpretation of our framework as reflecting a genuinely
discrete labour supply decision under demand side constraints is far-fetched. On the other hand,
a model with few points (and large IL) suffers less from the fact that irregular numbers of hours
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are hardly ever observed in practice than a continuous model or a model with large IL, and may
therefore give a better approximation to the equilibrium model with demand side constraints.
We are agnostic towards choosing between these two interpretations. The arguments given
above imply, however, that there is some ambiguity in choosing the number of points m and the
length of the hours intervals IL. It seems important to estimate the model for various values
of these parameters and check the robustness of the results for these choices. In our benchmark
empirical specification, we use IL = 10 and m = 8. We will perform a sensitivity analysis with
smaller values of IL (IL=4,2,1) and larger values of m (m=19,37,73).
To the utilities of all the alternatives iii the choice set, random disturbances are added as in
the multinomial logit model (Maddala,  1983)
Uj = U(yj, tj) + fj (j -0,..., m - 1) (4.6)
where  the  €J  are  i. i. d.   with  a  type  I extreme value distribution,  and are independent  of z  and
of other error terms in the model: cj cannot be interpreted as random preferences, which are
already represented  by  ET  in (4.2) Instead,  cj  can  be  seen  as  the  nonsystematic  part of utility
of  alternative  j. It could reflect an error  made  by the individual in evaluating alternative j,  or
could, for example, capture demand side phenomena which make alternative j unattractive, such
as search costs or other characteristics of jobs with specific numbers of hours. Obviously,  the i.i. d.
assumption is quite restrictive and implies that the cj do not follow the natural ordering in the
alternatives. One might therefore argue that in a model like ours, where random preferences are
already included, the <j should no longer be needed. While this may be true from an economic
modelling point of view, we will see below that the 5· facilitate estimation substantially. Moreover,
adding the €j implies that all outcomes have nonzero probability, even that who would not be
rational for any value of the random preference terms, for example due to nonconvexities in the
budget set. In this sense the g have the same role as the measurement or optimization error in
the continuous model of Hausman  (1985).
The individual chooses  j  if  Uj is larger  than the other Ui. Conditional  on  €r,  ir.  and  w,  the
probability that j is chosen is
Pr [Uj 2 U, for all i] - (4.7)exp(U(yj, tj))E;181 ezp(U(Vi, 4))
The wage rates of nonworkers and some of the workers are not observed. We need a wage
equation to take account of this.  The wage equation is also needed to allow for correlation
between wage rates and random preferences ( r).   The wage equation is defined  as:
4 It  way seem  more general to replace  E,  by  .w:.  and to estimate a scale parameter  s. The scale  of the utility
functioIl, however, is not identified. As a consequence, setting s equal to one is a way to normalize the scale of
the  utility  function.  without  loss  of generalization  (as  in the standard multinomial logit model).
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logu, = *5 + €W (4.8)
where   z   is a vector of individual characteristics (education level.  for  example),   71'  is a vector
of parameters, and E" is an error term, assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero,
independent of z and I. Initially, we assume that €- is uncorrelated with the random preference
term €r in (4.2). We relax this assumption below, and allow that €r and EU' are correlated. Such
a correlation may have various explanations. First, unobserved heterogeneity may play a role.
One might then expect that those with high productivity also have larger preference for working,
i. e.,  a lower marginal utility of leisure. This would  lead  to a negative correlation between €W  and
2.    Alternatively, measurement errors  in  the  wage rate (which  we  do not explicitly allow  for)
may  lead  to a negative correlation between  E-  and labour supply,   i. e.,  to a positive correlation
between  €W  and  € r.
As  in van Soest   ( 1995), the model described  so far appears to underpredict the number  of
nonworkers and overpredicts the number of part-time jobs involving a few hours per week.  Unob-
served fixed costs of working, such as commuting costs or child care costs, might be responsible
for this. Because we use a direct utility function, we could incorporate fixed costs in a natural
way: fixed costs could be subtracted from income V if h > 0. The problem with this is that it
may lead to negative values of income minus fixed costs, which cannot be dealt with due to the
translog utility function. We therefore follow a slightly different approach which is computation-
ally more convenient: we add fixed revenues of not working (FR) to the income at zero hours of
work.5   Thus  U(yo, to) is replaced  by  U(yo  + FR, to).   FR  is  specified as follows:
F R - 8't (4.9)
t is a vector of exogenous variables, 6 a vector of parameters. 6 Positive fixed revenues increase
the probability of nonworking by increasing the utility of nonparticipation (since utility increases
with income). The fixed revenues are fully incorporated in the structural model. For example, an
6A difference between fixed costs of working and fixed revenues of not working is induced by the income
effect.  If the same regressors were used in the fixed costs and the utility function, this would just be a matter
of functional form. An alternative way to avoid problems with negative income values would be to define fixed
costs  as a percentage of income  (as in Euwals  and van Soest,  1999).  or to  work  with a quadratic rather  than  a log
quadratic utility function. The former does not seem very natural from an economic point of view, the latter has
the drawback that the constraint that utility must increase with income becomes binding,
csWe also estimated models with a random error term added to the right hand side of (4.9).  In all our
specifications however, the estimated standard deviation of it appeared to be close to zero, with standard error
larger than its estimate.  Even if such an error term is included. as long as it is independent of other error terms,
the  model is identified without imposing exclusion restrictions  on the regressors  r  in  (4.2)  or  on  t  in  (4.9).   The
intuition behind this is the same as in the censored regression Inodel with uiiobserved censoring threshold (see
Nelson, 1977).
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increase in wages will increase U(YJ' lj) for j>0, but does not change the utility of not working,
and thus increases the participation rate. Therefore, the effects  of  wage  (or  tax.  benefits,  etc.)
changes on participation can be easily analyzed in this framework. Coinpared with the niodel
conditional on participation  (see,  for  example,  Blundell.  1987),  this  is  an important advantage
for policy analysis.
Estimation
For estimating the structural labour supply model, we use a simulated maxi11111111 likelihood
method approach. In contrast  to van Soest  ( 1995), we incorporate  the wage equation  (4.8)  and
estimate it siniziltaneously with the labour supply model. The standard model. without random
preferences aiid with observed wage rates otily, could be estiinated by maximum likelihood. The
likelihood contribution would be given by equation  (4.7).   For unobserved wages, the error terms
in the wage  equation  (6")  have  to be integrated out using  (4.8).   When random preferences  are
considered, an additional error term (Er) has to be integrated out as well. This requires two
dimensional numerical integration. We deiiote the probability of working hj hours conditional
on E' and the wage rate zi· 7 by
Pr[h - hj I w. €rl (j - 1...., m), (4.10)
This probability directly follows  from (4.7), using  (4.1),  (4.2)  and  (4.9) to obtai11 the values  of
U(yi, li). The exact likelihood contribution for someone observed  to  work h° hours with observed
gross wage rate w° is then given by
f+00
L={/ PrIh = h° I it,0. €rlfi(€r I u,°)d€'}f(·u,e), (4.11)j -/.
If the  wage  rate  is not observed (usually implying  that  h'  =  0), the exact likelihood  is
L - f.2.1.I PrIh = h° I w. frlfi (€r I w)d€rf(u')dw, (4.12)
Here  fl  is the conditional density  of €r given w (or given  €W, the error  term  in  (4.8),  and  f(W)
is the density of the  wage  rate  (or  of €W).   Both  are  univariate  normal  densities.
To solve the numerical integration problem, we approximate the integral by a simulated mean:
for each individual,  we  take R drawings  from  the  distribution  of the error terms  (€r  in   (4.11)
or €r and  €u'  in  (4.12)),  and  compute the average  of  the R likelihood values conditional  on  the
drawn errors. The integral  (4.12)  can  thus  be  approximated  by
7Throughout. we condition 011 earnings of the husband and cliildren. and other exogenous explanatory variables
I. z ali(i t. These are suppressed in otir Iiotation.
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1 R .1
L= RS Pr[h = h° I u·q, €qi (4.13)
q=1
where wq = ir'z + q. and (wq, 4) (q = 1...., R) are based upon independent draws from the
distribution of (cw, €').  Similarly, the integral (4.11) can be replaced by
1 R
L = # I Pr[h = h° I u,0. 66] f(120) (4.14)
9=1
The resulting estimator is inconsistent for fixed R. but will be consistent if R tends to infinity
with the number of observations (n).  If itl/2/R -* 0 and with independent drawings across
observations, the method is asyinptotically  equivalent to maximum likelihood.  see  Lee ( 1992)  or
Gourieroux and Monfort  (1993).
The estimation method also makes clear why the error terms fj in (4.6) are useful. These
error ternis  inake  Pr[h  =  h°  1  u·, €r] a smooth rionzero  function  of the parameters. The extreme
value error terms facilitate estimation and play the role of a kernel smoother, as described in
Mcfadden  (1989).    8    See  also  Hajivassiliozi  and  Ruud  (1994) who compare the properties  of
smooth and non-smooth simulated maximum likelihood estimators. In terms of the discrete
choice literature. the model can be called a generalized mixed logit model. Brownstone and
Train (1999) compare mixed logit models with pure probit models in which all errors are normally
distributed. Estimation of the probit models is computationally harder. but feasible using the
GHK simulator. The result.9 of Brownstone and Train suggest that the choice between logit and
probit errors does not substantially affect the estimates of the parameters of interest.
4.3 Data
The data we use are drawn from Mexico's Urban Employinent Survey (Encuesta Nacional de
Empteo   Urbano.  second  quarter  of  1992).   conducted  by  Ingtituto  Nacionat  de  Estadistica.   Ge-
ograjia e Infor·matica (INEGI, AIexico's National Statistics Iiistitute) in 32 Mexican cities. The
survey is the only quarterly household silrvey in Mexico and the source of official open unem-
ployment rates. It provides detailed information on the economic activities of all the household
nienibers older than twelve years of age, such as employment status, employment conditions,
working hours.  labour  income.  characteristics of the workplace.  etc..  but  no  information  on  non-
labour income. It has been used for unemployment analysis in urban Alexico. by, for example,
8The compiitational coin·eliience of the extreiIie vallie error terills (often combined with error terins Witll
aiiother  distril)litioll   such   as   tlie  liorilial) has beeii exploited earlier   ill the cont.ext  of cliscrete choice dynaiiii c
programining and  panel  data models  (see  Berkover  atid  Stern.  1991.  mid  Stern.  1995)
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Fleck and Sorrentino (1994).  It has also been used by Villagomez (1996) for an analysis of the
labour market in Mexico City, with focus on the impact of segmentation on the individual's
labour supply. In this paper, we use the sub-sample for married couples in Mexico City in which
each partner is less than 65 years old and the husband is employed. This gives observations on
3008 households. Some observations, however, are incomplete. 302 observations have no infor-
mation on the husband's income, 173 observations have no information on the wife's income, in
3  observations  both " husband"  and  wife are females,  in 20 observations  the  wife is retired  or  a
full-time student. After eliminating these observations, we get a sample of 2510 families. The
means and standard deviations  of the variables  used  in the analysis are presented in Table  4.1.
Iii 26 percent  of all households,   the  wife  has  a  paid job. Figure 4.1 gives the distribution
of working hours for the working wives. 31 percent of them work less than 30 hours per week
(compared  to only  8.6 percent of their husbands) Figure 4.2 gives the distribution of the working
wives' after-tax wage rates.    The  mean and median  of  the  wage  rate  are  7.17  and 4.89 pesos,
respectively, while the figures for the husbands are 7.58 and 4.44 pesos, respectively.
To get an idea about the age pattern of the female participation rate, we plot a nonparanietric
estimate of the participation probability as a function of age in Figure 4.3. The pattern is inversely
U-shaped. Women of about 30 years of age work most often. Figure 4.4 shows the pattern for
different subsamples. The figures do not reveal a clear relation between participation and the
presence of children or other adult females in the household if age is controlled for. A model with
more structure seems needed for this.
In our final sample,   83.1% are nuclear families, consisting  of no other persons   than  head.
partner, and their children. We use various indicat,rs of family structure in the labour supply
model. The variable adutts counts the number of adults including head, partner, their children
of age at least  12  (1.18 per household, on average), and other household member  of  age at least
12   (0.22 per household, on average). Childle counts the number of children younger  than  12.
ofemate is a dummy for the presence of other adult female(s) in the family.  This usually refers
to daughters older than 11, of whom there are, on average, 0.59 per household, and sometimes
to other female household members older  than  11  (0.14 per household, on average). Finally,  the
interaction dummy chdofem indicates whether there are adult females other than the mother who
could take care of the young children.9 48% of the families in our sample have young children
(age  5  12),  26% of these  also  have adult females other  than the mother. Adult females other
than the mother are present in about 35 percent of all families in the total sample.
'We also replaced chdofem with a dummy for the presence of both daugliter 2 12 and a child S 12. This gave
very similar results.
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Table 4.1. Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics
Variable Definition Alean Std. Dev.
age age of the individual 35.6 10.0
age2 age squared 1368 776
hour working hours 8.86 16.7
dnosch dummy no formal schooling 0.049
dbasic dummy 1-6 years education 0.428
djunior dummy 7-9 years education 0.187
dsenior dummy 10- 12 years education 0.048
dcollege dummy university education 0.078
dtechb dummy vocational education 0.041
plus 6 years education
dtechj dummy vocational education 0.160
plus 9 years educat iOIl
dtechs dummy vocational education 0.010
pius 12 years education
fnc total weekly earnings of the husband 364.5   (pesos)       480
and unmarried children
othern weekly earnings of other members 24.0 (pesos) 95.6
child12 No. of children of the head 0.876 1.09
of household aged 12 or less
adult number of adults (older than 12) 3.40 1.67
ofemate dummy presence of other female adult    0.353
chdofem dummy preseiice of both other 0.127 0.333
adult female and young child
eldis number of elderly and disabled 0.029 0.181
wage hourly wage (after-tax, pesos) 7.167 7.854
Note: wives of employed family heads only: 2510 observations.
Table 4.2 gives the means of some variables for several subsamples.  The low educated group
refers to females with at most six years of schooling, and the high educated group are all the
others. Compared to those with lower education level, highly educated individuals tend to be
younger, participate more often, and. given participation, have higher wage rates and work more
hours. Their husbands incomes are higher, possibly because the husband also tends to have
high education level. Wives with high education level have more young children but fewer adult
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females in the household. This may be due to the age differential, however.
Table 4.2. Means by Education Level and Family Composition
Variable Education With Children Without
Low High Other No other All Children
female female
obs. 1199 1311 319 888 1207 1303
age 38.3 33.1 36.8 30.0 31.8 39.1
chddle 0.78 0.96 1.66 1.88 1.82   0
adults 3.91 2.94 4.29 2.36 2.87 3.90
fnc 280.7 441.1 333.2 3322.3 325.2 400.9
participation 18.7 32.0 32.9 24.1 26.4 24.9
hours* 33.65 35.02 32.48 34.59 33.90 35.18
wage
* 4.43 8.63 5.82 7.61 7.02 7.31
* Workers only
In families with children, the wives participate more often if there is another adult female. Given
participation however, they work fewer hours than the wives in other families. Comparing all
wives with children with those without children, we find that the former participate more often.
On the other hand, conditional on participation, wives without children work more hours. The
differences are small, however.
Many of these results suggest that the effects of family composition on participation and hours
worked are different. In the structural model, this can be allowed for by making preferences as
well as fixed costs of working (or fixed revenues of not working) dependent on family composition
variables.
In the empirical literature on structural labour supply models, the role of progressive income
taxes is often emphasized (see Hausman,   1985, for example).   For the current study on Mexico,
however, the relevance of explicitly including the income tax in the analysis is doubtful. Mexico's
tax system is described in the appendix. The relation between before and after tax incomes is
almost linear. Moreover, nearly 36% of the workers in the sample work iii the informal sector,
where income taxes are hardly collected. Finally, although the situation has improved, tax
evasion is still common due to poor tax collection, long collection lags, and high inflation rates.
In  1991,  only 17.1 million individuals registered as tax payers in a population of about 86 million
(Aspe Armella, 1992), and total tax income was 15.6% of GDP. Individual income tax is just a
small part of this, amounting to 2.0% of GDP in 1990 (OECD Economic Surveys. 1992).  We
will use only after-tax income in the benchmark model, ignoring the weak nonlinearity iii the
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income tax, and discuss a model which incorporates the features of the income tax system in
our sensitivity analysis. The survey contains information on after-tax earnings per week. Log
after-tax hourly wages are computed from this and hours worked per week. In the model with
income tax. before-tax wage rates are recovered from the after-tax income using the details of
the tax brackets. It is assumed that before tax wage rates do not vary with hours worked. In
the benchmark model, it is assumed that after-tax wage rates do not vary with hours worked.
The husband's earnings, together with earnings of unmarried children, are considered as the
wife's nonlabour income. In the models we present, we do not include income of other family
members. We included this as a separate explanatory variable, but found it was insignificant.
4.4 Estimation Results
We present the estimation results for three labour supply models with fixed costs in Table 4.3.
In the first model (Model  I). the error  term  in  the wage equation is assumed  to be uncorrelated
with random preferences, while the other two models (Models II and III) allow for correlation.
The SML estimates of all models are based upon R = 20 draws per household. We use IL = 10
and m=8 for Model I and II, and IL =4 and m=1 9 for Model III. Model II is our benchmark
model, for which we will discuss the results in detail. The results for the other two models are
presented to show how sensitive the results are for allowing for correlation (model I) and for the
choice  of the number of points  in the budget set (model  III).  In the sensitivity analysis  in  the
next section, we will compare the resulting elasticities with some other alternative models. The
estimates of Model II and III appear to be very similar, but different from those of Model I. The
estimated utility function is increasing in income in more than 98% of all sample points for all
three models. 10
loThe liumbers of exceptions are 45, 17, and 29 (out of 2510 observations) in Models I, II and III. respectively.
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Table 4.3. Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Model I Model II Model III
Utility Atnction (Equation 4.1,1.
1 All 0.913 (0.184) 1.780 (0.221) 1.812  (0.194)
/112 0.706 (0.086) 0.486 (0.088) 0.638  (0.084)
A22 -1.864 (0.265) -2.045 (0.256) -2.161  (0.218)
bl -14.879 (2.017) -21.816 (2.314) -23.589 (2.070)
"326's iii  62  (Equation  4.2)
constant 4.846 (2.938) 8.856 (2.950) 7.849  (2.742)
ofemizte -0.046 (0.370) -0.122 (0.383) 0.089  (0.387)
ch.dofem 0.501 (0.432) 0.465 (0.429) 0.339  (0.425)
age/102 9.595 (10.30) 15.597 (10.41) 13.560  (10.06)
age2/104 -9.551 (13.03) -15.976 (13.35) -13.431 (12.97)
child12 0.105 (0.137) 0.094 (0.138) 0.130 (0.137)
adult -0.207 (0.088) -0.215 (0.092) -0.241   (0.100)
ar           0.909 (0.256) 0.821 (0.253) 0.704  (0.248)
p                0              0.858 (0.094) 0.879 (0.091)
Fixed Revenues  (Equation  4.9)
constant 2134.7 (663.7) 1095.5 (235.9) 1282.7  (259.4)
ofemale 10.549 (73.25) 8.015 (34.3) -8.302  (37.48)
chdofem -186.23 (92.64) -87.106 (39.7)  -85.795  (42.37)
age/102 -8015.8 (3089) -3766.0 (1139) -3966.6 (1211)
age21104 9891.3 (3870) 4603.3 (1437) 4856.4 (1534)
child12 16.047 (25.68) 6.646 (12.01) 4.288  (12.88)
adult 52.145 (25.35) 19.556 (9.895) 23.940 (11.27)
eldis 7.469 (82.17) 15.141 (38.35) 16.751  (41.23)
Wage  Equation  (Equation  4.8).
constant 0.010 (0.363) 0.600 (0.308) 0.623  (0.309)
age/102 5.542 (1.910) 3.478 (1.643) 3.396  (1.645)
age2/104 -6.389 (2.515) -3.805 (2.166) -3.747 (2.169)
nosch 0.083 (0.112) 0.009 (0.091) 0.013  (0.091)
djunior 0.196 (0.065) 0.187 (0.051) 0.188  (0.052)
dsenior 0.443 (0.096) 0.410 (0.072) 0.404 (0.073)
dtechb 0.324 (0.083) 0.265 (0.067) 0.275  (0.068)
dtechj 0.612 (0.056) 0.554 (0.049) 0.559  (0.049)
dtechs 0.751 (0.195) 0.638 (0.180) 0.655  (0.188)
dcolleg 1.035 (0.070) 0.856 (0.060) 0.862  (0.060)
a. 0.504 (0.016) 0.473 (0.012) 0.473  (0.012)
logSL* -1485.8 -1466.1 -1775.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
* log SL: simulated log likelihood.
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The signs of the parameters determine the way in which characteristics affect preferences.  A
positive B2k implies a positive effect of zk on the marginal utility of leisure, and a negative
effect on labour supply. A positive parameter in the fixed revenues equation indicates that the
corresponding variable has a negative impact on participation. In all three models, coefficients of
age terms appear to be insignificant for preferences, but significant in the fixed revenues equation.
The coefficients for the number of young children are separately insignificant but Wald tests show
that they are jointly significant (at the 5% level) in models II and III. The number of adults plays
opposite roles in labour supply and labour force participation: we find a positive coefficient in
b2 and a negative coefficient in fixed revenues. The number of elderly and disabled people is not
significant.11 The joint presence of young children and another adult female decreases fixed costs
of working, thus increasing labour force participation of mothers. It does not affect preferences
significantly, implying that it will not change labour supply conditional on participation.
To show the effects of family structure. we have drawn some labour supply curves in Figures
4.5-4.7.  These are based on simulations using Model II, and take account of fixed revenues
and error terms. Presented are, as a function of wage rate and family characteristics, expected
numbers of hours worked, with the expectation taken over the error terms in the model other
than €™. The wife's age is set to 35 years. Figure 4.5 presents labour supply curves for families
including and excluding other adult females. In both families there are 1 child and 4 adults. In
the range between 0 and 20 pesos, containing nearly 96% of all observed wages, the presence of
other females increases the labour supply of mothers. Figure 4.6 shows that the more children
the  wife  has, the fewer hours  she  will work. Figure 4.7 shows  that the number of adults  in  the
family does not have much influence at low wage levels, but at high wages individuals in large
families work more. This is because, at low wages, the two opposite effects on preferences and
fixed revenues cancel out, while at high wage levels, the positive effect via preferences on labour
supply dominates. Overall, the three figures suggest that the impact of family composition is
quite limited, although it is statistically significant.
The significant estimates of p in Models II and III indicate that the error in the wage equation
(Ew) and the random preference term (e') are correlated. Their positive signs imply a positive
correlation between the two. In the model, this reflects a positive correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity in wages and unobserved heterogeneity in the marginal utility of leisure. This is a
somewhat unexpected result, since we would expect that the more productive people also tend to
1 1 Although  this  is  not  necessary for identification, we excluded this variable  from the preferences specification.
Since the variable hardly plays a role in the fixed revenues either. we do not expect the results would chalige if
the variable had not been included at all.
4.5. Simulations 79
have a larger preference for work. i.e. a lower Hiarginal utility of leisure. An alternative. perhaps
more plausible, ititerpretation is that the positive correlation reflects measurement error in the
observed hourly wages.12 This is not explicitly allowed for in our model, however: we assume
that the wage rate including the error terin drives the labour supply decision.
Due to the complex structure of the model, the parameters A  are hard to interpret.  Iii1J
Figure 4.8, we draw some iiidifference curves in the (V, h) plane for families with one child and
four adults, including one other female. Age is set to 35. For other types of fainilies, t.he figures
are similar. The figure is based upon Alodel II. Error terms and fixed costs are 11Ot taken into
account. Utility levels increase from the dashed to the solid line. The curves have t.lie expected
convex sliape. At low hours. many ciirves are aliziost flat. iiidicatiiig tliat tiobody (ignoriiig error
teriiis) wozild want to work part-time. This can explaiii why relatively few part-tinie jobs are
observed  in  the data. Together with fixed revenues.  random  preferences,  etc.-  the  sliape  of  the
indifference curves determines the sensitivity of labour supply for changes iii wages. other inc om e.
etc.. This will be discussed in next section.
4.5 Simulations
Using simulations. we first examine the goodness of fit of the models, and then aiialyze the seii-
sitivity of average labour supply and participation with respect to wage rate and other inconie.
The third purpose of the simulations is to compare the different specifications of the model. In
particular, we study the relevance of incorporating the tax system. The siniulated liours per in-
dividual are the "expected hours," computed as a probability weighted sum of hours levels. Froni
these. we compute average values for the whole sample and for several subsamples. Simulated
hours   giveii   participatioii   are the ratios of hours worked   and   the   probability   of   participation.
Wage and income elasticities are derived by increasing all wage rates or other incomes by  1St
and calczilating the percentage change of average hours.
Table 4.4 presents means of observed and simulated hours (given participation) and partic-
ipation rates for Model II. We split the sample according to the women's education level, and
eadi group is further split by family type. The model fits the data quite well in ternis of the pre-
dicted Ineall hours worked and participation rates for the whole sample. The model also predicts
a large part of the difference between participation rates of those with high and low education
12In  a  loglinear model for hours worked,  it is straightforward to sliow that correlation betweeii  f ".  ail(1  c "  would
perfectly correct  for a meastireinent error  i Ii  ic  independent  of h.   If the ekect of wages on labour  stipply  is  positive.
tliis wozilci lead to a iiegative correlation between wage eqiiation and labour supply equation errors.  Iii the clirrent
nonlinear  model. the correlation  we  find  can  be  seeii  as  a first order approximation  for  this.
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level, although there are no education variables in the structural model, and education enters
through the wage rates only. Differences between average hours worked of working women in
the various subsamples are small, and they are not captured by the model. Similar results (not
presented) are found for Models I and III.
Table 4.4. Average Hours Worked and Participation
No. obs. Sample Model II
Whole sample 2510 34.6 (26.5%) 33.7 (26.4%)
High education 1311 35.0 (32.0%) 34.0 (30.3%)
Family composition
No child 584 35.4 (32.0%) 34.4 (30.8%)
With children 727 34.7 (32.0%) 33.6 (30.0%)
No other female 579 35.0 (30.2%) 34.0 (27.7%)
With other females 148 33.8 (39.2%) 32.1 (38.3%)
Low education 1199 33.7 (18.7%) 33.4 (22.0%)
Family composition
No child 719 34.8 (19.2%) 34.0 (21.6%)
With children 480 31.8 (17.9%) 32.6 (22.8%)
No other female 309 32.9 (12.6%) 33.1 (18.8%)
With other females 171 30.9 (27.5%) 31.5 (29.8%)
Percentages in parentheses are participation rates
Sample: sample means and participation rates
Model II: simulated means and participation rates using Model II
Simulated elasticities for Model II are presented in Table 4.5 for the full sample and in Table 4.6
for some sub-samples. The numbers are point estimates. By repeating the simulations for a
large number of draws from the estimated asyniptotic distribution of the parameter estimates,
we also calculated 95% confidence intervals (Table  4.5) and standard errors (Table  4.6).   As  can
be seen in Table 4.5, a rise of 1% in all wage rates would lead to a rise of average working hours
by 0.87%, while participation would increase by 0.75%. If other income (i.e. husband's and
unmarried children's income) increases by 1%, average working hours would fall by 0.17%, and
participation would decrease by 0.10%. The confidence intervals show, for example,  that the other
income elasticity of hours worked is significantly negative, though not very precisely determined.
It should be noted that many different elasticities are used in the empirical literature, limiting the
value of comparisons. For example. many studies consider the elasticity of the average household,
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or the mean of the elasticities of all households in the sample. We consider the elasticity of average
hours worked, which seems the most interesting elasticity from a policy point of view. Moreover,
the other income elasticity will depend on what is included in other income, which is largely
determined  by  the  data  at  hand (see Section 4.3). Finally, our elasticities include the effects  on
participation, while many empirical studies in the literature focus on workers only, and analyze
labour supply elasticities conditional upon participation.
The main conclusion from Table 4.6 is that the wives who are higher educated are more
sensitive to wage changes, but less sensitive to changes of other incomes than the lower educated.
For given education level, elasticities do not vary a lot with family composition, and many of
these differences are insignificant. For the low educated wives, the wage elasticity decreases with
the preseiice of children younger than 12, but for the higher educated wives, the reverse is fouiid.
The (absolute value of the) income elasticity increases with the presence of children for both
education levels.
Table 4.5 Elasticities; Whole Sample
point estimate 95% confidence interval
Ehw 0.867 10.600, 1.089]
€hi -0.166 1-0.264, -0.071]
Epw 0.746 10.528, 0.922]
€p, -0.097 [-0.199,-0.002]
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Table 4.6 Elasticities for some Subsamples
€hw €hi €pw                    €pi
High education   1.020 (0.13)   -0.153 (0.04)  0.873 (0.10)  -0.065 (0.04)
Composition
No child 1.003 (0.13)  -0.139 (0.04)  0.861 (0.10)  -0.043 (0.04)
With childern 1.034 (0.13)  -0.165 (0.04)  0.883 (0.11)  -0.083 (0.04)
No other female 1.078 (0.14)  -0.163 (0.05)  0.931 (0.11)  -0.076 (0.04)
With other feni. 0.904 (0.12)  -0.173 (0.04)  0.746 (0.10)  -0.104 (0.03)
Low education   0.635 (0.12)  -0.186 (0.06)  0.555 (0.10)  -0.146 (0.07)
Composition
No child 0.652 (0.12)  -0.157 (0.06)  0.576 (0.10)  -0.104 (0.07)
With children 0.610 (0.12)  -0.229 (0.06)  0.526 (0.10)  -0.205 (0.07)
No otlier female 0.602 (0.12)  -0.250 (0.05)  0.530 (0.10)  -0.229 (0.08)
With other fem. 0.620 (0.11)  -0.203 (0.06)  0.522 (0.09)  -0.178 (0.06)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
We present the simulation results for the whole sample of various alternative specifications in
Table 4.7. The first row repeats the results of the benchmark model, Model II. In the second row,
the simulated maximum likelihood procedure is based upon R = 30 instead of R = 20 draws
per observation. Rows 3,5 and 6 use models with more points in the choice set and smaller
hours intervals (multiples of 4,  2,  and  1  hours per week, versus 10 hours in model  II).  Row 4  uses
the same model as row 3, but with R - 30 instead of R = 20. The table shows that in terms
of predicted hours and participation, these specifications give similar results as the benchmark
model. In terms of elasticities, the results for R - 20 and R - 30 draws are also very similar.
This suggests that for 20 draws already, the simulated maximum likelihood results are a good
approximation to exact maximum likelihood,  in  line  with the results  of van Soest   (1995).   The
wage elasticities vary somewhat with the number of points in the choice set, with smaller values
in the model with a finer hours grid. but even the smallest values are above the lower bound
of  the 95% confidence intervals according  to the benchmark model (see Table  4.5).    Thus  the
elasticities we obtain are reasonably robust to the choice of hours grid, although there seems
to be some tendency that choosing fewer points leads to higher wage and income elasticities of
hours worked.
The  seventh  row of Table 4.7 presents the simulation results of Model  I. In terms of average
working hours and participation rates, Model I performs similarly to Model II; the assumption
of no correlation between wage equation error and random preferences does not matter much for
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goodness of fit. But coinpared to Model II, the wage elasticities are smaller.
The final row in Table 4.7 shows the results when we incorporate the progressive income tax
system (Model  III). The estimated elasticities are very close to those  in the benchmark model,
confirming that the nonlinearity of the Mexican income tax system hardly plays a role.
Table 4.7. Simulation Results of Alternative Model Specifications
predictions elasticities
Hours Partic. €hw €hi €pw    €p,
Model II
(IL = 10, m = 8, R = 20) 33.7 26.4% 0.867 -0.166 0.746 -0.097
IL = 10, m = 8, R = 30 33.8 26.4% 0.853 -0.163 0.733 -0.096
IL = 4, m = 19, R = 20 33.9 26.5% 0.802 -0.165 0.685 -0.071
IL = 4, m = 19, R = 30 33.9 26.6% 0.792 -0.163 0.677 -0.070
IL=2, m=37, R=20 34.1 26.7% 0.713 -0.160 0.616 -0.053
IL -1, m -73, R =20 34.5 26.3% 0.604 -0.152 0.531 -0.037
Model I (p = 0) 34.0 26.0% 0.333 -0.175 0.308 -0.062
IL = 10, m = 8, R = 20,
including tax 33.8 26.3% 0.847 -0.174 0.732 -0.105
To test formally for model misspecifcation, we use the chi-square goodness of fit tests introduced
by  Andrews (1988). These are generalizations  of the traditional Pearson chi-square tests  for  the
multinomial model. They are based upon partitioning the sample space into a given number
of cells J, and comparing sample frequencies with probabilities predicted by the model. In our
case the test statistic is based upon the SML estimates, and the test statistic can be computed
straightforwardly.  Let A b e the n x J matrix with the differences between observed and predicted
cell probabilities per observation, where n is the number of observations.13  Let B be the n x K
matrix of scores, where  K  is the number of estimated parameters,  and  let  C be the matrix  [A l B]
The test statistic is then equal to the explained sum of squares of the regression of an n x l
vector of ones on the columns of C. If the J cells are constructed as products of a partition of
the covariates space  (X)  into G cells, and the space of endogenous variables (working hours,  H),
then under the null of a correct specification, the test statistic follows a chi-square distribution
with J-G degrees of freedom.
We computed eight test statistics based on different partitions of X x H.  For X, we use
four  partitions:    a) no partitioning,   b) two education categories (low level  vs. high level),   c)
13The observed probability is one if the individual belongs to tlie cell and zero otherwise. The predicted
probability is based upon the parameters estiinates, and conditional on the covariates.
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two  family size categories (small vs. large families), d) three types of families (with children
and other females, with children  but no other females, without children).    For  H  we  use  two
partitions: a) a partition into eight hours categories, and b) a partition into the three categories
not working. working part-time, and working full-time. The results are presented in Table 4.8.
The tests reject the null-hypothesis of no misspecification. This shows that the model does
not perfectly reproduce participation rates and hours worked in the data.14 The fact that the
model specification is formally rejected by the data is not uncommon in the literature. As far as
we know, in the few studies that explicitly test for this, the result is the same (Magnac, 1991,
Pradhan  and van Soest,   1997).
Table 4.8. Chi-square tests
Part. of X   Part. of H   Test Stat. J-G Critical value
(a = 0.01)
a)           a)          510          7                 18.5
a)          b)         118          2                 9.2
b)            a)           565           14                    29.1
b)             b)            142             4                     13.3
c)           a)          520         14                 29.1
c)             b)            118             4                     13.3
d)            a)           534           22                    40.3
d)            b)           122            6                    16.8
* Hours worked given participation
Partions of X: a) No Partition, b) two education categories:
c) two family size categories; d) three family type categories.
Partitions of H: a) eight cells: non-workers, seven cells of workers
partitioned according to working hours; b) three cells: 0 hours,
between 0 and 40 hours, 40 hours of work or more.
14A closer look at the test results reveals that the columns of A and B are almost collinear. The explained sum
of squares remains small if either the columns of A or the columns of B are included, but explodes when they are
iised simultaneously. The intuitive interpretation is that the model fit may be reasonable, but that the flexibility
of the model should lead to an even better fit if the specification was correct.
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4.6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the labour supply of married women in Mexico City, emphasizing the influence
of family structure. We used a static structural neoclassical model, extending the model of van
Soest (1995). Fixed revenues of not working are taken into account,  and are found  to be positive
for all the observations. Also incorporated are random preferences, error terms in wages of
nonworkers, and correlation between these two types of error terms.
We find that the overall effects of family structure on labour supply are limited although
significant, with some opposite effects through fixed revenues of not working and preferences.
Nevertheless, in the range where most observed wages are found. the presence of another female
increases labour supply of mothers with young children. These results are robust across the
different specifications. The estimates for alternative specifications (not presented in the paper)
not only have the same signs but also appear to be very similar in magnitude and significance
level.
The married women's labour supply elasticities we find are in line with those in the literature
(although these are often defined and computed in different  ways):  in our benchmark model,  the
uncompensated wage elasticity of average hours worked for the total sample is 0.87, while the
other income elasticity  is -0.17. These elasticities are based  upon a discrete choice set, where  it
is assumed that each married females chooses between working 0 hours, 10 hours, 20 hours,
and 70 hours per week. Increasing the number of choices to multiples of 4, 2 or 1 hour per week,
leads to somewhat smaller wage elasticities, and to almost the same income elasticities. These
elasticities are never outside the 95% confidence interval for the elasticities in the benchmark
model. On the other hand, ignoring the correlation between the error term iii the wage equation
and the random preference error term, leads to strongly underestimated wage elasticities.
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4.A Appendix
Mexico's income tax system
Mexico has an individual based income tax system. It is progressive with 8 brackets, which are
indexed on inflation. To compensate for the high inflation rate, subsidies are used to reduce the
effective marginal rate. The subsidy rates are also progressive. The marginal tax rate ranges
from 3% to 35%, but if subsidies are taken into account, they vary only from 3% to 17%.  Many
components of income are tax-exempt, for example, fringe benefits, overtime pay, and social
insurance benefits (OECD Economic Surveys,  1992).
In the sample, 545 out of 644 workers fall in the brackets with a marginal rate of 17% or
less. Taking account of the subsidy, their effective marginal rate is at most 8.5%. In Figure 4.A,
the wives' yearly after-tax earnings are plotted against yearly before-tax earnings. The relation
is close to linear. Regressing after-tax earnings on before-tax earnings for workers gives a slope
coefficient of about  0.82 (with standard error 0.002),  and  an  R2  of 0.99.
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Figures
Figure 4.A. Relationship between after-tax earnings and before-
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of hours worked; workers only
Figure 4.2. Distribution of after-tax wage rates; workers only
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Figure 4.3. Nonparametric regression of participation rate
on age with 95% uniform confidence interval (bandwidth = 8
hours)
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Figure 4.4. Nonparametric estimates of participation rates on
age for subsamples with 95% uniform confidence intervals
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Figure 4.5. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with one
child, four adults, with or without other female
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Figure 4.6. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with zero
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Figure 4.7. Simulated Labour Supply Curve: Family with one
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Figure 4.8. Indifference Curves; Family with one child, four
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A Structural Labour Supply Model
with Nonparametric Preferences*
5.1    Introduction
Nonparametric regression techniques are usually seen as a statistical device for data description
and exploration. They are typically not used for estimating more complex models with a rich
economic structure, which are often required for policy analysis. Models for policy analysis,
therefore, are often characterized by restrictive functional form assumptions, which are required
to make the econometrics tractable, but lack sound economic foundation.
An example is the extensive literature on neo-classical structural labour supply models. This
literature goes back to Hausman's kinked budget constraint model, which has been extended in
many directions and applied to many data sets.  See, for example, Burtless and Hausman  (1978),
Hausman   (1981,    1985),   and the surveys of Moffitt   (1986.    1990) and Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999).    It  is  one  of the first  type of limited dependent variable models in micro-econometrics
where economic theory and econometric specification are directly linked. In most applications of
this model, a restrictive specification of preferences is used, particularly when the budget sets are
nonconvex.  The main reason is that an analytic solution of the utility maximization problem then
requires explicit expressions for both the direct utility function and the labour supply function
(or the indirect utility or expenditure function).   Thus  the rich economic structure  of the model
hampers flexibility of the specification.
In the case of piecewise linear convex budget constraints, this problem can be avoided. Using
the specific search algorithm  for the optimum  for  this  case (see Blomquist,   1983, for example),
*Chapter 5 is identical to Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2000).
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only the specification of the labour supply curve is necessary, and more flexible specifications
come within reach. Blomquist and Newey  ( 1997) have exploited  this idea to estimate the labour
supply curve nonparametrically, approximating it by a series expansion. This is to our knowledge
the only example in this field where economic theory and nonparametrics are combined into one
econometric model. Still, this study remains close to the original Hausman framework, and does
not allow for, for example, non-convex budget sets, unobserved wages of non-workers, or joint
decisions of two spouses. The main reason is that Blomquist and Newey use the labour supply
function only, and avoid the need to specify the underlying direct utility function.
In this chapter, we build the model around a nonparametric specification of the direct utility
function. In this way, we introduce a structural nonparametric labour supply model which can
be used for the analysis of all sorts of (non-linear) tax and benefits changes. Following van
Soest  ( 1995), we replace the actual budget  set  by a finite number of points  on its boundary,  and
approximate the utility maximization problem by finding the best point in this finite set. We
do not require that the tax and benefits system is piecewise linear or convex, and we show how
fixed costs of working, unobserved wages. and non-participation can be incorporated.
Moreover, we show how our model avoids the critique by MaCurdy et al. (1990) that co-
herency of the model implicitly limits the range of elasticities that can be obtained. This implies
that policy outcomes may be driven by implicit constraints on the chosen model, rather than
by the data and the estimates. Thus our framework allows for a nonparametric specification of
preferences but also for many other features of structural labour supply models which have been
addressed in the literature.
In our framework, the direct utility function is approximated by a nonparametric series ap-
proximation in hours and income. Observed individual or family characteristics are incorporated
through one or more of the coefficients in the series approximation. Unobserved heterogeneity
can be incorporated by treating one or more of the parameters of the utility function as random
coefficients. Their random parts can in principle be allowed to have some flexible distribution, for
example a mixture of normals or a discrete distribution with several mass points, as in Heckman
and Singer (1984).
For given length of the series expansion, our model can be estimated by smooth simulated
maximum likelihood.  GEV I type errors are added to the utility values of all alternatives in
the finite choice set. These errors can be seen as alternative specific random errors in utility
evaluation,  or can simply  be  interpreted  as a smoothing device  (as in Keane and Moffitt, 1998).
The wage equation is estimated jointly with the labour supply model, and non-participants are
included.
The results can be used to compute labour supply elasticities or to analyze the effects of
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changes in taxes and benefits on participation and labour supply. The approach will be applied
to data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel. and we will illustrate the usefulness of our results
for policy analysis by studying the consequences of a recently proposed income tax reform for
which nonconvexities  in the budget constraint are particularly important.
In statistical terms, the method we propose is similar to, for example, the technique of
semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood introduced by Gallant and Nychka (1987). Error  term
distributions and/or the utility function can be specified with some flexible series approximation.
Once the number of terms in the series approximations is fixed, ML is performed, with its usual
Kullback-Leibner information criterion interpretation. The nonparametric feature is that the
number of terms can become large, i.e. increases to infinity with the number of observations, but
at a slower rate. We focus on the practical application of these ideas, and not 011 deriving the
appropriate convergence rates or the asyniptotics of the estimator if the number of terms in the
series approximation tends to infinity. Thus, formally, our hypothesis tests and standard errors
are only valid under the assumption that the length of the series approximation is given, and
that the utility function is perfectly captured this given length. In this case, standard properties
of (parametric) simulated maximum likelihood apply. Comparing results for different lengths of
the series expansion will show whether this is an overly restrictive view.
The difference between our framework and many other nonparametric models is that economic
theory is used to impose some structure on the model. A utility function is estimated, but labour
supply, i.e., the outcome of utility maximization, is observed.  One wage rate (at most) is observed
for each individual, but the complete budget set is needed for utility maximization. Economic
theory does not impose the functional form of the utility function. It therefore seems natural
to use a flexible, nonparametric specification of this utility function, while at the same time
retaining the economic structure of the model.
So basically, we combine information in the data with two types of prior information: the
nonparametric assumption of utility maximization, and the limitation of the number of terms in
the series approximations required due to the finite size of the sample.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2. we introduce
the model and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the discrete approach compared to the
continuous approach. In Section 5.3, we discuss the estimates of the model for Dutch female
labour supply data. We focus on the sensitivity of the results to the chosen length of the series
approximation. We look at labour supply elasticities, and at the effects on participation and
hours worked of a recently proposed tax reform. In Section 5.4, we discuss several simulation
exercises to investigate the quality of our ML estimator. and its sensitivity to misspecification.
Section 5.5 concludes.
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5.2 The Model
We present a static neo-classical structural labour supply model. The basic framework is similar
to  that  of van Soest   (1995). We describe the model for single decision makers. The model  for
joint decision makers such as married couples is a straightforward generalization of this, but is
not the focus of the current paper. In the application below, we will analyze the labour supply of
married females, conditional on hours worked by their husbands (and on the husbands' earnings),
where the woman is the only decision maker in the model.
Utility
The individuals utility depends on leisure (TE - h, where TE is the time endowment), and
on  total net income  of the family  (y).   Net  inconie is partly determined  by the individual's  own
earnings, but can also contain the spouse's earnings. asset income, child allowances, etc.. We
follow the majority of labour supply studies, in which 'leisure' is the aggregate of all other tillie
uses except work. The time endowineIit is a common constant for all individuals, and will drop
out of the polynomial expansions.  As a consequence, it is equivalent to work with a direct utility
function  with  arguments  y  and h instead  of  y  and  TE -  h.
The model would be consistent with utility maximization in a life cycle framework with
intertemporally additive preference if net income could be replaced by total expenditures (see
Blundell and Walker.   1986).    In our application,   the  data  do not contain any information  on
consumption expenditures or savings, so that we remain iii a static framework.
The direct utility function is specified as a polynomial in its arguments h and y
U(h, y) = I E     0(p. q)hpyq: (5.1)
p=O....,K q=0....,K-p
A- is the order of the polynomial and determines the flexibility of the utility function. If K is
allowed to become arbitrarily large, the parameters a(p, q)  can be chosen in such a way that
U(h, y) can approximate any given function of h and y to any desired accuracy on a given
compact set.  In this sense. the class of utility functions in (5.1) is very general, and can be
seeii as a nonparametric family of utility functions. On the other hand, for a finite sample size,
the  order  of the polynomial  that  can  be  used  is  limited.   As  usual  with tionparametric series
expansions, asymptotics will require that K tends to infiziity much slower than the number of
observations. In practice on the other hand. only small values of K can be used in estimation for
the size of the sample which is typically available. We will use K = 1.2.3.4 and 5. and compare
the results for these different values of K.
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We will see below that the economic interpretation of the model requires that the utility
functioii is increasing with income (this is due to the assumption that everyone always chooses
a  point  on the frontier  of her budget set rather  than  in the interior).   We  will  not  impose  this
assumption a pnon but check whether it is satisfied by our unrestricted estimates. We will
also see that the model does not require quasi-concavity of preferences, so that we do not have
to   impose this either   (this is because  we   use   utility  maximization  over  a finite budget   set,   not
requiring tangency  conditions).   Thus  we  will Iiot impose  any a prioR restrictions on the utility
futiction in (5.1).
To allow the utility function to vary with taste shifters such as age and the number of
children, the parameters  a (p. q)  can  be made dependent  on a vector  X of individual  and  family
characteristics. In practice. however, it will be hard to disentangle effects of X via different
a(p, q).  In the estimates below therefore. only the parameter a(1.0) -the coefficient of the linear
term h in (5.1) - will be allowed to vary with X:  a(1,0)  = Bo + X'B. This is an attractive
choice from the point of view of interpreting the results. since it implies that the marginal utility
of leisure varies linearly with  X,  and  the  sign  of the coefficients  in  13  immediately determiiies
whether the corresponding taste shifter has a positive or a negative impact on the marginal
utility of leisure,  i.e., a negative or a positive impact on labour supply.   On the other hand, there
is no theoretical reason not to allow more of the a(p, q) to depend on X, or not to allow for a
nonlinear effect of X on these parameters. A specification which is fully nonparametric in X
would obviously require this. Our series expansion makes the utility function nonparanietric in its
arguments h and y, but not in X. Practical limitations due to curse of dimensionality problems
and limitations of the data prevented us from experimenting with specifications which are more
flexible in X. Moreover, the utility function is only identified up to a monotonic transformation
which may depend on X, implying that complete flexibility in terms of X would lead to an
unidentified model  (cf., e.g., Pollak and Wales,  1979).
Apart from heterogeneity through observed characteristics X, preferences may also vary with
unobserved characteristics. To incorporate this, the Hausnian type models have typically allowed
for random preferences by adding an error term to one of the parameters of the utility function.
We follow the same strategy and, in line with the way X is allowed to enter, assume that
unobserved heterogeneity  (urp) enters through the parameter  a(1,0)
62(1,0) = Bo + X'B + urp    urp - AYO, aQp) (5.2)
The normality assumption is mainly made for convenience, and could in principle be replaced
by a more flexible distribution. For example. a niixture of normals could be used, or a discrete
distribution  with a finite number of mass  points  (cf.   Heckman and Singer, 1984). While these
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are interesting non-parametric extensions of the framework considered here, we will not consider
them in our estimates below. The reason is that we already found it hard to accurately estimate
the variance  orp in the normal specification given by  (5.2), and could  not find strong support  for
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, with the standard error on the estimate of arp typiCally
exceeding its point estimate.
Constraints
Labour supply is based upon utility maximization under constraints. An obvious constraint is
the budget restriction:  to each choice of the number of working hours corresponds a different net
income for the family. To determine net family income as a function of the wife's working hours,
we need her earnings, other household income (husband's earnings, child benefits, asset income),
taxes, and potential unemployment benefits or social security benefits. The components of other
household income are observed or can be computed directly from variables observed in the data.
To determine the wife's earnings for each number of working hours, we assume that her gross
hourly wage rate does not depend on her hours worked. This is a common assumption in most of
the structural labour supply literature, although exceptions exist (see Mothtt, 1984, or Tummers
and Woittiez,  1991).   If wage rates are observed  in  the data without measurement error,  we can
then compute gross earnings for each possible number of working hours for those women who
work.
For non-workers, we need to predict the before tax wage rate. For this purpose, and to be able
to take account of measurement error in observed wage rates, we explicitly need to incorporate
a wage equation. To account for selectivity of observed wages in a way consistent with the
labour supply model, we estimate the wage equation jointly with the labour supply model.1  The
parameters in the wage equations are then used to predict the wages of non-workers. Because
the labour supply model is nonlinear in wages. it is necessary to take the wage rate prediction
errors into account to get consistent estimates of the labour supply model (see the description of
the estimation technique given below).
The wage equation we use is given by
Logiv  =  Z'y  +  u.,  + ew, (5.3)
u.,  - 3(0, LI') (unobserved heterogeneity in wages) ,
1 Here we follow  Gong  and van Soest (2000) rather than Vall Soest (1995). The latter estimates  the  wage
equation separately using a standard Heckman selection model (Heckman.   1979).   with the selection equation
which cari be seen as a (linearized reduced form) approximation to the selection mechanism implied by the
structural model
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ew - N(0,  72) (measurement error):
with u,v, e. independent of each other and of other error terms in the model.
Here w is the observed wage rate, which possibly contains measurement error eu,· According to
simulation results of Blomquist  (1996),  such measureinent error could be quite influential for  the
elasticities of interest.   and   this   is  the   reasoii   wliy we incorporate  it.     Note   that   ae   and  0„   are
separately identified because the wage which enters the labour supply part of the model includes
uw   but   not   ew.     Thus   a  inore   general   interpretation   of eu. might   be   the   part   of  the   wage   rate
which is job or hours specific, and which is not iised in the respondents' labour supply decisioii.
We do not allow for meastirement errors on other variables. If women's wages are measured
with error. men's wages probably contain errors as well. and in our model this would lead to
measurement error in other income. This could be included in a similar way. but would require
an equation for other income. To keep things siniple. we do not do this iii the clirrent paper.
Another reason  for 11Ot addressiiig this issue  is that results of Blomquist (1996) suggest  that  tlie
bias iiiduced by this is much smaller than the bias due to measurement error on the wage rate.2
In the sample we use for estimation, all husbands work, and usually earn so much that social
assistance benefits for the family do not apply: family incomes excluding the wife's own earni11gs
usually exceed the official minimum standard of living, which depends on age, marital status and
family composition. For the few families in which the husband's earnings are so low that this is
not the case, we incorporate social assistance benefits: if family inconie is lower than the official
minimum standard of living, it is increased up to the minimum standard of living threshold.
We do not model unemployment insurance benefits. This is difficult to model due to lack of
data and due to the static nature of our framework. since unemployment insurance benefits are
of temporary nature. The most important type of benefits that enter the budget constraints are
child benefits, which do not depend on earnings or labour market status of the two spouses.
Following van Soest   (1995), the budget constraint under which the individual   maximizes
utility is approximated by a finite number of points. We take multiples of 4 hours (0,4,8,...,60)
This gives 16 points for each individual:  (hj, yj), j = 0....,15, where yj is after tax family income
if the wife works hj = 4j hours per week. Earlier research has shown that the sensitivity of the
results to the number of points is sniall (van Soest,   1995,  and  Gong  and van Soest, 2000).   We  do
not  repeat this analysis  iii  the czirrent paper since there  is no reason to expect a different  result.
2The specification of the error teriti in the wage eqiiat. ioii is different front that used iii earlier papers 1ising a
Similar  fratnework.   In  Gong  and vail Soest   (2000). a Ineasurellient error is iiot ii icluded explicitly. but the wage
error is allowed to correlate witli tlie random  preference  terni  ur,p·   The  significant  estimate  of  the  covariance  is
thell iiiterpreted as an indicatioii of measurement error.   Here we Inake  this more explicit.
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Fixed costs of working
Models without fixed costs of working. in which the utility function explains participation as well
as hours worked. typically tend to underpredict the number of non-workers. Including fixed costs
of working is one way to repair this. Fixed costs of working can also be seen as some gain to not
working compared to all the other possibilities. which makes 11Ot working more attractive than
working few hours per week. The level of the fixed costs may depend on individual and household
characteristics Z. We model them as: FC = Z'8. where Z is a vector of individual and family
characteristics.3 Iii computing the values of the utility function, we then replace income yj by
yi - FC if j > 0, i.e.. if the wife works. Since U is increasing with income, positive fixed costs
decrease the utility of working compared to the utility of not working, and therefore decrease the
probability of participation.
Fixed costs were used in a similar way by Callan and van Soest (1996) and Euwals and van
Soest (1999). An alternative way to explain the lack of part-time jobs is given by Dickens and
Lundberg (1993), Tummers and Woittiez (1991),  and Van Soest et al.  (1990), who model job offer
probabilities  for   part   time  jobs. Van Soest   ( 1995) uses disutilities of part-time jobs, reflecting
search costs of jobs with irregular hours. These methods attain the same goal as fixed costs:  the
model can reproduce both the participation rate and average hours worked. The choice between
the three seems a matter of taste; we chose fixed cost because it is economically plausible and
hardly complicates the model or the estimation procedure.
As explained above, the intuitive explanation why fixed costs are identified is the lack of
observations with a small positive number of working hours. While this argument is valid for
a restrictive specification of the utility function which limits the way in which utility can vary
between points with zero, few, or many hours per week, the argument no longer holds if the
specification of the utility function is fully nonparametric.  For such a specification, the utility
function itself could pick up the gap in the distribution at few hours, by assigning lower utility to
such hours values. Thus it seems that the fixed costs are nonparametrically unidentified. In our
specifications, the identification problem does not arise, due to the restrictive way in which the
taste shifters are allowed to enter the utility function and the fixed costs. Still, this seems a rather
unnatural way to obtain identification. The way to avoid this would be not to include fixed costs
explicitly in the nonparametric (higher polynomial expansion order) model, and to consider the
utility function as an evaluation of preferences in which fixed costs are already captured.  The
reason why we have not done this is that it makes a fair comparison with the parametric (lower
3Unobservecl heterogeneity iii fixed costs can be allowed for by addiIlg another error term. We experimented
with this biit it did not lead to any significant iniprovenient.
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order) model impossible.
Alternative specific error terms
The only error terms included so far are random preferences. In additioii. we introduce alternative
specific error terms as follows:
·u(hy.yj)=U(hj,yj) + cj; j=0. ..,15(4) (5.4)
We assume that the g are iid and follow an extreme value distribution. We assuine that the
answer  to the desired hours  question is based upon maximizing  u(hj, UJ) rather than U (hj,  YJ )
The error €j can be seen as the error made in evaluating alternative j. There are several reasoiis
why these errors are incorporated. First, they are needed to give nonzero probability to choices
which cannot be optimal for any value of the random preference term. Such choices may very
well exist in case of a nonconvex or discontinuous budget set, where some points on the budget
frontier may give very low family income compared to adjacent points.  Iii this sense, they play the
same role as the optimization or measurement errors iii the traditional Hausman (1985) model.
Second, it is attractive to include the g from a computational point of view: we will see below
that they facilitate simulated maximum likelihood estimation by smoothing the approximation
of this likelihood, and Call thus be seen as a smoothing device. The same interpretation is given
to them by Keane and Moffitt (1998).  They use the same type of error terms, but, enforcing their
interpretation, impose that the <j have a small variance compared to the variance in U(hj,16).We
do not make such an assumption and thus allow for both interpretations. Due to the assumption
on the distribution of the g the resulting model shows some similarity to the multinomial logit
model. The probability that an individual chooses alternative j, conditional on wage rates, tax
and benefit rules, exogenous variables, and random preference parameters, iS given by:
P[jl = exp{U(hj,yj)}/ Xezp{U(hk,1/k)}(5) (5.5)
k
The summation in the denominator is over the 16 points in the choice set.
P[j] increases with U(hj, 1/j) (given the other U(hk, Yk))· Since U is increasing in income. the
utility of working increases with the (before and after tax) wage rate. The utility of not working
is not affected by the wage rate. Thus the participation probability increases with the wage. This
illustrates that the participation decision is fully incorporated in the structural model, other than
in many labour supply studies which are conditional on participation.
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Coherency
An important issue in the piecewise budget constraint model is coherency. If preferences are not
quasi-concave in some relevant region, the model may not have a well-defined unique solution for
a non-zero probability set of values of the error terms. This implies that probabilities typically
used in likelihoods do not add up to one, and maximizing the likelihood can lead to inconsistent
parameter estimates. Van Soest et al.  (1993) give an example where the latter is indeed the
case. They argue that coherency should be imposed a priori before estimation. MaCurdy et
al.  (1990) show that imposing coherency in the linear labour supply model implies that labour
supply cannot be backward bending.  Thus imposing coherency conditions limits the flexibility of
the specification of preferences. Van Soest et al.  (1993) show that quasi-concavity of preferences
is suflicient but not necessary to guarantee coherency, and confirm the result that imposing
coherency in a restrictive specification leads to bounds on the potential elasticities and policy
effects. Blomquist (1995) shows that this problem is not unique to ML-estimation but also plays
a role if another estimation technique (IV) is used.
In the current set up, there are two reasons why the coherency problem does not arise and
conditions limiting flexibility can be avoided. First, the coherency problem in the Hausman
(1985)   model  is  due  to  the  way of solving utility maximization using Kuhn-Tucker's rules,  i.e.,
first order conditions. If preferences are not quasi-concave, there may be multiple solutions to
these first order conditions. The multi-regime econometric model based upon the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions may then have zero or more than one solutions.  In our set up, however, we do not
need to rely on tangency conditions or on other results of duality theory, since we simply choose
the utility maximum from a finite set of utility values. Due to the assumption of continuously
distributed €j, the probability that two points have optimal utility is zero, and with probability
one, our method defines an unambiguous utility optimum. Thus the model has a unique solution
with probability one and is coherent, whatever the shape of the utility function.
A second danger exists, however. An implication of the MaCurdy et al. (1990) critique is
that a seemingly flexible functional form may not be flexible anymore once quasi-concavity or
monotonicity are imposed. Even though we do not impose these conditions explicitly, it might
still be the case that the structure of the model implicitly will enforce the estimates to satisfy
quasi-concavity. For example, a wrongly shaped utility function would lead to high probabilities
of choosing the corners  of the budget frontier  (0  or  TE  hours  of work),  and ML estimates will
avoid this shape if the data points are typically not at these corners.  Thus even if coherency is not
imposed, the question whether quasi-concavity combined with functional form does not limit the
range of elasticity values or policy effects remains relevant.  In our case, however, we use a flexible
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functional form of the utility function. Even if we would impose quasi-concavity of preferences
on some relevant region of (h, y) space, we would not impose more than that, because our series
approximations are able to approximate any quasi-concave utility function arbitrarily. Thus
the  problem in MaCurdy  et  al.   ( 1990) that imposing coherency or quasi-concavity immediately
bounds tlie range of possible elasticities - due to the restrictive functional form - will not occur.
We will not iinpose quasi-concavity but we will check ex post whether estimated preferences
are quasi-concave. While this is strictly spoken not even necessary for the interpretation of the
model (only utility in the finite choice sets matters), it would help to reconcile our findings witli
those of the Hausinan approach.  The only thing we really need for economic interpretation
(atid meaningful policy simulations) is that utility increases with income y Since this is not
necessary for coherency of the econometric model either, we will check the condition el: post
without imposing it a p, zori.
Estimation
Due to the multinomial logit nature of the model. estimation by maxiinum likelihood would be
straightforward if random preference terms were observed and all wages were observed without
measurement error. In that case, the likelihood would follow directly from (5.2) and (5.5). since
the  U(hi' YJ)  wozild  then  be  known functions of parameters, explanatory variables. the observed
wage rate, and the known random preference term. The likelihood contribution of a given
individual would be her wage density (following from (5.2)) multiplied by the probability  in  (5.5).
But we do not observe the error terms (including those in the wage equation). As a consequence,
the likelihood contribution of a given observation is given by the mean value of the appropriate
expression  according  to  (5.2)  and  (5.5),  with  the mean taken  over the unobserved errors.    This
mean is a two-dimensional integral.  Such an integral can be approximated by conventional
numerical (quadrature) routines, in principle. A convenient alternative which also works for
dimensions higher than two. is simulated maxinium likelihood: the integral is replaced by a
simulated average based upon R independent draws from the (multivariate normal) distribution
of the unobserved errors, conditional upon the observed wage rate.  Due to the law of large
numbers, the approximation will be accurate if R becomes large. With independent draws across
observations. it can be shown that the approximation is accurate enough to make simulated
maximum likelihood asymptotically equivalent to exact maximunl likelihood if R tends to infinity
faster than the square root of the number of observations (see, for example, Hajivassiliou and
Ruud,   1994).   We  will  use  R  =  20. The sensitivity  of the results  to the choice  of  H is analyzed
by  Gong  and van Soest  (2000),  who  find  that  R  =  20 is large enough.   We will obtain  the same
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conclusion in our Monte Carlo study.
The simulated maximum likelihood procedure is greatly facilitated by the presence of the €j.
Without these, the likelihood contribution conditional on the unobserved error terms would be
either 0 or 1. The simulated likelihood would become a discontinuous function of the parameters,
its maximization would be numerically much harder, and zero contributions would have to be
dealt with. Adding the 9 smooths the likelihood and bounds it away from zero. Adding the
6, could thus be seen as a smoothing device, without giving the Ej any real economic meaning.
This  is the interpretation of Keane and Moflitt  (1998).   They  fix the variance  of the  €j  at  some
small value, and at the same time. impose a normalization on the systematic part of the utility
function. This a priori limits the share of the variance of the fj in the total variance of u(hj, yj)
We normalize the variance of cj only, and do not impose an additional scale normalization on the
utility function. This corresponds to the view that the cj could have some meaning as alternative
specific errors in the economic model. We let the data decide how important this is. Apart from
the normalization of the variance of €j we impose (2(0,0)  = 0 to fix the location of the utility
function.
5.3   Data and Estimation Results
Data
The data are drawn from the May  1995 wave of the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel  (SEP).  This is
a panel consisting of about 5,000 households, which are representative for the Dutch population
excluding people living in nursing homes, etc. We focus on married or cohabiting women in the
age group 16-64 whose partners have a paid job with observed earnings. We exclude women who
are full-time students, receive full-time disability benefits, or receive pensions or other retirement
benefits. This leads to a sample of 1794 women; 1100 of these have a paid job.
We tried to construct the dependent labour supply variable in such a way that demand side
restrictions do  not  play  a  role.  i.e.,  we  want  to use desired hours instead of actual hours worked.
For people who are looking for a(nother) job, we know how many hours they would like to work
in their new job. We consider this number rather than their actual hours as their desired labour
supply. For those who are not looking for a(not. her) job, however, we have no further information,
and have to assume that desired hours are given by actual hours.  Of the 694 non-workers in the
sample, 116 are looking for a job, and thus have positive desired hours.  Of the 1100 workers in
the sample, 152 are looking for another job with desired hours different from actual hours.
Earnings in the SEP are measured as gross earnings in the year 1994, retrieved from the
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respondents' tax files. These earnings can only be used to compute an hourly wage rate for the
job held at the time in the survey in May 1995 for people who have not changed jobs in 1994 or
from January 1995 until May 1995. For those who did change jobs in that period. earnings are set
to missing. This concerns 55 observations. Table 5.A.1 in the appendix contains the definitions
of the variables we use in the analysis. and Table 5.A.2 presents some sample statistics.  Non-
participation ainong married woilleti iii the Netherlands is still substantial, although it has fallen
substantially during the past two decades. III our sample (which excludes those who are not
available  for  work such as students or disabled),  the net participation rate (excluding those  who
are looking for work) is 60.9%. while the gross participation rate (including job searchers) is
67.3%.
Estimates
We have estimated the model for K = l to K = 5. In Tables 5.A.3 and 5.A.4 we present the
results for K=2 and K=5. Most parameters in the utility function cannot be interpreted
directly. The exceptions are the interactions between hours worked and characteristics, since
these parameters determine how the marginal utility changes with characteristics. These results
are similar for the two models.  They show that age is insignificant, while the presence of children
increases the disutility of hours worked, i.e., reduces labour supply. This effect is still stronger
when tliere are children of pre-school age. The impact of children we find is in line with the
bulk of the labour supply literature (see Nakamura and Nakamura,  1990, for example). Random
preferences play virtually no role: arp is small (compared to, for example, the variance of each
alternative specific error term which is normalized at. 7r2/6), and the standard error of its estimate
exceeds the point estimate.
We find that children reduce fixed costs. which seems counterintuitive. Combined with the
effect of children on preferences, this finding could mean that for women with children, working
a small number of hours per week is particularly attractive. Fixed costs fall with age until
approxinlately age 47.
The wage equation estimates correspond to commoti findings in the human capital literature,
with an increasing age pattern until about age 41. and higher wages for the higher educated.
The estimates of the standard deviations ou and of suggest that the labour supply decision is
largely based on the predicted wage. Most of the unpredicted part of the wage is not used in the
labour supply decision, for example because this is ineasurement error.
All the results discussed above are similar for the second order model and fifth order model.
They are also valid for the third and fourth order lilodel (results available upon request from the
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authors).   Only the first order estimates give a different picture,  with, for example,  an  even much
larger role of the measurement error €w compared to u..
To choose between the models of different orders, we present their likelihoods and AIC values
in Table 5.1. According to both the AIC criterion and likelihood ratio tests, the first order model
is clearly outperformed by all other models. Differences among the higher order models are much
smaller, but still, the fifth order model is a significant improvement compared to lower order
models, and also yields the best AIC value. In the sequel, we will focus on the first, Second
and fifth order model, since all results for the intermediate third and fourth order models are in
between the results for the second and fifth order model.
Table 5.1. Likelihood and AIC for different
specifications (real data)
specification  # parameters Likelihood AIC
lat order 22 -4536.04 5.081
2nd order 25 -4235.75 4.750
3rd order 29 -4234.08 4.753
4th  order                                 34 -4224.57 4.748
5th order 40 -4209.93 4.738
Figure 5.1 shows some estimated indifference curves   for the first, second and fifth order
models. Utility is increasing with income in almost all data points, although we did not impose
this a priori. Utility is also usually increasing with leisure, except at low hours for the fifth order
model.
The indifference curves for the first order model are by definition linear, so quasi-concavity
is not an issue there. The quadratic indifference curves for the second order model imply quasi-
concavity of preferences for all observed values  (h, V)·  For the fifth order model, the indifference
curves are convex in most of the relevant range of (h, V)-space, but not everywhere. In particular,
quasi-concavity of preferences is violated at points in (h, 1/) space with high values of working
hours.
Figure 5.2 presents labour supply curves, constructed in a similar way as traditional labour
supply curves. Hours worked are drawn as a function of the woman's own wage rates. The curves
concern a benchmark individual (age=40, non-female income=1000, 1 child aged less than 5, and
random preference  term  set  to  zero).  We show expected hours worked  in  case  of a linear budget
constraint (no fixed costs, no taxes or benefits), computed  as the probability weighted  mean
of the possible hours values 0,4,8,...,60 in the model. The probabilities are computed from the
model estimates (using (5.5)). Again, the first order model gives very different outcomes  from
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the other models. These other models lead to labour supply curves which are similar to each
other in the range of low wage rates, but which show some larger differences for high wage rates.
For the second, third and fourth order model, labour supply is everywhere forward bending. For
the fifth order model, labour supply is forward bending except at very high wage rate levels.
Elasticities
Figure 5.2 shows the sensitivity of labour supply to the wage rate for a benchmark individual.
but since elasticities vary over tlie sample, this will not be the most interesting figure for policy
analysis. For this purpose. we are more interested in aggregate elasticities. We define the (own)
wage elasticity of labour supply of some given group of women as the percentage change iii total
desired hours   of that group   if all their before   tax wage rates   rise   by 1% . Unlike SmIle other
elasticities used in the literature. this definition takes full account of the impact of the wage rate
on the participation decision (with desired hours equal  to  zero for non-participants).    We  also
show which share of the elasticities is due to the effect on participation.4 Our elasticities are based
on increasing gross wage rates and leaving the tax system unaffected.  Thus they correspond to
what Blomquist (1996) calls the Mongrel's labour supply function rather than the labour supply
curves in Figure 5.2. Since the benchmark for policy analysis will be the actual tax system and
not some linear system, this again seems the most relevant definition from a policy point of view.
The way in which net wage rates change is endogenous. On average, they will change by slightly
less than 1%, due to the progressive nature of the tax rules.
The elasticities can be computed from model simulations, first using actual (predicted) wage
rates, and then with all wage rates increased by 1%. Standard errors are computed by deter-
ministic bootstrapping, repeating the calculations for new parameter values of the model drawn
from the estimated distribution of the parameter estimates. In a very similar way, we have also
calculated the elasticity and the sensitivity of participation with respect to the husband's wage
rate. Since the husband's earnings reflect the bulk of family income other than the woman's own
earnings, these are approximately the same as other income elasticities.
The first four columns of Table 5.2 contain the results for each of the five models, for all
women as well as separately for the low and high educated.  In line with Figure 5.2, the elasticities
according to the first order model deviate substantially from those according to the other models.
The four higher order models, however, lead to siniilar elasticities. with overlapping confidence
intervals. The own wage elasticity is somewhat above one. While this is not out of line with other
A We  look  at desired hours  only  and  not  at  actual hours. Participation is defined as havillg positive desired
hours (i.e.. gross participation).
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findings for the Netherlands (cf. Theeuwes, 1988, for example) or other countries (Killingsworth
and  Heckman.  1986,  Blundell and MaCurdy,   1999),  it is somewhat higher than recent findings
with similar models  (cf. Van Soest  and  Das,  2000, and Vlasblom,  1998).   The main reason seems
to be that we have allowed for measurement error in the wage rates:  if we set op to zero, the own
wage elasticity is about half as large. This difference is in line with the standard argument that
measurement error biases the coefficients to zero if not properly accounted for. The cross-wage
elasticity is about -0.16, iii line with earlier findings for the other income elasticity (Theeuwes,
1988). Tlie effects on participation preserited in Table  5.2  are the changes in percentage points
if husband's or own wage rates increase by 1%.5 Alore than half of the cross-wage elasticity, and
somewhat less than half of the own wage elasticity are due to an effect on participation.
The labour supply of low educated women is of particular interest from a policy point of view,
slice their participation rates are lower and their unemployment rates are higher than for other
women. We find that the supply of labour for the low educated is somewhat more sensitive to
both wage rates than for the high educated. Again, the various higher order models lead to the
same conclusions here.
5The elasticities of participation Call be obtaitied by dividing tliese 111111ibers by the predicted participatioii
rates. approximately  0.673  for tlie wliole sample.  0.635  for  the low educated.  and  0.832  for  the high educated.
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Table 5.2. Changes in participation, elas. of hours, and policy effects
Husband's wage Own wage Policy effects
chaIige elas. change elas. chaiige change
iIi part. of hrs in part. of lirs iii part. in 11rs
model (X-points) (%) (%-points) (%) (%-points) (%)
5'/, order:
all -0.110 -0.176 0.532 1.259 -2.99 4.87
(0.026) (0.047) (0.054) (0.13) (0.50) (0.83)
low educated -0.122 -0.222 0.561 1.344 -3.72 4.68
(0.029) (0.048) (0.059) (0.14) (0.56} CO.89)
high educated -0.062 -0.051 0.411 1.027 0.01 5.41
(0.022) (0.074) (0.041) (0.11) (0.35} (0.99)
4'b order:
all -0.099 -0.156 0.500 1.173 -2.87 4.62
(0.028) (0.047) (0.047) (0.12) (0.46) (0.65)
low educated -0.111 -0.196 0.526 1.258 -3.57 4.48
(0.031) (0.051} (0.051) (0.13) (0.53) (0.701
high educated -0.051 -0.049 0.392 0.942 0.02 5.01
(0.019) (0.055) (0.036) (0.091) (0.27) (0.74)
3'·d order:
all -0.113 -0.167 0.470 1.093 -2.70 4.23
(0.026) (0.040) (0.045) (().11) (0.47) (0.54)
low educated -0.126 -0.203 0.490 1.175 -3.38 4.10
(0.029) (0.047) (0.049) (0.12) (0.54) (0.59)
high educated -0.062 -0.070 0.391 0.879 0.09 4.61
(0.017) (0.033) (0.034) (0.079) (0.29) (0.52)
2-1 order:
all -0.105 -0.151 0.453 1.063 -2.56 4.27
(0.020) (0.034) (0.043) (0.10) (0.34) (0.55)
low educated -0.115 -0.180 0.471 1.139 -3.20 4.19
(0.022) (0.038) (0.046) (0.11) (0.38) (0.59)
liigh educated -0.063 -0.069 0.383 0.854 0.05 4.50
(0.013) (0.029) (0.033) (0.071) (0.25) (0.48)
lat order:
all -0.046 -0.089 0.571 2.062 -1.87 13.70
(0.0050) (0.0094) (0.059) (0.20) (0.36) (1.40)
low educated -0.051 -0.107 0.589 2.229 -2.50 15.09
(0.0056) (0.012) (0.064) (0.23) (0.40) (1.62)
higli educated -0.028 -0.043 0.494 1.645 0.68 10.23
(0.0031) (0.0051) (0.044) (0.14) (0.29) (0.99)
Simulatiozis are based upon real data.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
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Proposed Tax Reform
To illustrate the usefulness of the fully structural model. we have analyzed the potential conse-
quences of a recently proposed tax reform, in which the nonconvexities in the budget set close
to zero hours of work play a large role.  Such a reform can therefore not be analyzed using the
convex budget constraint model of Blomquist and Newey  (1997), or other models not considering
the participation decision or not allowing for nonconvex budget sets.
We briefly describe the tax system and the proposed reform. More details are given in van
Soest  and  Das  (2000). The budget constraints  for a benchmark value  of the husband's income
(working full time with earnings equal to three times the minimum wage) are presented in Figure
5.3. The current system has individual taxation of the two spouses, but with one joint feature:
the length of the first tax bracket (with a rate of 0%) depends upon earnings of the spouse. If
both spouses work and both earn more than Dfl 8,600, then the tax free allowance for both is
Dfl 8.600.  If the wife has no own income. the husband's tax free allowance is Dfi 16,800, i.e. the
wife's tax free allowance is transferred. If the husband earns more than Dfi 8,600, but the wife
earns less tlian Dfi 8,600, the wife can (and. in general, will) largely transfer her allowance to the
husband, so that her own tax free allowance becomes Dfl 400 and her husband's allowance will
be Dfl 16,800. The transfer possibility creates a disincentive for the woman to earn more than
Dfi 8,600 if the husband's earnings are high.  This is shown by the solid curve in Figures 5.3,
which gives net family income as a function of the wife's hours of work. There is a dip when the
wife's earnings attain the maximum transfer threshold.
In  a recent report (Ministry of Finance,  1997),  the main ideas are sketched  for a complete
reform of many features of the tax system of the Netherlands.  The main reforms concern in-
creasing taxes on polluting activities. changing some of the VAT rates, and reducing taxes on
labour. The latter implies changing the income tax system for private households. The report
contains 21 specific proposals for income tax revisions. We only look at the most radical type of
reforms, which involves abolishing tax free allowances for two earlier families.6 Only in genuine
one earner families, the tax free allowance of the only earner would be increased. Additional tax
revenues are used to lower the marginal tax rates, so that the revision as a whole (also accounting
for changes in other taxes) would be revenue neutral.
The budget constraint for the benchmark family after the reform is given by the dotted line in
Figure 5.3. There is a discontinuity at 0 hours of work:  as soon as the woman starts working, the
additional tax free allowance of the husband is lost. and family income falls. Thus the proposed
6 We consider the basic version  of option 3  in  Ministry of  Finatice  (1997).  Tlie  final  proposal  which  has  gone to
parlianierit (Ministry of Finaiice,  1999) is niore refiied anci avoids tlie probleni with sinall part-time jobs addressed
below.
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reform creates a disincentive for women to take a small part-time job.
The estimated effects of the policy reform are presented in the final columns of Table 5.2.
Again, the higher order models give similar results, but the first order model does not. Since
many women who now have a small part-time job would decide to stop working after the reform,
participation would fall. This effect is concentrated in the group of low educated women. On
the other hand, net earnings of full-time workers increase, and labour supply is stimulated in
the sense that there is a substantial increase in hours worked, in spite of the negative effect on
participation. Average hours (including zeros) would increase by between 4 and 5%.
5.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
The  goal  of this section is threefold. First,   we  want to establish the finite sample properties   of
the estimator we have used if the model is correctly specified. There are two reasons here why
there could be a problem. First, the model is nonlinear and fairly complicated, and the finite
sample bias of maximum likelihood in this type of model is an open issue. Second, we do not
use exact maximum likelihood but simulated maximum likelihood, approximating the likelihood
using  R  = 20 draws  for each observation (with independent draws across observations). While
there is some evidence that the results are not very sensitive for the chosen value of R for this
type of model, this, at least in theory, remains a potential source of bias for every new version
of the model or every new dataset.
The second purpose of the Monte Carlo simulations is to analyze the consequences of using a
too restrictive model for the estimates of the elasticities of interest and of the policy effects. In
the previous section, we have seen that the fifth order model is preferred to any of the lower order
models using the AIC criterion or likelihood ratio tests. Still, using the real data, we did not
find much difference between elasticities according to the various higher order models, suggesting
that a second order model would be sufficient to get reasonable estimates of the parameters of
interest. We want to confirm this finding in a situation where we know that the order of the
series expansion is the only source of misspecification.
Third, the issue of measurement error in hours worked has until now not been addressed. In
the original Hausman model, measurement error is explicitly incorporated, but in our model, it
is not.  We want to check whether the presence of measurement error in hours worked can bias
the results for the parameters of interest in our model.
We used the exogenous variables in the sample and the estimates of the fifth order model
in Table 5.A.4, to generate 100 new data sets. Using equation (5.3), wage rates (including
114 Ch 5.  A Structural Labour Supply Model with...
measurement errors) are generated for all observations. Using equation (5.5) (and errors drawn
from   the  GEV  1 distribution), optimal hours  are then generated   (i.e., the utility maximizing
element  of  {0,4,..., 60} is determined). Wage rates of non-workers  are  then  set to missing.   The
100  new  data  sets are generated independently (conditional  on the exogenous variables),   and
each of them consists of 1794 (independent) observations.7  For each of the 100 new data sets, we
estimated the fifth order and the second order model. (Measurement errors on hours worked will
be discussed below.)   Each of these estimations required numerical optimization  of a simulated
likelihood function, and thus requires substantial computational effort.  This is why we have
restricted the Monte Carlo study to 100 new data sets, which is rather low compared to other
Monte Carlo studies.8 We believe, however, that the results are stable enough not to expect
that a larger number would lead to very different results.9 Based upon each set of estimates, we
repeated the calculations of elasticities and policy effects as presented in Table 5.2. In Table 5.3,
we summarize these results. We focus on the sample as a whole, and do not distinguish between
education levels.  For each elasticity or policy effect, we present the mean and the "sample"
standard deviation over the 100 new data sets.
The right hand column refers to the fifth order model. This can be used to answer the first
question: is there a serious bias in the simulated ML estimates, either due to the small sample
or due to the small value of R? We know that the true elasticities and policy effects are their
point estimates for the fifth order model in the first row of Table 5.2. The result is striking: the
numbers in the second column of Table 5.3 are quite close to those in the first row of Table 5.2.
There is no evidence of any systematic bias in the point estimates of the elasticities. There is a
somewhat larger difference in the estimate of the policy effect. Why the policy effects are harder
to estimate than the elasticities is not quite clear, the former is probably a still more complicated
function of the parameters of the model than the latter.
7We do not generate actual hours or involuntary uneinployment, and we do not generate missing wage rates
for workers. Thus for all those in the new data sets who want to work. the wage rate is observed. In the actiial
data. there are some workers with unobserved wage rate and some job searchers with known desired hours but
unknown wage rate. Such observations will reduce the accuracy of tlie model estimates.  As a consequence, the
Monte Carlo simulations may somewhat overestimate tlie accuracy of results that cari be obtained with the real
data.
8Blomquist  ( 1996).  for  example,  uses 400 replications.   He has niuch  simpler  Inodels (with fewer parameters).
and only 602 observations. however.
9We also experimented with 75 new data sets. and obtained very similar conclusions.
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Table 5.3. Results of a Monte-Carlo study
Estimated model
2™t order 5th order
wage effects
husband's wage
- change in participation (in %-points) -0.110 -0.115
(0.025) (0.027)
- elasticity of hours worked (in %) -0.155 -0.178
(0.045) (0.049)
own wage
- change in participation (in %-points) 0.471 0.524
(0.048) (0.058)
- elasticity of hours worked (in %) 1.11 1.23
(0.12) (0.14)
policy effects
- change in participation (in %-points) -2.27 -2.63
(0.40) (0.50)






Note: 100 data sets are generated using Gth order model
estimates (cf. Table 5.A.4). Means and standard deviations
(in parentheses) over these 100 are reported.
The standard deviations in the second column of Table 5.3 can be compared to the estimated
standard errors in the first row of Table 5.2. Standard errors in Table 5.2 are derived from
the estimated asymptotic distribution of the (simulated) maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters in the model. They could be inaccurate due to finite sample bias, due to too small
choice of R,10 or due to model misspecification.11 Comparing them to the standard deviations
10We have estimated the standard errors rising the common ML technique, thus implicitly assuming that R
tends to infinity at a rate of at least the square root of the number of observations.  This is the condition under
which ML and simulated ML are asymptotically equivalent (Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994, p. 2419).
11 We  have  used the outer product   estiinator  of  the information matrix: more robustness to misspecification
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in Table 5.3 suggests that the standard errors in Table 5.2 are somewhat underestimated. Again
however, the differences for the elasticities are quite small. For the policy effect on hours worked,
the difference is somewhat larger, but still quite modest. The conclusion can only be that
the performance of the simulated ML estimator in case of no misspecification appears to be
remarkably good. We find no evidence of either a finite sample bias, or a bias due to small R.
The first column of Table 5.3 shows the bias due to using a second order specification of
preferences rather than the fifth order specification. The differences with column 3 and with the
true values given in Table 5.2 are rather small. They are quite similar to the differences obtained
when the real data are used, see the fourth panel in Table 5.2. Thus although the fifth order
model is the true model and the second order model is misspecified, the bias on the elasticities
and the policy effects induced by this misspecification is very limited. This conclusion obviously
might be specific to our empirical example, where preferences apparently can be approximated
by a second order utility function reasonably well.
We repeated this exercise for the first, third and fourth order model. Results are not presented
to save space, but they all confirm the findings in Table 5.2. The third and fourth order model
yield similar results as the fifth and second order model. The frst order model, however, appears
to be too restrictive for the data at hand, and leads to grossly biased estimates of elasticities
and policy effects. This should not come as a surprise of course, since a linear utility function is
extremely restrictive.
The bottom panel of Table 5.3 shows the average log likelihood and AIC criterion values and
their " sample" standard deviations over the  100  new data sets. On average, the likelihood of the
fifth order model is substantially larger than that of the second order model. It appears that for
99 out of the 100 new data sets, a likelihood ratio test rejects the second order model in favour
of the fifth order model. Similarly, although the difference is always small, the AIC value of the
second order model is worse (i.e., larger)  than  the AIC value  of the fifth order model  in  (the
same)  99  data  sets. This confirms the conclusion from Table  5.1,  that  from a statistical point  of
view, the fifth order model outperforms the second order model  (and all other models).    From
an economic point of view, however, the conclusion is more or less opposite: both Table 5.2 and
Table 5.3 show that the second order model is already quite capable of reproducing the relevant
elasticities and policy effects.
might be obtained by also using the Hessian.
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Measurement errors in hours worked
The traditional Hausman model has two types of errors in the labour supply equation: random
preferences, and optimization or measurement (of hours worked) error.  In our labour supply
model, random preferences are incorporated. and the GEV I errors could be seen as alterna-
tive specific utility evaluation errors,  i.e.,  a  form of optimization error. They cannot  be  seen
as measurement error on (desired) hours worked, however. To investigate whether neglecting
measurement error on hours worked could bias the results, we have generated new data sets
including such measurement error, and re-estimated the model with these new data.
It is not clear what would be a reasonable size of the measurement error. Estimates of the
Hausman model do not lead to common findings on this point. Since different questions are used
in different surveys (annual hours versus weekly hours, for example), there is not mitch reason  to
expect that measurement errors are always of the same size. In the simulations below, we used
measurement errors  with  mean  zero and standard deviations  2  and 4 (hours  per  week).
The new data sets including measurement errors on hours worked are constructed from the
data sets used for the other Monte Carlo simulations. First, hours without measurement error
are  generated (as discussed above),  then a measurement error drawn  from  N(0,4)  or  N(0,  16)  is
added, then hours are again rounded to a multiple of 4. As before, we only considered the second
and fifth order models. The results are presented in Table 5.4. Again, the elasticities and policy
effects can be compared with the true values used to generate the data, given in the top panel
of Table 5.2.  They can also be compared to the figures in Table 5.3, based upon the same 100
new data sets without measurement errors.
We find that the wage elasticities of hours worked are not affected very much by the mea-
surement errors. This result we would intuitively expect in a linear model, where measurement
error on the dependent variable does not affect consistency (although it reduce efficiency).
The results for the effects on participation, however, are less in line with what a linear model
would predict.  If the measurement error is substantial (with standard deviation 4 hours per
week), the estimated effects on participation of changing the women's or their husbands' wages,
are strongly biased towards zero, with a bias of more than 50% of the absolute value of the true
effect. This is not due to less accuracy: the standard deviations do not exceed those in Table
5.3. A closer look at the parameter estimates suggests that this problem is related to identifying
fixed costs. Fixed costs estimates for the data with measurement error, lead to a large number of
people with negative predicted fixed costs. while fixed costs were almost always positive according
to the earlier estimates.
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Table 5.4. Monte-Carlo with measurement err. in hours worked
Std. deviation=2 Std. deviation=4
Estimated model Estimated model
2nd order 5th order 2nd order 5th order
wage effects
husband's wage -0.085 -0.060 -0.044 -0.029
- change in part. (%-points) (0.019) (0.025) (0.010) (0.019)
-0.145 -0.152 -0.127 -0.119
- elas. of hours worked (%) (0.041) (0.052) (0.040) (0.046)
own wage 0.329 0.320 0.195 0.178
- change in part. (%-points) (0.039) (0.042) (0.024) (0.026)
1.11 1.08 1.04 0.94
- elas. of hours worked (%) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
policy effects
- change in part. (%-points) -3.28 -3.06 -2.63 -2.17
(0.53) (0.63) (0.51) (0.52)
- change in hours worked (%) 7.94 8.13 10.2 9.89
(1.11) (1.27) (1.41) (1.45)
likelihood -4417.78 -4393.69 -4362.11 -4339.74
(46.1) (47.8) (44.3) (46.2)
AIC 4.95 4.94 4.89 4.88
(0.051) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051)
Note: 100 data sets are generated using 5th order model estimates
(cf.   Table 5.A.4). Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) over these
100 are reported, measurement error is added to hours worked with
either standard deviation equal to 2 or standard deviation equal to 4.
The policy eRect is another nonlinear and complicated function of the parameters. It is related
to the elasticities in the sense that both are driven by the sensitivity of labour supply to financial
incentives. Still, for the policy effects, we find results which are not in line with the results
for the wage changes. While the true policy effect on participation is reproduced reasonably
well, the policy effect on hours worked is grossly overestimated (by more than 100% in the large
measurement error  case).
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown how nonparametric features can be built into a fully structural
econometric model which is useful for policy analysis. We have combined a framework with a
rich economic structure (utility maximization under a complex budget constraint) with a non-
parametric specification of the key element  in this framework (the direct utility function).   We
have taken a static neo-classical labour supply model, one of the most popular structural models
in (cross-section) econometrics over the past two decades. We have replaced the direct utility
function by a flexible polynomial expansion, able to accurately approximate any utility function
in a given compact set of relevant hours income combinations. Using the direct utility function
only is made possible by treating the labour supply decision as a discrete choice problem, approx-
imating the budget frontier  by a finite  set. The model also deals  with many other problems   iii
the structural labour supply literature, like nonparticipation, fixed costs of working, unobserved
wage rates, measurement error in wage rates, and model coherency.
Using data for women with partner in the Netherlands, we use the framework to investigate
female labour supply elasticities and the consequences of a recently proposed reform of income
taxes which implies disincentives for small part-time jobs and incentives to work full-time. We
find that the fifth order model statistical outperform the lower order models, but the second
order model already gives almost the sallie outcomes as the fifth order model for the elasticities
and the policy effects.
We then proceed with some Monte Carlo simulations.  The most striking result is that if
the model is correctly specified, the performance of our estimator is excellent: there is no finite
sample bias on the elasticities and policy eHects, and the asymptotic standard errors are very
good approximations of the true standard errors. This finding seems in contrast with many earlier
Monte Carlo Studies  (such as Blomquist, 1996), although it should be realized  that our sample
size  may be relatively large (1794 observations, versus   602 in Blomquist,   1996). The second
finding confirms that with the real data: the true model used in the Monte Carlo simulations
(the fifth order model as estimated using the real data) deviates enough from lower order models
to reject these lower order models using LR tests or AIC criterion values in almost all Monte
Carlo replications.  On the other hand, every model of order at least two is a good enough
approximations to reproduce the policy parameters of interest quite accurately. This means
that from an economic point of view, it seems sufficient to use a second order model. Whether
this conclusion remains valid in other situations for different data sets obviously remains to be
investigated. The final set of Monte Carlo simulations gives a less positive image: measurement
error on the hours of work variable can seriously bias the estimates of policy effects, although
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they do not affect the estimated wage elasticities of hours worked.
The model considered here is obviously just one example, and it is kept as simple as possible.
Numerous directions of extension exist.  Some of these can straightforwardly be incorporated
in the current framework. The economic model can be extended to joint decision making of
husband and wife, gross wage rates varying with hours worked, cost of child care. Econometric
extensions include allowing for more flexible distributions of error terms in the wage equation
or in random preferences, or explicitly allowing for measurement error. The current results give




Table 5.A.1. Definitions of variables
tem gross hourly wage rate husband
hm actual working hours husband (per week)
w         gross hourly wage rate wife
h. actual working hours wife (per week)
h desired working hours wife (per week)
oth other income husband and wife
Vgross gross faniily income (excluding child benefits)
- 11'm *h m t u, *h t o t h
y         net family income (including child benefits) in thousands
dedul 1  if wife has primary education only (ref. category:).
dedu2 1 if wife lias lower vocational trianing; 0 otherwise.
dedu3 1 if wife has intermediate vocational training; 0 otherwise.
dedu4 1 if wife has highschool training, 0 otherwise.
dedu5 1 if wife has 11igher vocational training: 0 otlierwise.
dedu6 1 if wife has university degree; 0 otherwise.
age age of wife (in years)
nkid18   number of kids with age 18 or less
dkid05    1 if kid with age less than 5 is present
chbf child benefits (per week)
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Table 5.A.2. Summary statistics






- female earnings 334.59 396.6
- male earnings 1296.83 569.7











Table 5.A.3. Estimates of the 2 order modelnd
Parameters Estimates
utility function:
y2       0.839 (1.74)
(h/10)2 -0.447 (-18.6)
y * (h/10) -0.156 (-2.72)
y                      10.5  (6.70)
(/i/10) 3.32 (5.01)
(h/10) * nkid18 -0.482 (-11.8)
(h/10) * dkid05 -0.545 (-5.83)
(h/10) * (age/10) -0.469 (-1.34)
(h/10) * Cage/10)2 -0.009 (-0.20)
0       0.0298 (0.29)rP
fixed costs:














a. 0.183  (6.46)U
w       0.408 (29.63)(-I
t-values are in the parentheses
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Table 5.A.4. Estimates of the 5th order model
Parameters Estimates
utility function:
V5       0.0261 (0.08)
yd * Ch/10) -0.0381 (-0.22) Table 5.A.4. (continued)
v3 * Ch/10)2 -0.111 (-0.76) Parameters Estimates
1/2 * Ch/10)3 -0.0697 (-1.36) fixed costs:
y * (h/10)4 -0.0182 (-0.84)
constant 0.715 (4.40)
(h/10)5 0.0228 (3.71) nkid18 -0.0300 (-3.96)
14                   0.0985  (0.03)
dkid05 -0.0045 (-0.28)ya * (h/10) 0.663 (0.55)
age/10 -0.167 (-2.39)
92 * Ch/10)2 1.42 (1.76) Cage/10)2 0.0184  (2.18)
v * (h/10)3 0.423 (1.47)
wage equation:
(h/10)4 -0.336 (-3.98)
1/3       -3.58 (-0.37) constant 1.91 (7.78)
age/10 0.464 (3.66)y2 * Ch/10) -4.39 (-1.25) Cage/10)2 -0.0565 (-3.51)
1*(h/10)2 -4.44 (-2.59)
ded22 0.0508 (1.33)
(h/10)3 1.69  (3.63)
dedu3 0.231 (5.99)




y * (h/10) 5.08  (2.08)
dedu6 0.410 (5.48)11        -6.84 (-0.60) W      0.165 (5.68)0
(h/10) 1.46  (0.54)                     u 0.414 (32.1)0
(h/10) * nkid18 -0.492 (-11.5) t-values are iii the parentheses
(h/10) * dkid05 -0.510 (-5.22)
(h/10) * (age/10) -0.296 (-0.77)
(h/10) * Cage/10)2 -0.0281   (-0.57)
0       0.0106 (0.10)rP
t-values are in the parentheses
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Figure 5.1. Indifference curves benchmark individual
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quadratic        l
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Figure 5.2. Labour supply curves benchmark individual
j /,
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Figure 5.3. After tax family income as a function of the hours
worked by the wife. The husband earns three times the mini-













































Sexual Bias and Household
Consumption in Rural China*
6.1 Introduction
Evaluating the welfare of the poor and analyzing the impact of income policy and demographic
changes on the welfare of the poor are of main concern in most societies.  For this purpose,
recovering the exact Engel curve relationship is an important tool. For example, the budget
share spent on food is an important indicator of household welfare. The rate at which a rise in
income generates a decline in this budget share depends on the shape of the Engel curve of food.
Engel curves for families of different composition can be used to reveal how family composition
affects the food share, keeping family income constant. Differences in expenditures on typical
adult goods can be used to analyze differentials in the allocation of family budget to the needs
of boys versus girls (Deaton.  1989).
In this paper. we analyze Engel curves for several commodities in rural China using semi-
parametric methods. The aim is twofold. The first is to examine the shape of the Engel curves,
which is relevant for the analysis of consumer demand and welfare. There are few studies on
Engel curves in China. Fan et at. (1994, 1995) estimate Engel curves using data aggregated at
the provincial level. Following most of the papers in this field, they used specifications iii which
the budget shares are linear  in log income (linear Engel curves),  in  line  with, for example.  the
Almost Ideal Demand System developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). Recent evidence.
however. shows that a linear Engel curve might not be appropriate for many comniodities. See,
for example, Atkinson et at. (1990), Hausman et at. (1991, 1995), H8rdle and Jerison (1991),
* Chapter  6 is identical  to  Gong, van Soest and Zhang  (2000)
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Lewbel (1991), Blundell et at. (1998), and Bhalotra and Attfield (1998). Moreover, analyses
based upon aggregated data may be misleading if relationships are nonlinear (see Blundell et
at.,1993) Aggregate data cannot  be  used to estimate the impact of demographic changes  or  to
calculate the equivalence scales.
Second. we focus on differences between consumption patterns of households with boys versus
households with girls in various age groups. Thus, our second purpose is to determine whether
the commonly found boy preference in China is embodied in household consumption behavior.
In China, faiiiilies have preferred boys over girls for centuries. But just as in other countries,
evidence for this is largely based on census data on gender differentials in mortality and school
enrolment rates. 1 See Arnold and Liu (1986),  Zeng (1988), and Zeng et at.   (1993). Do household
consumption patterns reflect this preference? Empirical studies for various countries other than
China do not find much evidence for this.  See, for example, Deaton (1989) on Cote d'Ivoire
and Thailand, Browning and Subramaniani (1995), Subramaniam  (1996) and Subramaniam  and
Deaton (1991) on India. Ahmad and Morduch (1993) on Bangladesh, and Bhalotra and Attfield
( 1998) on Pakistan.    To our knowledge, the 011ly study which  aims at identifying the boy-girl
differentials in the consumption pattern of Chinese households using micro data is Burgess and
Zhuang  ( 1998).   They  use  data  on  only  two  out  of the thirty Chinese provinces. Their analysis  is
based upon the Working-Leser framework of linear Engel curves.  If this functional form relation-
ship is misspecified, this may also affect the coeflicients on the demographics and the conclusions
on sexual biases. They find some evidence of boy preference in household expenditures on health
and on education.
Our paper differs from the Burgess and Zhuang (1998) study in the following ways. First, our
data set is more representative of rural China as a whole. Second, we avoid the misspecification
of the Engel curves by using a flexible semiparanietric specification. Following Bhalotra and
Attfield  ( 1998). we apply the estimator  of the partially linear regression model introduced  by
Robinson (1988) Third. since total expenditures might  well be determined simultaneously  with
the expenditure shares, we allow for the endogeneity of the total expenditures. Here we follow
Blundell et aL (1998), applying the method developed by Holly and Sargan (1982).
The finding suggests that linear Engel curves are suitable for some but not all of the nine
expenditure categories we considered. For example, we find that the food expenditure share starts
decreasing only after some threshold level of total expenditures is reached. It also suggests that
failure in correcting for endogeneity of total expenditures leads to substantial biases iii some of
i It has beeri  foiziid ill tlie literature as evideiic.e of sexiial bias that iii ilially low inconie coziiitries  tlie 111011)idity
aild mortality rates are higher for females. especially aiiiong cliilclreii.  See. for example. D'Souza ancl  Cheti  (198()).
aiid Das Giipta (1987).
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the elasticity estimates. Hardly any evidence for boy preference is found from food consumption.
However, both Probits for school enrolment and analysis on educational expenditures conditional
on enrolment provide clear evidence for biases toward boys.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present the semiparainetric model and
the estimation techniques. Section 6.3 describes the data used iii the analysis and addresses
preliminary evidence of gender bias which can be detected in our data.  Iii Section 6.4, we
discuss the results: the semiparametric estiInates of the Engel curves are presented in the first
subsection, while the implications for gender bias are addressed in the second subsection. SeCtiOIl
6.5 concludes.
6.2 The Model
The general form of the Engel curve is given by
Vi =gi(lnc, I) + €; (6.1)
where y, represents the expenditure share on some commodity or group of commodities i, 1nc
is the log transformed total expenditures, x is a vector of variables that characterize family
composition, and e, stands for the error term. The index of the individual household is suppressed.
It is assumed that g is common to all households, so that variation across households with the
same total expenditures c and the same composition z is only due to the error term €,. For the
time being, we will assume that the error term satisfies
E(€i 11nc, z) = 0 (6.2)
The more general case where E is allowed to be correlated with 1nc is discussed below.
In I, we include variables such as the number of young children as a percentage of family size
and  the  number of Young  girls  as  a  percentage  of family  size. The former  is  the sum  of the latter
and  the the number  of young  boys  as a percentage of family  size.   Thus,  a test of significance  of
the percent.ag€ of young girls variable will be a test of whether the sex of a young child affects
the consumption of good i or not, controlling for, among other variables, the number of young
children.
Until recently, stemming from Working (1943) and Leser (1963), it has been popular to specify
g(lnc, I) parametrically, and in particular, as a linear function.  Thus, it has been common to
work with the specification
Y, = cri + 7,lnc + 8'ir + e, with ECE, I Inc) = 0. (6.3)
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This specification can be derived from, for example. the Almost Ideal Demand System by Deaton
and  Muellbauer  (1980),   or the Indirect Translog model by Jorgenson   et  at.    (1980).    It  is  also
referred to as Piglog.
The linearity assumption might be too restrictive for some goods. For example. Blundell et at.
(1998) found that, for their UK data, the Piglog specification fits the Engel curve for food quite
well, but for a commodity like alcohol. adding a quadratic logarithmic income term is required.
An alternative to the linearity assumption is to find the correct specification using a fully
nonparametric approach. A fully nonparametric model has the advantage that misspecification
is by definition avoided. The approach, however, becomes infeasible in practice if the dimension
of z is large and the number of observations is limited. Nonparametric estimators then sufTer
from the curse of dimensionality: due to the slow rate of convergence of the estimator, the
estimates will not be accurate in finite samples of the size typically available (see Hdrdle, 1990,
for example).
In our case. we want to work with rather detailed indicators of the presence of boys and girls
iii various age groups, so that the dimension of x will be rather large. Considering the size of our
sample of about 5400 observations, this makes a completely nonparametric estimator infeasible.
Robinson's ( 1988) semiparametric partially linear model allows  for a flexible functional forni
relationship between 1nc and  Vi,  but  at  the  same time avoids the curse of dimensionality. It gives
the following specification of the Engel curve:
16  -  gz +  12,(lnc)  + €, (6.4)
The nonparanietric part of this model is the unknown function Fi. This is a function of one
variable only, and thus the curse of dimensionality is avoided. The family composition variables
enter through the parametric part This has the advantage that a test for sexual bias in
consumption patterns can be written as a test of restrictions on the parameter vector Bi and
does not involve testing restrictions on the nonparametric part Fi.
Estimation
Following Robinson   ( 1988), the partially linear regression  model  can be estimated in various
steps. The expected value of y, conditional on 1nc is given by
E(Vi 11nc) = gE(z 11nc) + F,(lnc) (6.5)
The difference between (6.4) and (6.5) yields
y, - ECY, I liic) - 8'(.r - E(:r 11nc)) + fi (6.6)
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In the first step of Robinson's estimation procedure, the conditional means E(y, I 1nc) and
E(z | 1nc) are estimated nonparametrically, using one dimensional kernel regressions. In the
second step, the conditional means being replaced by their nonparametric estimates, Bi in (6.6)
is estimated by OLS. Robinson (1988) shows that the resulting estimator for Bi is v/ii consistent
and asymptotically normal.
There are several ways to obtain cotisistent estimates A(lne) for tlie values of the unknown
function  Fi. One consistent estimator is based  upon:
-,  -A(Inc) = E(y,   1nc) - 8, E(I 11nc) (6.7)
where  E(yi     1nc)  and  E(z     Inc)  are the nonparanietric estimates of E(y,  11nc)  atid  E(z  I  1nc),
which were already used to estimate 13, Robinson (1988) shows that  the  fact  that  il is estimated
does not matter  for the asymptotic distribution of A (lnc). which is therefore  the  sallie as  that  of
E(Y, 11nc) - gE(z I 1nc).
A second consistent estimator for the values of A is given by
- ,F,(Inc) = E(y, -dir  1nc) (6.8)
-,
where the right-hand side is a nonparametric regression estimate of yi -Biz on lnc.  In this
study, we used this second method, since it will make it easier to calculate the elasticities. It
only  requires one nonparametric regression in stead  of k+l i n the case  of  (6.7).
Elasticities
The elasticity of expenditures on commodity i with respect to the total expenditures is one plus
the elasticity of the expenditure share with respect to the total expenditures.  For each household,
the elasticity of expenditures on commodity i is calculated as the percentage change of the expen-
clitures on good i corresponding to a one-percent increase of the household's total expenditures.
Given the consistent estimates A (lnc)  and 11,  for each household, the expenditures on  good  i  are
computed at the actual total expenditures and at the one percent increased total expenditures,
respectively. There are two ways to combine the household specific elasticities into an aggregate
elasticity. One is to compute the (unweighted) average elasticity across all households. The
other is to take the weighted average. using households' expenditures on commodity i as weights.
We use the latter, which answers the question by how much expenditures on commodity i will
change if total expenditures of all households increase by one percent. This seems the more rele-
vant concept from a policy point of view. The 95% confidence interval is also computed, using a
bootstrap method:   the  data  set was resampled randomly with replacement. the parameters  and
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the elasticities were estimated for each resampled data set.  And the bounds of the confidence
interval were computed froni the standard deviations of the elasticities series.
Endogeneity of Total Expenditures
Until now we have assumed that the error term has conditional mean zero given total expenditures
1nc (and other variables  x).    This  assumption  may be problematic  due to potential correlation
between 1nc and 6, see, for example, Blundell et at.  (1998).  If ECE, 1 1nc, T) 96 0, the estimators
discussed above will not be consistent for the parameters of interest.
To take endogeneity of luc into account, we follow Blundell et al.  (1998) and use the popular
augmented regression technique introduced by Holly and Sargan (1982). Assume that there exists
a vector z such that
1nc = lr'Z + < (6.9)
with
E(< I z. z) = 0 (6.10)
and
ECE, I 1nc. z, x) = pi< (6.11)
Then we can write
8   -  gz  +  Fi (Inc)  +  pi<  + 4 (6.12)
with
E(ii I 1nc,ir, z) = 0 (6.13)
If < were observed, this would lead to the same partially linear regression as before, with regressors
2  -  (s, <)  instead of I and parameters 11  -  (di, Pi) instead of B.  Thus 13,  and P, could be estimated
using the Robinson (1988) estimator described above.
Since < is not observed, however, an additional preliminary step is required: 0LS of 1nc on
z yields OLS residuals <. which are consistent estimates of <. The semiparametric estimator
discussed above will then be applied with < replaced by <. Identification requires that the vector
of instruments z contains at least one instrument which is not in I. We use the log of disposable
family income for this. Moreover, z will also include some variables already included in x: regional
dummies, average age of the couple, family size, and family composition indicators.
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Smoothness Parameters
For the nonparametric regressions, we need to choose the kernels and the smoothness parame-
ters. Throughout the analysis, we will use a quartic kernel function. We adopt the method of
"Generalized Cross Validation"  (GCV) (see Craven and Wahba, (1979)) to choose the bandwidth
for all of the nonparametric regressions.  GCV has the same asymptotic optimality properties
as the complete cross validation procedure,  but is computationally  much more convenient.   For
arbitrary bandwidth h, the estimates 9, (written as an n x l vector, where n i s the number of
observations,   are a linear function  of  (the n x l vector)  1,,  with coefficients depending  oil  the
bandwidth h and the observations of the explanatory variables, stored in a matrix X.  They
can thus be written as A  = A(X: h)Vi·  GCV then consists of choosing the value h,  of h which
minimizes
1/nl [I - A(X, h)]7112/{1/n trace[I - A(X, h)]}2 (6.14)
It can be shown that this choice of h is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that it minimizes
the expected quadratic  loss  E[(yi -  9,)2] (see Newey  et  aL  (1990),  for example)
6.3 Data
The data we use were drawn from the "Rural Household Income and Expenditure Survey"
conducted by the State Statistics Bureau of China (SSB) and the Chinese Academy of Social
Science  (CASS). This survey is comparable  to the national household survey conducted  by  SSB;
the respondents are a subsample of the national household survey, and the questionnaire is
similar.2 Our survey was drawn in 1995 and provides information on 7998 households in rural
areas of 19 Chinese provinces.3 It contains detailed questions on income, expenditures, and self-
consumption, on land and capital ownership and financial assets, on labour market status of the
household members, etc. It contains age, gender, and relation with the head of household for
all members. For household members of at least 15 years of age, it includes variables such as
education, employment status, occupation, time allocation, etc.
In this study, we focus  on the nuclear families, i.e., households which consist  of two parents
and possibly children. This gives us 5541 observations. Some observations do not have complete
information or have implausible values on the expenditure variables of interest. After delet-
2The data from the national household survey are not available for use outside SSB.
3The survey does not cover all thirty provinces in China (cities and autonomous districts), mainly due to lack
of funding.
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ing these observations, a sample of 5394 households remains which is used for the estimations.
Table 6.1 gives the sample means and standard deviations of the variables we use in the analysis.
We classified the observations into three geographic regions: coastal, middle, and western
areas. This distinction has much more than only geographic meaning. The coastal area is
historically the most developed and the richest area, while the western area is the least developed
and poorest area among the three. According to the sample, the mean log total expenditures
of the households in coastal area was 7.90 (about 2697 1/vans) in 1995, while for the middle
and western areas, the numbers  were  7.50   (1808   yuans)   and   7.44 (1703 yuans), respectively.
Moreover, culture, traditions, and many other aspects of social life are significantly different in
the three regions.
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Table 6.1. Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Znc log total expenditures per capita(Vuan) 7.61 0.58
incinc log disposable income per capita( vuan) 7.18 0.71
food food share(%) 54.8 18.7
cereal cereal share(%) 25.8 13.9
prot protein share(%) 12.9 8.55
meat meat share(%) 7.5 7.2
fish fish share(%) 0.9 1.5
ueg vegetable share(%) 8.4 6.9
alta alcohol & tobacco share(%) 3.1 2.8
medi medical share(%) 2.1 4.2
edu education share(%) 0.7 2.2
num number of household members 3.97 0.98
padu*) percentage  of  adult  members  ( 19-) 60.3 21.3
pfadu**) percentage of female adult members(19-) 29.8 13.1
child6 percentage of children (0-5) 4.3 10.9
girl6 percentage of female children (0-5) 1.9 7.8
child12 percentage of children (6-12) 15.5 19.3
g'ir112 percentage of feiiiale children (6-12) 7.1 12.8
ch.ildl 5 percentage of children (6-12) 7.0 12.0
girl15 percentage of female children (13-15) 3.1 8.2
child18 percentage of children (16-18) 6.9 12.1
girl18 percentage of female children (16-18) 3.2 8.4
pllp12 percentage of children at school (6-12) 13.1 18.0
pug12 percentage of female children at school (6-12) 5.9 11.8
pup 15 percentage of children at school (13-15) 6.1 11.4
pug15 percentage of female children at school  ( 13-15) 2.6 7.6
pupl8 percentage  of children  at  school  ( 16-18) 3.2 8.7
pug18 percentage of female children at school (16-18) 1.4 5.7
pup19 percentage of children at school (19-) 1.0 5.0
puglg percentage of female children at school (19-) 0.4 3.2
age average age of husband and wife 41.8 9.38
dcoast dummy, 1 if household in coastal area 0.317 0.465
dmiddle dummy, 1 if household in middle area 0.454 0.498
duuest dummy. 1 if household in western area 0.228 0.420
Note: 5394 observations.
*):   both  parents  and  children  older  than  18.
**'.1. spouse and female children older than 18.
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Expenditures, self-consumption, and disposable income
The total expenditure variable was constructed from "household total expenditures in cash in
1995" and "self-consumption",  net of "expenditures on house-building and on production goods
(such as buying fertilizer or a tractor)",  and  net of "taxes". The reason for subtracting house
building expenditures is that house-building has the nature of an investment expenditure rather
than consumption. It is an occasional event and is mostly financed by saving (or borrowing).
Purchasing of production goods can be viewed as investment behavior and expenditures on these
are thus considered as production costs instead of consumption. As shown in Table 6.1, the mean
of log total expenditures per capita in 1995 was 7.61, which, translated into Chinese currency.
is 2018 vitans.4 The average disposable income (which does not include self-consumption) per
capita in 1995 was about 1713 yuans. To get a clear profile of the distributions and the relation
between the two variables, we depict the estimated bivariate kernel density estimates of log total
expenditures and log disposable income in Figure 6.1. The joint distribution is unimodal and
shows that the two variables are positively correlated though the correlation is far from perfect
(the correlation coefficient  is  0.495).
In 1995, the families' main outlay was on food, which on average accounted for almost 55% of
the family budget. Nearly half of the food expenditures was for cereals, and about 22% for protein
intake, which includes the expenditures on meat, fish, eggs, and cooking oil. The expenditure
shares on educational goods (excluding tuition fees) is 3.3%. The expenditure share of medical
care   is   1.8% of total expenditures, which is quite   low. The reason   is that medical services
are heavily subsidized by the government,5 implying that for these categories, expenditures as
recorded in the survey would substantially underestimate the use of the services.
In rural China, a substantial part of food consumption comes from self-production. Hence,
in constructing the food expenditure variable, we have included expenditures in cash as well as
the amount reflecting self-consumption. The latter was calculated from the quantity consumed,
which was asked in the questionnaire, multiplied with the average price of the good in the province
where the household lived.6 Table 6.2 shows the importance of self-consumption for total food
consumption in our sample of rural households. On average, self-consumption of food covered
37.6% of total expenditures, and 66.9% of food expenditures. About 90% and 72% of the cereals
and vegetables were from self-production.  This is consistent with the fact that rural China is
<One US Dollar is about 8.3 yuans.
5For example. most of the clinics in niral areas are publicly owned and the prices of their services are stipulated
by the government.
6In the questionnaire, the households were asked how much inoney they spent on food. They were also asked,
for each commodity, what was the total amount they consimied, how much of this was produced by themselves,
and which market price they perceived for this commodity.
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still a largely self-contained farmers society. On the other hand, about 72% of the meat and 88%
of the fish consumed were from the market.
Table 6.2. Distribution of Self-consumption Share(%)
Quantiles (21 Q2 03 94 Q5 Q6 07 Q8 09 Mean
Total 13.4 20.4 26.3 32.1 36.9 42.2 47.3 54.1 62.8 37.6
Food 38.0 51.4 60.3 66.6 71.6 75.8 79.7 83.5 88.1 66.9
Cereal 65.8 86.9 94.4 97.7 99.1 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 89.6
Meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 16.9 43.2 73.5 90.9 27.9
Fish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 60.0 12.3
Protein 0.0 7.0 17.9 29.2 40.4 52.4 64.2 77.2 89.1 42.7
Vegetable 0.0 40.2 69.5 83.2 89.6 93.9 96.6 98.7 100.0 71.9
Qj (j =1, . . . .9) is the jth percentile of the corresponding share.
To show how the size and the structure of the expenditures vary with disposable income, we show
the nonparametrically estimated relationships between the log total expenditures and income,
between the log expenditures on food and income, and between the proportion of self-consumption
(out of the total expenditures) and income in Figures 6.2,6.3, and 6.4, respectively. Expenditures
on consumption are almost constant at low income levels and only increase with income after
income reaches a certain threshold level. A more or less similar pattern is obtained for food
expenditures. Furthermore, the proportion of expenditures on self-consumption is also almost
constant at low income levels before it decreases with income. This implies that the very low
income families spend their additional income on activities other than consumption, such as
production or investment. Only after income has reached a certain level, families would spend
more on consumption and resort more to the markets for food.
Family composition and preliminary evidence of gender bias
Family composition is described by the number of members in certain categories as a percentage
of total family size. For example, an adult is defined as someone older than 18. "Percentage
of (female) adults" refers then to the number of (female) adults in the family as a percentage
of family size. On average, 60% of family members are older than 18 years. All "percentage of
(female) children" variables refer to the number of (female) children in the given category, as a
percentage of total family size.
From  Table  6.1  we  can  also  see  that the average nuclear family  in the sample has about  four
members, i.e. two children. This seems to be in contrast with China's one child policy. In rural
China, however, family planning policy has never been so strict as in urban areas and varies
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dramatically across regions. Instead, in most places, farmers are normally allowed to have their
second child if their first child is a girl or disabled. Also, minorities are also exempted from the
policy. In reality, many families even have more than two children, implying that the policy is
often not so effective. According to our  data (see Table 6.3 below), only about  26.1% the families
have one child, 42.3% of them have two children, and about 20.4% of them have three or more
children. There are more boys than girls in the age category below 16, and also in the category
of youngest children. Table 6.3 shows that there are fewer families without boys than families
without girls. Most of the families have one boy, reflecting the fact that in rural China boys
are preferred. The main reasons for this preference, among others, are that in a largely farmer's
society, men are the main labour providers, and that only the boys are considered as the ones
who continue the family roots.
Table 6.3 also presents some sample statistics for families with one, two, and three children.
The one-child families have the highest average income as well as total expenditures per capita.
They also have the highest share of protein consumption and lowest share of cereal consumption.
This is related to the fact that one-child families are more often in the richer coastal areas than
in the poorer innerland, while families with more than two children are more common in the
non-coastal areas.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is often found in the literature that female mortality
rates are higher than male mortality rates in the same age groups, and that school drop-out rates
are  higher for girls  than  for  boys.    It  can   also  be  seen in Table  6.1  that  in  all age categories,
the school enrolment rates are larger for boys than for girls. These findings can be compared
to data from other sources: according to the World Bank, the population female-male ratio for
China was 94:100 in 1995. The female gross primary enrolment rate7 in 1993 was 116%, against
120% for males. For females, this is the highest enrolment rate in Asia. The secondary school
enrolment rate was much lower: 51% for females and 60% for males in 1993.
As a preliminary analysis for this issue, we investigated the probability for a child to be in
school using a probit model.  We only looked at families with one child in the school attending age
category  6  to 18 (there might be additional children in other age groups). Controlling for total
family expenditures per capita, age group, geographical area and father's education, we found a
positive and significant coefficient for the boy dummy, indicating that boys are more likely to be
in school than girls in the same age category.8 At the mean of the sample, a boy's probability
7Gross enrolnient rate is the ratio of total enrolinent, regardless of age, to the population of the age group
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Estimates are based oii UNESCO's classification of
education levels. Primary, or first level, provides the basic elements of education at elementary or primary school.
Source:World Development Indicators 1997. The World Bank.
8When we include the interactions between the boy dummy and age, the coefficient of boy dummy becomes
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of being in school is about 7% points higher than a girl's. The estimates of the parameters are
presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.3 Sample statistics by Number of Children
No. of children nchild - 1 nchitd = 2 nchild - 3
% of the sample 26.1 42.3 20.4
% given nchitd
No boy 36.5 12.1 7.3
One boy 63.5 60.0 47.6
Two boys 27.9 36.3
Three boys 8.8
Sample statistics
lne:Ep. (p.c.) (yuans) 7.80(0.58) 7.59(0.56) 7.43(0.52)
1nincome(p.c.) (yuans) 7.34(0.71) 7.15(0.67) 7.02(0.69)
age 40.9(11.7) 40.5(7.9) 42.1(6.7)
coast 0.385(0.49) 0.295(0.46) 0.258(0.44)
middle 0.355(0.48) 0.488(0.50) 0.528(0.50)
west 0.260(0.44) 0.217(0.41) 0.214(0.41)
% of expenditures
food 54.3(19.6) 54.2(18.5) 55.7(17.6)
Cereal 23.0(13.2) 26.0(13.7) 28.9(14.6)
Protein 14.5(9.3) 12.2(8.1) 11.6(7.9)
Meat 8.7(7.9) 7.0(7.0) 6.6(6.3)
Fish 1.0(1.4) 0.8(1.2) 0.8(2.1)
Vegetables 8.4(7.3) 8.2(6.8) 8.4(6.4)
Alco.& tab. 3.6(3.6) 3.1(2.6) 2.8(2.5)
Medical 2.3(4.8) 2.0(3.6) 2.0(4.4)
Education 0.5(1.9) 0.8(2.4) 0.7(1.8)
In parentheses are standard deviations.
insignificant, although still positive. However, the coefficients of the boy dummy and the interaction terms are
jointly significant at 5% level. We also tried out several other specifications. For example, we included the second
order term of total Lnc and/or controlled for children in other age groups. The results remain the same.
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Table 6.4. Estimates of the probit model
Variable Estimates t-values
Lnc 0.124 (2.02)
Dummy boy 0.199 (2.99)
Dcoast -0.162 (-1.69)
Dmiddle -0.319 (-3.56)
Dummy age between 6 and 12 1.077 (13.88)
Dummy age between   13  and 15 1.287 (13.00)
Father's education (> 6 years) 0.458 (3.38)




The Shape of the Engel Curves
Figure 6.5 gives the parametrically and semiparametrically estimated Engel curves together with
95% uniform confidence bands (see H8rdle,  1990 for reference), where the endogeneity of total
expenditures is controlled for.  For some goods, such as cereals, alcohol and tobacco, medical care,
and education, the linear model gives a reasonable description of the Engel curve relation. But
for other goods, such as food, meat, fish, and vegetables, the linear model fits the data poorly
and a quadratic model would fit better.9 For these goods, a linear model would lead to biased
predictions for low and/or high income households. For example, a linear model would predict a
too large negative income slope of the food share for the low income households.
The  findings  here are different from those in Blundell   et  al.    ( 1998) Their findings based
on UK data suggest that food share Engel curves are linear. A reason for the difference could
be the different real income level of the low income households in our sample. Low income
families are the poorest among farmers who are already the poor in China. In 1995, an average
farmer consumes only about 2018 yuans per year, which is less than US$250. For these very poor
families, the percentage of expenditures on food remained relatively constant as income increased
because even with income increased, some of them were still barely able to feed themselves.  Only
after income has reached a certain level, the food share decreases. and additional resources are
9For these goods, the estimates of the quadratic IllOdel are all within the confidence bands. so that a quadratic
model would not be rejected against the semiparametric model.
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more and more allocated to non food consumption. Bhalotra and Attfield (1998) find a similar
result for rural Pakistan, where food consumption is 52% of the household budget, on average,
compared to 54.8% in our sample. In developed countries, there are hardly any "absolutely poor"
households, and the average food share is much smaller (34% to 37% in the UK data used by
Blundell et at., 1998)
For the meat and the fish shares. the linear model Engel curve assumption is rejected even
more clearly. For low income households, meat and fish are luxuries, and the budget share of
meat consumption increases with inconie. At higher income levels however, less of the additional
resources is allocated to fish, and the share spent on meat decreases with income.
In Table 6.5 we present the elasticities of consumption expenditures with respect to total
expenditures, as computed by both the semiparametric and the linear model, where endogetieity
of total expenditures is corrected for. It shows that the elasticities according to t<he liikear
and semiparametric model are similar for most goods.  Only for cereals we find a substatitial
difTerence. The siniilarity rests on the fact that the elasticities we calculated are elasticities of
the average' -not surprisingly, the two models give similar predictions for the means. Accordiiig
to the elasticities, fish is a luxury good. while food, cereals, vegetables, protein, and eclucatioii
are necessities. The other three elasticities are close to one, and not significantly different froni
one in either model.
Thus we find that households with higher income allocate less and less of their additional
income to food consumption. Moreover, they spend more on food containing more energy. If
total expenditures increase, cereal consumption decreases relative to total food consumption. For
a one percent increase of total expenditures, the household increases food consumption by 0.61%
and cereal consumption only by 0.22%. At the same time, the richer households spend more of
their food budget on meat, fish and other types of food which are rich of protein.
In table 6.6, we illustrate the influence of the correction for endogeneity of total expenditures
by comparing the estimated elasticities form the model with and without the correction. A is the
estimates  of  pi in equation  (6.11). A significant value  of A implies that exogeneity is rejected.
For five out of nine goods the Engel curve exhibits significant endogeneity of expenditures. For
example, a significant positive sign for A is found for cereals, the clearest necessity among the
goods.  In the other cases where endogeneity is significant. the correlation between the errors
is negative. aring the results of Model I in Table 6.6 with the confidence intervals in10 Colllp
Table 6.5, we find that for the goods (cereals, protein, meat, fish, and alcohol and tobacco)
where the endogeneity plays a significant role, the elasticities are biased if endogeneity is not
10This could be explained by the fact tliat a positive nleasurenient error on total expenditures induces a tiegative
nieasureinent error   011 the share.
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taken into account. The direction  of  the bias depends   upon   the  sign  of the correlation  -the
elasticities will be underestimated if the correlation is negative.
Table 6.5. Estimated Income Elasticities
Goods Semiparametric Model Linear Model
Food 0.559 [0.524, 0.600} 0.572 [0.540,0.606]
Cereal 0.232 [0.172, 0.2951 0.168 [0.104, 0.240]
Protein 0.881 [0.821, 0.9641 0.942 10.869, 1.018]
Meat 0.983 [0.903, 1.0921 1.068 10.973. 1.168]
Fish 1.819  1.689. 1.963} 1.949 [1.814,2.088]
Vegetables 0.496 10.401, 0.5901 0.524 10.415, 0.625]
Alcohol 8 Tabacco 0.991  0.900,1.076] 0.978 10.871, 1.090]
Afedicat care 0.976 10.702, 1.234] 1.009 [0.760, 1.248]
Education 0.606 10.224,0.949] 0.519 10.415, 0.625}
In brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
In both models endogeneity of total expenditures is corrected for.
Table 6.6. Estimated Income Elasticities and Endogeneity
Semiparametric Models Linear Models
Commod. Model I Model II Model I Model II
etas. das.         A das. das.         A
Food 0.574 0.559 0.009(0.93) 0.598 0.572 0.014(1.48)
Cereal 0.408 0.232 0.046(6.18) 0.355 0.168   0.044(6.21)
Protein 0.700 0.881 -0.028(-5.34) 0.769 0.942 -0.024(-4.84)
Meat 0.818 0.983 -0.015(-3.47) 0.914 1.068 -0.128(-3.15)
Fish 0.947 1.819 -0.011(-11.6) 1.085 1.949 -0.010(-11.3)
Veget. 0.556 0.496 0.007(1.59) 0.628 0.524 0.009(2.08)
Atc.8Tab. 0.763 0.991 -0.010(-5.48) 0.702 0.978 -0.009(-5.40)
Medical 0.989 0.976 0.000(0.12) 1.037 1.009 0.001(0.31)
Education 0.889 0.606 0.003(1.81) 0.830 0.519 0.002(1.66)
Model I: no correction for endogeneity of total expenditures.
 lodel LI: endogeneity of total expenditures is corrected for.
t-values in paretit lieses.
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Sexual Bias and Consumption Patterns
The  estimates  of the parameter vectors  Mi  in the partially linear model are shown in Table  6.7.
We focus on consumption differences related to differences in the number of male and female
household members in the same age categories. These differences are reflected by the coefficients
of the variables relating to the numbers of female members  (as a percentage of family size).
A negative sign of such a coefficient for some given commodity means that a family with a
female member in this age group consumes less of this Commodity than a comparable family with
a male member in the same age group.  Most of these variables are insignificant for the various
food  categories, but there  are some exceptions. The significantly  negative  coefficients of girl 15
for food and cereal suggest that girls aged at 12 to 15 consume less of this.  On the other hand.
for the youngest age group, the protein intake of girls is significantly larger than for boys.
For a typical adult good category alcohol and tobacco, we find insignificant differences between
boys and girls in the younger age groups. Since alcohol and tobacco are the only typical "adult
goods", this implies that there  is no evidence of sexual bias according  to the Deaton (1989)
method.
Thus in the food and adult goods equations, no convincing evidence of sexual bias can be
found. This conclusion largely coincides with most of the findings for various countries in the
literature (for example, Deaton (1989); see also Deaton (1997) for a review).  It does not say that
there is no sexual bias, but only that it is not revealed by food consumption patterns.
For educational goods, we have defined the family composition variables in a dif erent way.
Instead of the total number of boys and girls in a given age group, we consider the number of
boys and girls attending school.  We also include the age group older than 18. Students in this age
group mainly attend post-secondary school (college education, for example).   Thus the estimates
are conditional on the enrolment decisions. Differences in enrolment between boys and girls are
discussed in Section 6.3. We find that educational expenditures for boys and girls do not differ
significantly  for the younger age groups.    For the older age groups  (16-18 and older  than  18),
however, less is spent for girls than for boys. Thus other than the food equations, there is some
evidence of bias against girls in the educational goods equation. This is further enforced by the
fact that school enrolment rates are higher  for  boys  than for girls (see Table  6.4).
Some differences between expenditure patterns in families with male versus female adults
can be seen from the coefficients on "percentage of female adults." Since we also include the
"percentage of adults," this can be interpreted in the same way as the percentage of girls variables.
The coefficients of fadu for cereals and fish are negative, while that for medical expenditures is
positive. This suggests that female adults consume less cereal and fish than male adults.
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Table 6.7 : Estimates of the partially linear model
B,         (1)        (2)         (3)        (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)        (8)         (9)
age/102 -0.592 -0.026 -0.277 -0.306 -0.015 -0.246 0.052 0.111 0.027
(-2.64) (-0.16) (-2.36) (-3.18) (-0.71) (-2.46) (1.25) (1.75) (0.96)
ag.2/104 O.695 O.150 0.274 0.319 O.024 0.271 -O.099 -0.083 -O.037
(2.68) (0.78) (2.02) (2.87) (0.94) (2.33) (-2.07) (-1.12) (-1.18)
dcoast -0.009 -0.027 -0.050 -0.066 0.008 0.037 0.009 0.002 0.002
(-1.37) (-5.40) (-14.0) (-22.6) (12.4) (12.1) (7.04) (0.99) (2.30)
dmiddle -0.065 -0.025 -0.069 -0.080 O.005 0.018 0.005 0.003 O.000
(-12.3) (-6.29) (-25.1) (-35.5) (9.23) (7.70) (4.78) (1.75) (0.60)
num -0.083 -0.034 -0.027 -0.008 0.003 -0.012 -0.008 -0.012 -0.000
(-6.82) (-3.71) (-4.30) (-1.61) (2.39) (-2.24) (-3.41) (-3.41) (-0.04)
padu 0.036 0.035 -0.015 -0.005 -0.003 -0.017 0.001 -0.023   -
(-0.16) (2.10) (-1.31) (-0.47) (-1.24) (-1.67) (0.36) (-3.56)   -
pfadu -0.020 -0.035 0.007 0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.003 0.023
(-0.87) (-2.09) (0.60} (0.53) (-2.47) (0.45) (-0.66) (3.61) -
chU6 -0.047 0.061 -0.071 -0.046 0.001 -0.029 -0.020 0.018 0.002
(-1.08) (1.88) (-3.15) (-2.481 (0.16) (-1.50) (-2.52) (1.43) (0.32)
g"l6 0.001 -0.018 0.043 0.025 0.001 -0.010 0.004 -0.000 -0.005
(0.03) (-O.61) (2.08) (1.51) (O.14) (-O.55) (O.52) (-O.02) (-O 88)
childle' -0.036 0.045 -0.042 -0.025 -0.001 -0.013 -0.017 0.005 0.006
(-1.08) (1.81) (-2.39) (-1.78) (-0.16) (0.91) (-2.79) (0.48) (2.14)
gir£12* -0.005 -0.004 -O.003 -0.006 -O.000 -0.005 -0.000 O.004 -0.001
(-0.20) (-0.27) (-O.24) (-O.60) (-O.22) (-O.46) (-0.08) (O.69) (-O.31)
child15' -0.028 0.079 -0.064 -0.041 -0.004 -0.017 -0.013 -0.010 0.014
(-0.81) (3.08) (-3.56) (-2.79) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-1.99) (-1.07) (3.89)
giril 5 * -0.089 -0.067 -0.008 0.012 -0.003 0.013 -0.011 0.004 -0.001
(-2.79) (-2.81) (0.49) (0.88) (-0.93) (0.90) (-1.83) (0.49) (-0.11)
child18* -0.059 0.056 -O.053 -0.029 -O.007 -0.018 -O.020 -0.010 O.024
(-1.73) (2.19) (-2.97) (-1.96) (-2.00) (-1.16) (-3.22) (-1.07) (5.14)
gi,·118 * 0.002 -O.026 O.028 0.017 -O.002 0.003 -0.000 0.014 -O.018
(0,08) (-1.10) (1.68) (1.25) (-0.56) (0.45) (-0.07) (1.59) (-2.58)
p.p/9     - -        -        -        0.048
-            -            -            -            -             -            -            -            (6.05)
P.919     -       - -        -        -        -0.039
-            -            -            -             -            -            -            (-3.18)
p: 0.009 0.046 -0.028 -0.015 -0.011 0.007 -0.010 0.000 0.003
(0.93) (6.18) (-5.34) (-3.47) (-11.6) (1.59) (-5.48) (0.12) (1.81)
Note: 1. (1): Food, (2): Cereal: (3) Protein: (4): Meat; (5): Fish: (6): Vegetable:
(7)  Alcohol and tobacco; (8): Medical; (9): Education.
2.  t-values  are in parentheses
3.  All the estimates allow for endogeneity of total expenditures. See Table A6 in the
appendix for estimates under the assumption that total expenditure is exogenous.
* For education, the variables with '*' are replaced by the percentages of children attending
school in the same age groups, e L childle and girl12 are replaced by pup12 and p,912, etc.
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To test the sexual bias formally, we conducted two Wald tests for each commodity, the results
of which are in Table 6.8. One is to test the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of female-
member-related variables are zero -there is no bias between boys and girls for all the age groups.
For cereals. medical care, and education. the null hypothesis is rejected. The other is to test the
null hypothesis that the coefficients of all female-member-related variables are the same-the bias
is the same for all the age groups. This null hypothesis is rejected only for education.
The results in Table 6.7 give some interesting information beyond sexual bias. First, the fact
that all but one of the coefficients for household size (the variable num) are negative, suggests
economies of scale in household consumption.  A siniilar result was found by Bhalotra and Attfield
(1998) for rural Pakistan. Second, households in coastal and middle regions, ceteris paribus.
spend less than those in the western regions on cereals and meat, but more on fish, vegetables.
education, alcohol and tobacco. The differences might well be due to price differentials between
regions. For example, iii coastal area, the average price for fish reported by the households is
about 7.5 yuans, but it is about 8.4 guaris in western area. Finally, the endogeneity does not
seem to alter the estiinates of the family composition parameters systematically. In particular,
the signs and the significance of the estimates are largely unchanged.
The estimates for the model without correction for the endogeneity. are presented in Table 6.A
in the appendix. They are not very different from those in Table 6.7. Thus ignoring endogeneity
biases the elasticity estimates but not the conclusions on the other variables of interest or the
conclusions on sexual bias.
Table 6.8. Specification tests







Alco.& tab. 4.05 3.23
Medical 15.54* 6.49
Education 16.88* 12.89*
K2050(5) = 11.07 K205O(4) = 9.49
* Ho is rejected at 5% level
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6.5 Conclusions
We analyzed expenditure data from a cross-section household survey in rural China. We com-
pared parametric and semiparametric estimates of demand curves for nine expenditure categories:
food and several food categories, education, and medical expenses. Expenditure shares on these
categories are explained from total expenditure, family composition. and regional dummies. Ex-
penditures include self-consumption of home produced goods, which represents a substantial
share of total consumption in our sample.
It is likely that total expenditure is jointly determined with expenditure shares. We therefore
account   for  endogeneity of total expenditures, applying the 'augmented regression approach'.
It appears that for many goods. total expenditure is significantly endogenous. and failure in
correcting for endogeneity leads to substantial biases in some of the elasticity estimates.
We compare the linear Engel curve specification with a semiparametric partially linear model,
in which total expenditure enters in a flexible way. while the influence of demographics etc. re-
mains linear. Our semiparametric estimates of Engel curves suggest that Linear Engel curves
(or PIGLOG form Engel curves) are not suitable for most of the commodity categories we con-
sidered. Particularly in case of food, the linear model is clearly rejected by our data. This is in
contrast to findiiigs for tlie developed countries. The reasoii could be that our data contain a
large group of very low income households.
We find significant indicatioiis for econoinies of scale in consumption of seven out of nine
goods. The variation in consumption behavior among different geographic regions is also clearly
shown by the results.
We include dummies for the numbers of female children and adults in various age groups
to test for sexual bias. Hardly any discriminating effects between boys and girls are found in
the food consumption patterns. Probits for school enrolment suggest that boys have a larger
probability to go to school than girls of the same age. Moreover, conditional on enrolment, there
is evidence that educational expenditures for boys in the age groups 16 and older are larger
than for girls in the same age group. We find that the presence of adult female adults iii the
family significantly increases expenditures for medical care, which might imply that the health of
tliese females is neglected. These findings confirm the documented findings for other developing
countries that the sexual bias often manifests itself in other dimensions such as higher mortality




Table 6.A: Estimates of the partially linear model
(no correction for endogeneity)
3,       (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) (5) (6)      (7)      (8)      (9)
age/102 -0.593 -0.031 -0.274 -0.305 -0.014 -0.247 0.053 0.111 0.023
(-2.64) (-0.19) (-2.33) (-3.16) (-0.64) (-2.47) (1.27) (1 75) (0.80)
age«104 0.701 0.178 0.257 0.310 0.017 0.275 -0.105 -0.082 -0.030
(2.70) (0.92) (1.89) (2.78) (0.66) (2.37) (-2.19) (-1.12) (-0.98)
dcoast -0.013 -0.043 -0.040 -0.061 0.012 0.034 0.012 0.002 0.001
(-2.14) (-9.89) (-13.0) (-24.1) (21.0) (13.1) (11.4) (1.07) (1.62)
dmiddle -0.065 -0.028 -0.067 -0.079 0.006 0.018 0.005 0.003 0.000
(-12.5) (-7.18) (-24.5) (-35.3) (10 8) (7.55) (5.57) (1.75) (0.37)
nu771. -0.079 -0.012 -0.040 -0.015 0.002 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 0.001
(-6.99) (-1.46) (-6.83) (-3.16) (2.18) (-1.77) (-5.92) (-3,64) (0.83)
padit 0.057 0.025 -0.009 -0.001 -0.000 -0.018 0.004 -0.023   -
(-0.23) (1.51) (-0.80) (-0.14) (-0.13) 1-1.83) (0.88) (-3.59) -
pfadu -0.019 -0.032 0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.004 0.024    -
(-0.84) (-1.87) (0.38) (0.42) (-2.82) (0.50) (-(),84) (3.62)    -
ch,ld6 -0.044 0.077 -0.081 -0.051 -0.003 -0.027 -0.024 0.018 0.003
(-1.01) (2.38) (-3.58) (-2.46) (-0.77) (-1.38) (-2.96) (1.44) (().55)
*16 0.001 -0.017 0.042 0.025 0.000 -0.010 0.004 -0.000 -0.005
(0.03) (-0.59) (2.06) (1.50) (0.10) (-0.54) (0.51) (-0.02) (-0.87)
childl 2 * -0.035 0.050 -0.045 -0.027 -0.002 -0.013 -0.018 0.005 0.007
(-1.05) (2.03) (-2.58) (-1.91) (-0.57) (0.85) (-2.98) (0.49) (2.38)
91Ttle. -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.64) (-0.35) (-0,45) (-0.15) (0.69) (-0.30)
childls* -0.028 0.080 -0.065 -0.041 -0.004 -0.017 -0.013 -0.010 0.014
(-0.81) (3.10) (-3.57) (-2.80) (-1.21) (-1.11) (-2.00) (-1.07) (3.99)
giri 15* -0.091 -0.072 -0.011 0.014 -0.002 0.012 -0.010 0.004 -0.001
(-2.83) (-3.03) (0.69) (1.00) (-0.51) (0.84) (-1.63) (0.48) (-0.17)
ch,1418* -0.061 0.046 -0.047 -0.026 -0.004 -0.019 -0.018 -0.010 0.024
(-1.79) (1.80) (-2.63) (-1.75) (-1.26) (-1.26) (-2.88) (-1.08) (5.08)
glri  18* 0.003 -0.023 0.026 0.016 -0003 0.003 -0.001 0.015 -0.018
(0.10) (-0.95) (1.55) (1.17) (-0.82) (0.24) (-0.20) 0 59)  (-2.54)
pup 19     -       -       -       - - -         -         -         0.048
(6,02)
-0.039p.919      -        -        I        -
-              -              -              -              -              -              -              -              {-3.202
Note: 1. (1): Food: (2) Cereal: (3): Protein: (4): Meat: (5): Fish: (6): Vegetable:
(7) Alcohol and tobacco: (8): Medical: (9): Education.
2. t-values are in parentheses
* For education. the variables with ·*' are replaced by the percentages of children attending school
in the same age groups. e.g., childl 2 and 9,412 are replaced by puple and pug 12. etc.
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Figure  6.1 : Estimated Bivariate Kernel density of total expen-
ditures and disposable income per capita
Figure 6.2 : Nonparametrically estimated relationship between
total expenditures and disposable income per capita
, r
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Figure 6.3 : Nonparametrically estimated relationship between
food expenditures and disposable income per capita
.....
,  --I
5 -         \
I   - - -                                             /   /
Figure 6.4 : Semiparametrically estimated relationship be-
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Samenvatting
De vijf hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift zijn vijf empirische studies op het gebied van de micro-
econometrie. die betrekking hebben op verschillende maar verwante thenia's. Er worden drie
economische onderwerpen behandeld die te maken hebben niet de arbeidsmarkt en constimp-
tiegedrag. Hoofdstuk 2 en Hoofdstzik 3 gaan over de formele en de informele arbeidsmarkt in
stedelijke gebieden in Mexico. Het vierde en het vijfde hoofdstuk concentreren zich op het arbei-
dsaanbod van vrouwen in respectievelijk Mexico en in Nederland. Hoofdstuk 6 heeft betrekking
op consumptiegedrag van gezinnen op het Chinese platteland.
Bekeken vanuit een econometrische invalshoek, worden diverse micro-econometrische modellen
en technieken gehanteerd. De modellen in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 zijn modellen waarin
discrete afhankelijke variabelen en selectiviteit een rol spelen, en die geschat worden met behulp
van de maximale gesimuleerde aannemelijkheidsmethode. Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 behandelen statische
modellen voor dwarsdoorsnedegegevens, terwijl de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 gebaseerd zijn op dy-
namische modellen voor paneldata. De modellen in de Hoofdstukken 2,3 en 4 zijn parametrisch
van aard. Hoofdstuk 5 heeft een niet-parametrisch karakter en in het zesde hoofdstuk wordt een
semi-parametrisch model geschat met behulp van kern-schatters. Een gemeenschappelijk element
van al deze studies is dat ze betrekking hebben op micro-economisch gedrag van individuen of
huishoudens. De modellen zijn impliciet of expliciet gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat de
economische agenten zich optimaal gedragen, onder bepaalde restricties.
In de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 wordt arbeidsmarktmobiliteit in steden in Mexico onderzocht.
De arbeidsmarkt in steden in ontwikkelingslanden wordt in het algemeen gekenmerkt door de
aanwezigheid van een grote informele sector. Terwijl de werkgelegenheid in de formele sector
onderhevig is aan wettelijke regels. sociale premies en belastingen, met lonen die betaald wor-
den op reguliere basis en expliciete contracten tussen werkgevers en werknemers, is er in de
inforniele sector niet of nauwelijks sprake van institutionele beperkingen, en bestaat deze sector
voornamelijk uit micro-ondernemingen en kleine zelfstandigen.
De mate waarin de arbeidsmarkt gesegmenteerd is heeft een belangrijke invloed op bijvoor-
beeld de inkoinensverdeling en -ongelijkheid, en is daarom van belang voor economisch beleid.
168 Samenvatting
Het is dan ook niet verwonderlijk dat de laatste twintig jaar veel onderzoek naar arbeidsmarkt-
segmentatie gedaan is. Dit heeft geleid tot twee concurrerende visies. Fields (1975) ontwikkelt
een theoretisch model waarin werkgelegenheid in de formele sector gerantsoeneerd is. Degenen
die geen baan in de formele sector kunnen vinden, kunnen ervoor kiezen als werkloze naar een
baan te gaan zoeken. Als zij zonder werk echter niet financieel kuiinen rondkomen, gaan aan
het werk in de inforniele sector. De informele sector biedt in deze visie werkgelegenheid van se-
cundaire kwaliteit. en ieclereen die 111 de informele sector werkt, zou beter af zijn Inet een baan in
de formele sector. De informele sector fungeert als een buffer tussen werkloosheid en de formele
sector. Een van de implicaties van dit model is loondualisme: in evenwicht is voor iedereen het
loon in de informele sector lager dan in de formele sector. Het feit dat de informele sector een
buffer is heeft bovendien implicaties voor het patroon van mobiliteit tzissell de drie verschillende
arbeidsmarktposities (werkloosheid. formele sector en informele sector).
De andere visie beschouwt de twee sectoren als competitief. De formele en inforinele sector
hebben verschillende productiefuncties. en het feit dat werknemers heterogeen zijn impliceert
dat sommigen een grotere productiviteit in de ene sector hebben en anderen in de andere sector.
Onder de veronderstelling dat individuen vrij kunnen kiezen, en kiezen voor de sector waar ze het
hoogste loon kunnen verdienen. kan dit model getoetst worden met dwarsdoorsnedegegevens over
sectorkeuze en loonhoogte op individueel niveau (Heckman en Sedlacek, 1985). Magnac   (1991)
past een uitbreiding van dit model toe waarin ook non-participatie is nieegenomen op data van
gehuwde vrouwen in Colombia. Hij vindt dat de nulhypothese niet verworpen kan worden, en
concludeert dus dat de arbeidsmarkt in "zwak competitief evenwicht" is.
In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt de rol van de informele sector onderzocht vanuit dynamisch perspectief,
met nadruk op mobiliteit. Er worden kwartaaldata gebruikt van individuen in vijf grote steden in
Mexico. Er wordt gekeken naar overgangen tussen drie arbeidsmarktposities: werk in de formele
sector, werk in de inforniele sector, geen werk. Geanalyseerd wordt hoe de arbeidsmarktpositie en
de verandering daarin afhangt van individuele kenmerken, van inkomen vati overige leden van het
huishouden, en van de conjunctuur. Er wordt een gereduceerde vorm dynamisch multinomiaal
logit model voor panel data gebruikt, dat de arbeidsmarktpositie van elk individu in elk kwartaal
verklaart. Dit model  is een variant  op de eerste orde Markov modellen van Heckman ( 198la).
waarin expliciet onderscheid gemaakt wordt door structurele dynamische effecten (dummies voor
de vertraagde arbeidsmarktpositie) en niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit (individuele tijdsinvari-
ante  effecten). Voor iedereen belialve laag opgeleide mannen, wordt gevonden  dat  de  kans  om  in
de formele sector te blijven groter is dan de kans om in de informele sector te blijven. en dat de
overgangskans van informele sector naar informele sector groter is dan andersom. Samen met de
steekproefgemiddelden van de lonen iIi de verschillende sectoren, suggereert dit dat voor hoger
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opgeleiden, de primaire banen iii de formele sector te vinden zijn. Degenen met een secikiidaire
baan in de informele sector, hebben over het algemeen een laag overig gezinsinkomen en kunnen
het zich niet veroorloven helemaal niet te werketi. Dit stenit overeen met het buffermodel van
Fields ( 1975). Voor mannen en vrouwen  met  een laag opleidingsniveau wordt  een  heel  ander
resultaat gevonden. en blijkt de symmetrische  en competitieve visie meer relevant.
Een beperking van het model in Hoofdstuk 2 is dat het effect van de te verdienen lonen op de
sectorkeuze niet expliciet is opgenomen, waardoor loondualisme niet geanalyseerd kan worden.
Dit wordt anders in Hoofdstuk 3, waar (een deel van) dezelfde data worden gebruikt 0111 het
verband ttissen loonverschillen en sectormobiliteit te onderzoeken. Het model van Hoofdstuk 2
krijgt een meer structureel karakter:  het te verdienen loon in elke sector, speelt expliciet een rol iii
de sectorkeuze. Het model wordt hiertoe uitgebreid met loonvergelijkingen voor de formele en de
inforinele sector. Alle vergelijkingen worden gezanienlijk geschat met de maximale gesillizileerde
aannemelijkheidsmethode
De schattingen laten zien dat de lonen in beide sectoren toenemen met opleidingsniveau, maar
veel sterker in de formele sector dan iii de informele sector. Daardoor neemt het loonverschil
tussen formele en informele sector toe met opleidingsniveau. Ditzelfde loonverschil heeft een
sterk positieve invloed op de kans dat iemand in de formele sector werkt in plaats van in de
informele sector. Simulaties op basis van de modelschattingen laten zien dat daarnaast niet
geobserveerde heterogeniteit bepalend is voor de sectorkeuze en de overgangen van de eiie sector
naar de andere.
De Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 gaan over het arbeidsaanbod van vrouwen. Het gebruikte model
is een discreet structureel statisch arbeidsaanbodmodel. Het voornaamste verschil ten opzichte
van bestaande varianten is dat de loonvergelijking simultaan met het arbeidsaanbodmodel wordt
geschat. Het model kan worden gebruikt voor het schatten van arbeidsaanbodelasticiteiten en
voor dc analyse van de gevolgen van veranderingeri in belastingen en sociale uitkeringen voor het
arbeidsaanbod.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt arbeidsaanbod en participatie van gehuwde vrouwen in Mexic»staci.
Het arbeidsaanbod van de echtgenoot wordt als gegeven beschouwd. De nadruk ligt op elas-
ticiteiten en de invloed van gezinssamenstelling. De niet-gecompenseerde loonelasticiteit van het
aantal gewerkte uren wordt geschat op 0.87, de elasticiteit ten opzichte van overig inkomen op
-0.17. Deze schattingen sluiten  goed  aan  bij de bestaande literatuur. Gezinssamenstelling heeft
een statistisch significante maar niet erg grote invloed.  De aanwezigheid van een andere vol-
wassen vrouw in het huishouden. verhoogt het arbeidsaanbod van gehuwde vrouwen met jonge
kinderen. Deze resultaten zijn niet gevoelig voor de precieze modelspecificatie.
Hoofdstuk 5 heeft naast een enipirische ook een belarigri,ike niethodologische conipoitent. In
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dit hoofdstuk wordt aangetoond hoe in het structurele arbeidsaanbodmodel niet-parametrische
preferenties kunnen worden ingebouwd. Dit geeft aan dat niet-parametrische modellen ktinnen
worden gebruikt voor beleidsanalyse. iets wat in de literatuur nog weinig gedaan wordt.  De
directe nutsfunctie wordt in dit model benaderd door een polynoom. Voor gegeven graad van
de polynoom, kan het inodel geschat worden als een parametrisch model. Door de graad van de
polynoom te laten groeien. ontstaat een flexibele specificatie waarmee een willekeurige nutsfunctie
goed benaderd kan worden.
Het model wordt gescliat met data van gehuwde vrouwen in Nederland, voor polynomen van
verschillende lengte. De geschatte arbeidsaanbodelasticiteiten en de geschatte effecten van een
specifieke belastinghervorming zijn niet erg gevoelig voor de graad van de polynoom zolang de
polynoom minstens van graad twee is. Dit ondanks het feit dat het model van graad twee statis-
tisch gezien verworpen wordt ten opzichte van meer algemene modellen. Monte Carlo simulaties
laten zien dat de schattingsprocedure opmerkelijk goede eindige steekproefeigenschappen bezit.
Anderzijds leiden ze tot enige zorg over de gevoeligheid van de resultaten voor meetfouten in
gewerkte 1iren.
Het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 6 is de vraag naar consumptiegoederen.  In dit hoofdstuk
worden semi-paranietrische methoden gebruikt om Engel curven te schatten voor gezinnen op
het Chinese platteland. De vorni van de Engel-curven wordt onderzocht. en er wordt gekeken
naar verschillen in constimptiepatronen tussen gezinnen met zonen en gezinnen met dochters
in diverse leeftijdsgroepen.  Voor dit doel worden lineaire Engel curven vergeleken met een
semi-parametrisch partieel lineair model, waarin totale bestedingen op een flexibele manier zijn
opgenomen, terwijl daarnaast de invloed van demografische variabelen enz. lineair wordt veron-
dersteld. Omdat totale bestedingen simultaan bepaald kunrien zijn met budgetaandelen, wordt
toegelaten dat totale bestedingen endogeen zijn. Voor veel goederen blijkt dat inderdaad exo-
geniteit van totale bestedingen moet worden verworpen. Niet corrigeren voor endogeniteit leidt
in een aantal gevallen tot een Hinke vertekening van de schattingen van de elasticiteiten.
De semi-parametrische schattingen laten zien dat lineaire Engel-curven voor de meeste cate-
gorieiin goederen niet geschikt zijn. Iii het bijzonder geldt dat het lineaire model wordt verworpen
voor uitgaven aan voeding. Er worden significante schaalvoordelen gevonden voor zeven van de
negen goederen. De resultaten wijzen bovendien op grote variatie in consumptiepatronen tussen
regio's. Uitgaven aan voeding hangen nauwelijks af van het geslacht van de kinderen.  Wel
wordt gevonden dat de uitgaven aan leermiddelen etc. voor schoolgaande jongens groter zijn
dan voor schoolgaande meisjes in clezelfde leeftijdsgroep. Probit-resultaten laten bovendien zien
dat jongens eeii grotere kans hebben naar school te gaan dan ineisjes van dezelfde leeftijd. Deze
resultaten zijn in overeenstemming met resultaten in de literatuur voor andere ontwikkelingslan-
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den.
De bevindingen in dit proefschrift leiden tot enkele algemene conclusies. Hoewel gereduceerde
vorm modellen normaal gesproken gemakkelijker kunnen worden geschat en minder veronder-
stellingen vereisen dan structurele vorm modellen, zijn ze niet altijd consistent met de economis-
che theorie en maken ze het niet altijd mogelijk de effecten te schatten waarin de onderzoeker
geinteresseerd is. Anderzijds hebben structurele modellen - als ze goed gespecificeerd zijn - een
gezonde economische basis, en geven ze meer inzicht in wat van belang is voor beleidsanal-
yse. Dit wordt bijvoorbeeld geillustreerd door het verschil tussen de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3. Het
(gereduceerde vorm) model van Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat opleidingsniveau van invloed is op
sectorkeuze en -mobiliteit: het (structurele) model van Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat dit verklaard
kan worden uit de invloed van het verschil tussen de te verdienen lonen. De Hoofdstukken 4
en 5 laten zien hoe niet-lineaire belastingen en vaste kosten kunnen worden meegenomen, en
illustreren daarom wederom de voordelen van een structureel model.
Eeii tweede algemene conclusie heeft betrekking op de tegenstelling tussen gerestringeerde
parametrische specificaties en flexibele. semi-parametrische of niet-parametrische specificaties.
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat een lineair model vaak duidelijk verworpen wordt door de data. Hoofd-
stuk 5 en Hoofdstuk 6 tonen aan dat ook flexibele specificaties bruikbaar zijii voor beleidsrelevante
analyses, en dat niet- en semi-parametrische technieken veel meer zijn dan statistische teclinieken
om de data te beschrijven.
Al met al beogen de studies in dit proefschrift een bijdrage te leveren aan het overbruggen
van de kloof tussen beleidsrelevant economisch onderzoek en statistisch verantwoord enipirisch
onderzoek.
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